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Abstract 
Most individuals experience a traumatic event at least once in their life but only a minority 
develops persistent symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Thus, pre-traumatic 
factors exist that increase vulnerability to PTSD. Identifying them is important to extend etio-
logical models and to develop effective prevention programs. One pre-traumatic risk factor 
that has received particular attention in recent years is impaired cognitive control, defined as a 
decreased ability to maintain and regulate goal-directed behavior in the face of changing envi-
ronmental demands. Although a considerable body of research reported associations between 
cognitive control impairments and PTSD, there is a lack of research investigating whether 
these impairments precede symptom development and whether manipulating them changes 
symptomatology. However, these conditions need to be met to label impaired cognitive con-
trol as a causal risk factor for PTSD. The major goal of this thesis is to fill this gap by exam-
ining temporal precedence as well as effects of manipulated cognitive control on PTSD symp-
toms in analogue and clinical samples. In particular, the studies presented in this thesis follow 
two different methodological approaches in influencing cognitive control—transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) and cognitive control training—and focus on posttraumatic intru-
sive re-experiencing as the main criterion. Additionally, they investigate the causal role of 
impaired cognitive control for posttraumatic rumination, a maladaptive processing style that 
maintains symptomatology. 
     Using the trauma film paradigm as an experimental equivalent, study I and study II aimed 
to manipulate cognitive control via tDCS over a brain region that is central to the cognitive 
control network—the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)—and to explore effects on 
film-related intrusive memories (study I & II) and rumination (study I) in healthy individuals. 
Furthermore, both studies examined whether impaired pre-stressor cognitive control was 
linked to increased post-stressor intrusive memories or rumination. Study I relied on the uni-
ty/diversity framework to operationalize cognitive control and focused on resistance to proac-
tive interference—i.e. the inhibition of no-longer relevant information in working memory—
as the relevant cognitive control function. N = 118 healthy women completed the modified 
California Verbal Learning Test assessing resistance to proactive interference twice—before 
and during 20-minutes tDCS (1mA; anodal, cathodal, or sham). Following tDCS, participants 
watched a trauma film and intrusive memories and rumination were measured after a 10-
minutes resting period. There were no effects of tDCS on resistance to proactive interference 
and intrusive memories or rumination. Moreover, no significant correlations between these 
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measures emerged. Study II was designed to meet some methodological shortcomings of 
study I. This study used a similar design but relied on the dual mechanisms of control frame-
work to define cognitive control. The dual mechanisms of control framework conceptualizes 
cognitive control as operating by two distinct modes: proactive control that is actively main-
taining goal-relevant information to anticipate interferences, and reactive control that is goal 
reactivation only in response to interferences. To date, no study has tested whether deficits in 
proactive control are related to intrusive memories. N = 121 healthy men and women per-
formed the AX-Continuous Performance Task—an established measure of proactive con-
trol—during 20-minutes tDCS (1 mA; anodal, cathodal, or sham), watched a trauma film, and 
reported intrusive memories after a 10-minutes filler task. There were no effects of tDCS on 
proactive control or intrusive memories. Moreover, decreased pre-stressor proactive control 
was not linked to increased post-stressor intrusive memories.  
     In contrast to the analogue designs in study I and II, study III focused on a clinical sample 
of N = 33 PTSD patients and investigated the effects of a 6-session cognitive control training 
on intrusive re-experiencing, rumination (repetitive negative thinking and brooding), and 
comorbid depressive symptoms. In this double-blind, randomized, controlled pilot study, par-
ticipants were assigned to either a cognitive control training designed by Siegle et al. (2007) 
or a placebo training and tested at three time points (baseline, post, 1-month follow-up). The 
cognitive control training consisted of the adaptive Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task and 
Wells’ Attention Training. All participants showed a significant reduction in intrusive re-
experiencing, rumination defined as repetitive negative thinking, and comorbid depression 
after the training. However, training groups did not differ in these effects. Furthermore, only 
the placebo group reported a significant reduction in rumination defined as brooding. Addi-
tionally, there were no training effects on cognitive transfer tasks. 
     In sum, this thesis aimed to overcome the limitations of previous research by shedding 
light on causal associations between impaired cognitive control and intrusive re-experiencing 
as well as posttraumatic rumination. The study findings presented in this thesis question the 
role of deficient cognitive control for PTSD and thus contribute to our knowledge on risk fac-
tors that might influence the development of posttraumatic stress symptoms. Of course, meth-
odological shortcomings, especially with regard to the manipulation of cognitive control, 
must be taken into account when interpreting the obtained results and are discussed. Moreo-
ver, implications for theoretical models and methodological approaches as well as directions 
for future research on cognitive control in PTSD are outlined. 
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“Tell me, sweet lord, what is't that takes from thee 
Thy stomach, pleasure and thy golden sleep? 
Why dost thou bend thine eyes upon the earth, 
And start so often when thou sit'st alone? 
Why hast thou lost the fresh blood in thy cheeks; 
And given my treasures and my rights of thee 
To thick-eyed musing and cursed melancholy? 
In thy faint slumbers I by thee have watch'd, 
And heard thee murmur tales of iron wars; 
Speak terms of manage to thy bounding steed; 
Cry 'Courage! to the field!' And thou hast talk'd 
Of sallies and retires, of trenches, tents, 
Of palisadoes, frontiers, parapets, 
Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin, 
Of prisoners' ransom and of soldiers slain, 
And all the currents of a heady fight. 
Thy spirit within thee hath been so at war 
And thus hath so bestirr'd thee in thy sleep, 
That beads of sweat have stood upon thy brow 
Like bubbles in a late-disturbed stream; 
And in thy face strange motions have appear'd, 
Such as we see when men restrain their breath 
On some great sudden hest. O, what portents are these?(…)” 
               — Shakespeare: Henry IV, Part 1 (2.3.39-67) — 
      
     The observation that individuals suffer from serious emotional, behavioral, and cognitive 
disturbances after exposure to a life-threatening event is as old as mankind. From The Iliad by 
Homer to All Quiet on the Western Front by Remarque, classic literature offers numerous 
examples that illustrate the way in which traumatic experiences affect an individual’s well-
being (Weisaeth, 2014). Most impressively, in his history play Henry IV, Part 1, William 
Shakespeare (1598) lets Lady Percy bewail the condition of her husband after combat 
exposure, thereby providing one of the most accurate descriptions of posttraumatic stress 
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symptoms in the history of literature. Today, this symptom constellation is labeled 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and is defined in the most recent version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 2013, p. 271-272) by 
the following core criteria: persistent intrusive re-experiencing of the traumatic event 
(intrusive memories; nightmares; flashbacks; emotional distress in response to trauma 
reminders; physical reactivity to trauma reminders), avoidance of trauma-related internal or 
external reminders, alterations in mood and cognitions (deficits in recalling features of the 
traumatic event; negative assumptions about oneself or the world; exaggerated blame of self 
or others; negative affect; diminished interest in activities; feelings of isolation; diminished 
positive affect), and hyperarousal/reactivity (irritability or aggression; risky behavior; 
hypervigilance; heightened startle reaction; concentration disturbances; sleep disturbances).  
     Although posttraumatic stress symptoms have been well-known for many centuries, the 
acceptance of PTSD as an official diagnosis has been controversial. It has found its way into 
diagnostic systems not until 1980, being greatly influenced by the conditions of war veterans 
as well as women protests against institutional responses to rape victims (e.g., Friedman, 
Resick, & Keane, 2014). Part of this controversy came from the assumption that a strong 
mental reaction to life-threatening events is a natural coping mechanism, thereby questioning 
the legitimacy of disability claims (Weisaeth, 2014). Epidemiological research clearly 
disproved this assumption and demonstrated that trauma exposure is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the development of PTSD: although experiencing traumatic events is 
part of human existence, most people do not suffer from posttraumatic stress symptoms in the 
direct aftermath of the event or they recover quickly within a few days or weeks (Friedman et 
al., 2014). For example, in Germany 24.2 % of individuals deal with a life-threatening event 
at least once in life, but 1-month prevalence rate of PTSD is only 2.3 % (Mearcker, 
Forstmeier, Wagner, Glaesmer, & Brähler, 2008). Thus, some individuals seem to be more 
vulnerable, more often fail to recover from the initial stress reaction, and experience more 
severe and persistent posttraumatic stress symptoms than others. As a consequence, 
identifying vulnerability factors has become an important focus in trauma research to better 
understand the origins of PTSD and extend etiological models but also to reduce individual 
and socioeconomical costs by developing prevention programs. A number of pre-traumatic, 
peri-traumatic, and post-traumatic factors that might influence PTSD were discussed in recent 
years. Especially the identification of pre-traumatic risk factors, defined as experiences or 
characteristics of the traumatized individual that existed prior to the traumatic event, is 
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challenging due to methodological and ethical restrictions. To date, female gender, young age, 
low socioeconomic status, and a history of mental disorders have been linked to more adverse 
trauma responses (Vogt, King, & King, 2014, for an overview). Additionally, the systematic 
investigation of cognitive impairments in war veterans with posttraumatic stress symptoms 
led to the conclusion that neurocognitive factors could also play a role in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD. Hence, in combination with the inclusion of neuroscientific methods 
into clinical psychology, trauma researchers are paying more and more attention to the 
neurocognitive underpinnings of PTSD, thereby translating basic cognitive models into 
clinical research approaches. In this context, one of the most studied but also most critically 
discussed factors that might be responsible for symptom variability in trauma survivors is 
impaired cognitive control, the main subject of this thesis. 
Cognitive control as a multiple-named, multifaceted construct 
     A man arrives at a train station early in the morning. While buying a train ticket, he chats 
with an old lady waiting next to him. Reaching for his purse, he finds a note with the number 
“25” written on it in this bag. Suddenly, he remembers that his colleagues had asked him to 
buy a bouquet of flowers for 25 euros today and to bring it to the office as a birthday present 
for their boss. Since there is no flower shop near his office, he has to buy it at the train 
station. Hurrying to the next flower shop, a man with an e-roller crosses his way. Luckily, he 
can stop in front of him and avoids a crash. In this moment, his colleague calls and tells him 
to spend only 15 euros for the flowers and to buy marguerites. Thus, the man walks into the 
next flower shop, briefly checks whether they are offering marguerites, orders a bouquet for 
15 euros, and runs back to get the next train.   
     From coordinating behavior in response to changed goals to stopping automated actions to 
integrating new information—the described example illustrates that everyday situations 
require the constant, purposeful regulation of thoughts and actions. This ability is known as 
cognitive control and involves engaging in, maintaining, and regulating goal-directed 
behavior in the face of distracting information or changed situational demands (for overviews 
see Cohen, 2017; Goschke, 2014). Different names for this construct have been established, 
for example, “executive functions”, “central executive”, “attentional control”, “supervisory 
attention system”, or “frontal lobe mechanisms” (e.g., Baddeley, 1983; Miyake et al., 2000; 
Shallice, 1988; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). However, in this thesis, the term “cognitive 
control” will be used for the sake of simplicity. Although researchers across disciplines agree 
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that cognitive control is central to adaptive human functioning, there is still disagreement 
about its operationalization. Whereas some authors suggested cognitive control to be a unitary 
construct, relying on a single component, modern theories highlight the diversity of domain-
specific cognitive control functions and propose different models to define the organization of 
these functions (Cohen, 2017). Two of these models are central to this thesis: the 
unity/diversity framework (Miyake et al., 2000) and the dual mechanisms of control (DMC) 
framework (Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). 
The unity/diversity framework 
     The unity/diversity framework is a descriptive model of the relation between three 
cognitive control functions: updating and monitoring of representations in working memory 
(“updating”), shifting between multiple tasks, goals, operations, or mental sets (“shifting”), 
and inhibition of automatic or dominant responses (“inhibition”) (Miyake et al., 2000). For 
instance, in the example described above, organizing behavior for buying flowers and 
incorporating the new price information as well as which flowers to buy requires monitoring 
and updating of working memory. Buying a ticket while chatting with the old lady requires 
shifting and stopping in front of the e-roller to avoid a crash requires inhibition. However, in 
this example all three cognitive control functions seem to be intertwined. Indeed, using latent 
variable analyses, Miyake and colleagues (2000) found that updating, shifting, and inhibition 
are neither identical nor independent but best described as three separate but correlated 
factors. Thus, cognitive control is not seen as a unique construct but consists of three 
distinguishable functions (= diversity) that share an underlying similarity (= unity). 
Additionally, modifications of this model were proposed. First, by performing latent-variable 
analyses on inhibition-related tasks, Friedman and Miyake (2004) reported that inhibition of 
automatic or dominant responses is closely related to inhibition of interference from goal-
irrelevant information (e.g., in the example, screening for marguerites between other flowers). 
Furthermore, both functions differ from inhibition of information that had been but is no 
longer relevant—known as resistance to proactive interference (e.g., ordering a bouquet for 15 
instead of 25 euros). Hence, inhibition does also include diversity. Second, Miyake and 
Friedman (2012) suggested an alternative bifactor model. This bifactor model assumes each 
cognitive control function to consist of what is common across the three functions and of what 
is specific to this particular function. Interestingly, updating-specific components—reflecting 
controlled information gating or retrieval in working memory—and shifting-specific 
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components—reflecting cognitive flexibility—have been reported (Miyake & Friedman, 
2012). However, the researchers could not find inhibition-specific components when 
including a common factor into the model. Thus, they described the common factor as the 
capability to maintain goal-relevant despite goal-irrelevant information, an ability that might 
also be central to inhibition. Importantly, the unity/diversity framework is not comprehensive, 
as other components of cognitive control might also exist, and should not be interpreted as the 
overall basics of cognition (Friedman & Miyake, 2017). Nevertheless, especially the original 
model has been established as a useful taxonomy of cognitive control functions to guide the 
examination of cognitive control in PTSD in recent years.  
The dual mechanisms of control framework 
     In contrast to the unity/diversity framework, the DMC framework (Braver, 2012; Braver et 
al., 2007) is a theory-driven model based on cognitive and brain research. It highlights the 
temporal dynamics of cognitive control and describes performance in cognitive tasks as a 
result of task parameters and individual traits (Braver, 2012). In particular, the DMC 
framework postulates that cognitive control operates in two distinct modes: proactive and 
reactive. Whereas the proactive control mode involves active maintenance of goal 
representations to anticipate disturbances, the reactive control mode is transient and operates 
in response to interferences from the environment or salient trigger events. According to 
Braver (2012), a proactive control mode can be described as “early selection” and a reactive 
control mode as “late correction”. Adaptive cognitive functioning needs a mixture of both 
modes for a positive costs-benefits trade-off. In this regard, context plays an important role, 
defined as specific information that influence the selection of responses (Braver, 2012). 
Context representations in working memory bias attention towards goal-relevant information. 
For proactive control, these context representations have to be sustained over longer periods 
of time, but for reactive control, context representations only occur as needed. Thus, proactive 
control needs reliable contextual cues from the environment, is more resource-demanding, 
and not feasible in very long intervals between goal formation and realization (Braver et al., 
2007). In contrast, reactive control is disadvantageous when failure has to be avoided as it 
depends on interfering events or salient triggers and when individuals are confronted with no-
longer relevant goals or information (Braver et al., 2007). In the example described above, a 
reactive control mode would involve the representation of the goal to buy flowers only after it 
is formed, i.e. when his colleagues had asked him the evening before. Thus, it might not be 
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accessible when the man arrives at the train station and when he spends the last minutes 
before train departure chatting with the old lady. It is only retrieved by a salient trigger, for 
example, finding the note before boarding the train. In contrast, a proactive control mode 
would involve the continuous maintenance of the goal from the evening before to buying the 
flowers before train departure. Thus, behavior can be adjusted to meet the goal, for example, 
by arriving earlier at the train station to have enough time or by not chatting with the old lady. 
However, it has been found that individuals differ in their deployment of proactive and 
reactive control when performing highly demanding tasks (Braver, 2012). These differences 
are thought to result from selective impairments in one of both control modes and therefore 
from an imbalance in dual mechanisms (Braver, 2012). Interestingly, Friedman and Miyake 
(2017) assumed that the common factor within the bifactor model of the unity/diversity 
framework is similar to a proactive control mode. Moreover, performance in working memory 
tasks seems to rely on proactive control, since memory items have to be maintained and 
updated over a certain period of time (Braver, 2012). However, despite the conceptual clarity 
of the DMC framework and its link to the unity/diversity framework, the model has been 
applied less frequently in cognitive and clinical research and has not yet been investigated in 
the context of PTSD. 
Brain regions associated with cognitive control  
     As important but also as controversial as the organization of cognitive control functions is 
their neuronal foundation. Based on lesions studies, neuroimaging, and computational 
modelling, cognitive control has mainly been associated with activation in the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), but also with cingulate and parietal cortices (e.g., Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, 
Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Stuss, 2011). To converge information 
and to guide complex behavior, these regions interact with sensory and motor systems, as well 
as subcortical systems such as the basal ganglia and the limbic system (Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Miyake & Friedman, 2012, for overviews). Especially the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have been discussed to play the most critical 
roles in this network, providing top-down control for organizing, monitoring, and adapting 
goal-oriented actions and orchestrating cognitive control functions (e.g., Mansouri, Tanaka, & 
Buckley, 2009; Niendam et al., 2012; Robinson, Calamia, Gläscher, Bruss, & Tranel, 2014). 
     Within the unity/diversity framework, no specific assumptions on the involved brain 
regions have been made (Friedman & Miyake, 2017; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). 
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Empirically, manipulating information in working memory has frequently been linked to 
activation of the dlPFC and the ACC (e.g., Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Kim, Kroger, 
Calhoun, & Clark, 2015; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Activation in the 
dlPFC has also been related to performance in shifting tasks, besides activation in the inferior 
frontal gyrus, the parietal cortex, and the medial frontal cortex (e.g., Kim, Cilles, Johnson, & 
Gold, 2012; Sylvester et al., 2003). Additionally, performance in inhibition tasks has been 
associated with activation in the dlPFC, the ACC, and the inferior frontal gyrus as well as 
partly with ventrolateral, orbitofrontal, and parietal regions (e.g., Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2004; Blasi et al., 2006; Fassbender et al., 2004; Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007; Warren et al., 
2013). However, it must be noted that neuroscientific research on cognitive control is 
extensive and has also produced conflicting results. Thus, also less convincing evidence for 
the dlPFC’s involvement in inhibition and shifting tasks exist (see also Aron et al., 2004; 
Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004). In contrast to the unity/diversity framework, the DMC 
framework makes predictions on the location and temporal dynamics of neural activity 
associated with proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012; Chiew & Braver, 2017). 
Proactive control should be related to sustained activation of the lateral PFC as a top-down 
bias that maintains context representations. In contrast, reactive control should be linked to 
rapid, transient activation of the lateral PFC prior to responding but also to additional regions 
such as the ACC and the posterior cortical or medial temporal lobe areas. In particular, this 
transient activation should “reflect the bottom-up reactivation of task goals, mediated either 
via the detection of interference (…) or via associative and episodic associations” (Braver, 
2012, p. 2). 
Linking cognitive control to PTSD: model suggestions 
     If cognitive control is indeed a factor that influences PTSD symptom development, there is 
a need for conceptual models specifying through which pathways this factor should operate. 
In a systematic review of neuropsychological studies, Aupperle, Melrose, Stein, and Paulus 
(2012) proposed such a model. They suggested that exposure to a traumatic event increases 
attention towards trauma-related internal or external stimuli in all individuals, but only 
individuals with pre-traumatic impaired cognitive control should experience difficulties in 
inhibiting attention and responses to these stimuli. As a result, these individuals should be 
constantly confronted with internal and external trauma reminders, a process that sustains re-
experiencing and hyperarousal. To deal with this confrontation, coping strategies such as 
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avoidance are applied. Avoidance in turn reduces the engagement in rewarding or pleasurable 
activities, an effect that should foster emotional numbness or social isolation. Thus, this 
model provides an explanation of why individuals differ in posttraumatic stress symptoms by 
combining findings from attention and cognitive control research. Moreover, it explains the 
development of hallmark symptoms of PTSD. Nevertheless, the model follows a relative 
unspecific approach that is not integrated into established theories of PTSD or cognitive 
control, a limitation that also applies to most cognitive control literature on PTSD. To deal 
with this limitation, potential pathways by which cognitive control may influence symptom 
development with regard to two famous etiological models will be exemplified in the 
following. In particular, these suggestions will focus on intrusive memories as a key re-
experiencing symptom of PTSD.  
Example I: Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of PTSD 
     Intrusive memories are brief, vivid, and recurring recollections of the traumatic experience, 
mostly occurring in the form of sensory fragments of the event (Marks, Franklin, & Zoellner, 
2018, for an overview). A famous theory that explains the manifestation of intrusive 
memories in the aftermath of a trauma is Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of PTSD (2000). 
This model assumes that intrusive memories develop when individuals process the traumatic 
experience in a way that elicits a continued sense of threat. This continued sense of threat 
results from individual differences in the appraisal of the traumatic event and/or its 
consequences as well as in the nature of the trauma memory and its integration into 
autobiographical memory. More specifically, Ehlers and Clark (2000, p. 325) suggested that 
the trauma memory is “poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into its context in time, 
place, subsequent and previous information and other autobiographical memories”. Thus, 
sensory-perceptual details about the traumatic event are encoded without context or 
conceptual organization, leading to a here-and-now threat experience when the memory is 
activated. Furthermore, due to strong stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-reaction associations, 
representations of the trauma memory can be easily and automatically triggered by a number 
of internal and external cues (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Hence, pre-traumatic cognitive control 
functions that supervise contents of working memory might help individuals to ignore 
distracting cues and to stay focused on activated goals. In terms of the unity/diversity 
framework, the relevant cognitive control functions might be updating of working memory 
and inhibiting dominant responses or goal-irrelevant information and resisting to proactive 
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interference (see also Bomyea, Amir, & Lang, 2012). Moreover, Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
argued that maladaptive coping strategies such as avoidance should impede inhibitory 
learning, thereby aggravating intrusive re-experiencing (Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 
2004). If cognitive control supports individuals in dealing with trauma cues repeatedly and 
successfully, activation levels of trauma memory should decrease, resulting in increased 
inhibitory learning (see also Wessel, Huntjens, & Verwoerd, 2010) and decreased symptoms. 
In this way, cognitive control might contribute to a constant symptom reduction in the 
aftermath of a traumatic event. In contrast, deficient cognitive control might disturb this 
process, thereby increasing the likelihood that intrusive re-experiencing persists in the 
aftermath of the event. Additionally, the DMC framework has proposed that individuals with 
anxiety disorders who monitor their environment for external or internal cues of threat more 
often rely on a cost-efficient reactive instead of a proactive control mode (Chiew & Braver, 
2017). It has also been demonstrated empirically that threat perception increases reactive 
control and impairs proactive control by occupying working memory capacity (e.g., Yang, 
Miskovich, & Larson, 2018). The continued sense of threat assumed by Ehlers and Clark’s 
model might also reduce proactive control in trauma survivors. This imbalance in control 
modes might in turn decrease the maintenance of goal-relevant information and might 
enhance a shift of attention towards trauma-related distractors, therefore supporting persistent 
intrusive memories. However, individuals with pre-traumatic impairments in proactive control 
might be per se more sensitive to background monitoring and threat-relevant goal-incongruent 
features of the environment (Chiew & Braver, 2017), might have more difficulties in 
maintaining activated goals, and might also have less resources to attenuate the cognitive 
imbalance further elicited by threat perception, thereby being predisposed for symptom 
evolvement.  
Example II: dual representation theory 
     Another theory that focuses on the development of intrusive memories is the dual 
representation theory, a model that connects established concepts of PTSD with results from 
cognitive neuroscience (Brewin, 2008; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, Gregory, 
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). Brewin and colleagues (2010) distinguished two separate but 
parallel-operating representational systems in memory: on the one hand, contextual memory 
representations (C-reps) that are contextually bound, deliberately retrieved, and can be 
integrated into semantic memory. They enable individuals to verbally communicate a 
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traumatic experience and to reappraise the event in a meaningful way. Moreover, at the 
neurological level, C-reps are associated with brain regions that are responsible for 
contextualizing memories such as the hippocampus and are controlled by top-down processes 
of the PFC. On the other hand, sensation-based memory representations (S-reps) cannot be 
deliberately retrieved but are low-level, isolated, and easily triggered by internal or external 
cues. S-reps involve emotional and autonomic components linked to the amygdala as well as 
brain regions that are directly related to perception rather than higher order prefrontal control. 
Brewin (2008) postulates that intense stress exposure during a traumatic event increases 
amygdala and decreases hippocampal activity. Therefore, it should lead to strong S-reps and 
weak C-reps. However, in traumatized but healthy individuals S-reps should be connected to 
C-reps of the traumatic event. Thus, the trauma memory can be integrated within an 
autobiographical context and is susceptible to top-down control of the PFC. In contrast, 
intrusive memories should result from the formation of a persistent S-rep that is poorly 
connected to a corresponding C-rep and therefore lacks contextualization and top-down 
control. Constant avoidance of trauma cues is thought to maintain this disintegration. Dual 
representation theory itself specifies the role of the PFC and of top-down cognitive control. 
When healthy individuals deliberately recall a traumatic event, visual imagery is activated via 
C-reps directed by PFC-related cognitive control mechanisms that support, for example, the 
inhibition of specific retrieval cues or the differentiation of contexts similar to the traumatic 
events (Brewin, 2008). However, individuals with decreased pre-traumatic activity in the PFC 
and diminished cognitive control functions such as inhibition (unity/diversity framework) or 
proactive control (DMC framework) might experience visual imagery to be more often 
activated bottom-up by S-reps and to be less successfully regulated. Moreover, this process 
might also increase avoidance and block integration, therefore further consolidating 
posttraumatic stress symptoms. 
     These model suggestions aimed to exemplify the pathways by which persistent intrusive 
memories might be causally influenced by pre-traumatic impaired cognitive control as defined 
within the unity/diversity framework, the DMC framework, or neuropsychological 
approaches. However, with the proposition of theoretical pathways, the question emerges 
whether empirical evidences support a causal relation between cognitive control deficits and 
PTSD symptomatology. 
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From theoretical models to empirical evaluation: constituting causality in 
cognitive control research on PTSD 
     PTSD is the only DSM-5 diagnosis that requires the identification of an etiological 
factor—the experience of a traumatic event—and is therefore outstanding in the 
conceptualization of mental disorders (APA, 2013). However, given the unpredictability of 
traumatic events, this requirement implies serious methodological and ethical challenges for 
research on causal relations between pre-traumatic cognitive control and PTSD symptoms. 
Nonetheless, clarifying causality is essential: Diminished cognitive control empirically 
observed in PTSD patients might be a cause or a consequence of posttraumatic stress 
symptoms or both might reinforce each other. For example, regarding the DMC framework, a 
proactive control mode consumes cognitive resources. Impaired proactive control possibly 
found in PTSD patients might also result from distress due to posttraumatic stress symptoms 
that reduce capacity for proactive control after the traumatic event. Moreover, reduced 
performance in cognitive control tasks might be a consequence of distracting posttraumatic 
symptoms. Additionally, impaired cognitive control prior to the trauma might interact with 
acquired disturbances after the trauma, with subtle pre-traumatic differences in cognitive 
control transforming into more severe impairments and leading to a vicious cycle of depleted 
cognitive resources and symptom reinforcement. Thus, causal relations need to be 
determined. To define what makes a potential risk factor a causal risk factor, Vogt and 
colleagues (2014) transferred the definition of causal risk factors by Kraemer and colleagues 
(1997) to trauma research. They stated that a causal risk factor in PTSD should meet the 
following criteria:  
(1) It is associated with PTSD symptoms, 
(2) temporally precedes PTSD symptoms as demonstrated by longitudinal or experimental 
designs,  
(3) and can be manipulated and this manipulation induces symptom changes. 
     Even when these criteria are fulfilled, causality remains a probabilistic construct. Thus, the 
true causal mechanisms accounting for the effect of a risk factor can never be stated with 
absolute certainty (Vogt et al., 2014). Nevertheless, evaluating whether cognitive control 
deficits meet the criteria of a causal risk factor would clearly extend our understanding of the 
disorder and underpin the theoretical models postulated above. Hence, recent research as well 
as research gaps will be summarized in the following. 
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(1) Cross-sectional research on cognitive control in PTSD  
     When reviewing the literature, it becomes evident that findings on cognitive control 
deficits in PTSD samples are inconsistent and differ between studies but also within studies. 
On the one hand, this lack of consistency might result from most studies not including a 
conceptual model of cognitive control or PTSD, thereby choosing specific cognitive control 
tasks only in terms of availability. On the other hand, differing outcomes might be explained 
by characteristics of specific cognitive control tasks or the explored trauma sample. Thus, 
meta-analyses that cumulate evidence across independent studies and take methodological 
variance into account should offer the best overview. Polak, Witteveen, Reitsma, and Olff 
(2012) pooled effects across 18 studies and found that PTSD patients perform significantly 
worse on measures of cognitive flexibility and working memory than trauma-exposed healthy 
controls and significantly worse on measures of cognitive flexibility and inhibition than 
trauma-unexposed healthy controls. However, subgroup characteristics influenced these 
results. Cognitive control deficits were more pronounced in individuals with war 
traumatization, male gender, higher age, and comorbid depression. Polak and colleagues 
(2012) suggested that severity of symptoms might explain these findings. For example, 
studies that included war combat patients reported higher symptom severity than studies with 
other trauma samples and men usually experienced more war traumatization. Importantly, this 
meta-analysis focused on a small subset of circumscribed cognitive control measures. For 
instance, only studies that assessed inhibition using the Stroop task or working memory 
updating using a simple digit span task had been included. In addition to Polak and colleagues 
(2012), Scott and colleagues (2015) applied meta-analytic techniques to investigate deficits 
associated with PTSD in nine broader neurocognitive domains across 60 studies. Besides 
attention/working memory and cognitive control, these domains also included verbal learning, 
verbal memory, visual learning, visual memory, language, speed of information processing, 
and visuospatial abilities. The researchers reported an overall medium effect size across 
domains, with also significant medium effect sizes for deficits in attention/working memory 
and cognitive control in PTSD patients. Specifically, these effect sizes were independent of 
trauma type, trauma exposure of the control group, symptom severity, age, or comorbidities. 
However, effect sizes were influenced by treatment seeking status of participants, comorbid 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, IQ, and male gender. Lastly, Woon, Farrer, Braman, 
Mabey, and Hedges (2017) recently evaluated whether PTSD symptom severity is a potential 
moderator of the link between PTSD and cognitive control in an analysis of 14 studies. In 
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accordance with previous research, PTSD patients showed mild-to-moderate impairments in 
cognitive control as compared to trauma-exposed and trauma-unexposed healthy controls. 
However, there was no moderating effect of PTSD symptom severity.  
    In conclusion, although inconsistencies exist (see also Danckwerts & Leathem, 2003, for an 
overview), meta-analyses on the current body of cognitive research indicate cognitive control 
deficits in PTSD patients as compared to healthy controls. These meta-analyses offer 
important insights into general cognitive control impairments associated with PTSD. 
However, they barely inform on specific cognitive control functions. Cognitive control was 
used as an unitary construct (Scott et al., 2015; Woon et al., 2017) or neurocognitive tasks 
were included that rely on a variety of cognitive control domains (Polak et al., 2012), making 
it difficult to draw general conclusions on single functions as defined within the 
unity/diversity framework. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no research has 
systematically investigated cognitive control deficits in light of the DMC framework.  
(2) Longitudinal and experimental research on temporal precedence 
     A major issue of recent cognitive research in PTSD is that most findings are based on 
cross-sectional data. This approach answers the question whether cognitive control is indeed 
diminished in PTSD patients but it states nothing about temporal dynamics. Although 
longitudinal research is challenging and expensive, a few studies examined whether cognitive 
control deficits precede symptom evolvement. Nevertheless, the number of studies that 
focused on cognitive control instead of general intelligence and additionally excluded 
individuals with mild brain injuries is scarce. In a large epidemiological study on a 
community-based sample of young adults, Parslow and Jorm (2007) reported that individuals 
with lower scores in cognitive tasks that measured verbal recall, working memory, and 
visuomotoric speed prior to a natural disaster showed more intrusive re-experiencing 
afterwards. However, the results were not controlled for pre-traumatic PTSD symptom levels. 
Furthermore, Marx, Doron-Lamarca, Proctor, and Vasterling (2009) administered a 
neuropsychological test battery in a military sample and reported that diminished pre-
deployment visual memory recall performance but not verbal memory, sustained attention, 
working memory, or response inhibition predicted PTSD symptoms after deployment. 
Interestingly, the effect was strongest in individuals with PTSD existing before deployment, a 
result that might support the assumption that cognitive impairments can be a risk factor but 
also a consequence of PTSD.  
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     In addition to longitudinal research with PTSD samples, experimental research with 
healthy individuals also provides insights into temporal precedence. These approaches 
typically use paradigms that expose healthy individuals to laboratory stressors and assess 
subsequent intrusive memories. Especially the trauma film paradigm has been established as a 
useful prospective tool in recent years (e.g., Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016, for 
overviews). In this paradigm, healthy participants complete cognitive tasks, watch a film 
fragment that depicts stressful or traumatic events, and specify the number of intrusive 
memories either during a short period of time at the laboratory or via an intrusive memory 
diary. Research administering the trauma film paradigm indicated that post-film intrusive 
memories are related to pre-film deficits in resistance to proactive interference (Verwoerd, 
Wessel, de Jong, Nieuwenhuis, & Huntjens, 2011; Wessel, Overwijk, Verwoerd, & de Vrieze, 
2008). Besides the trauma film paradigm, alternative approaches typically instruct participants 
to describe the most distressing experience of their life. Following this approach in the context 
of cognitive control, Verwoerd, Wessel, and de Jong (2009) showed that low resistance to 
proactive interference but no other inhibition-related measures predicted intrusive memories 
of the experience. Again, these findings can be integrated into the unity/diversity framework, 
but research on the DMC framework is missing.  
     In conclusion, prospective research on the link between cognitive control and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms is scarce. Whereas clinical research in different trauma 
samples has produced inconsistent findings, analogue research pointed towards the role of 
inhibition—especially resistance to proactive interference—and working memory updating 
for intrusive memories.  
(3) New directions: manipulating cognitive control in the context of PTSD  
     The research findings described so far indicate that cognitive control deficits are not only 
associated with PTSD in general and intrusive memories in particular, but might also precede 
symptomatology. However, as stated by Kraemer and colleagues (1997), to determine 
whether a risk factor causally influences a target construct, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
a manipulation of the risk factor changes the target. To date, there is a lack of research 
addressing cognitive control manipulations in PTSD. Therefore, this thesis presents two 
methodological approaches that might help filling this gap.  
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     First, a large body of research suggests that cognitive control can be manipulated by 
altering neuronal activity in related brain regions, for example via transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS). TDCS is a well-established, safe, non-invasive, and effective method to 
modulate neuronal activity, cognition, and even behavior. Although the physiological effects 
of tDCS are complex and not entirely clear, tDCS is generally assumed to act by polarity-
dependent hyper- or depolarization of resting membrane potentials (e.g., Nitsche & Paulus, 
2001; Priori, 2003; Wassermann & Grafman, 2005). Importantly, tDCS does not trigger 
action potentials but rather changes membrane permeability and synaptic transmission by 
increasing/decreasing firing rate. More specifically, electric current flows from the positive 
anode to the negative cathode (Tremblay et al., 2014). Thus, anodal stimulation is assumed to 
cause increases in neuronal excitability and spontaneous firing rates by depolarizing resting 
membrane potentials, whereas cathodal stimulation leads to the opposite effect (Bestmann, de 
Berker, & Bonaiuto, 2015). These effects should persist for at least one hour, even after 
stimulation (Nitsche et al., 2008). In recent years, it has been shown that prefrontal cathodal 
tDCS has the ability to diminish cognitive control, and prefrontal anodal tDCS has the ability 
to enhance cognitive control in healthy individuals, especially in tasks measuring working 
memory updating and inhibition (e.g., Andrews, Hoy, Enticott, Daskalakis, & Fitzgerald, 
2011; Brunoni & Vanderhasselt, 2014; Fregni et al., 2005; Hoy et al., 2013; Wolkenstein, 
Zeiller, Kanske, & Plewnia, 2014). In contrast, tDCS research on the DMC framework is 
limited (Gómez-Ariza, Martin, & Morales, 2017). However, no study has yet examined 
whether tDCS-induced alterations in cognitive control might also affect intrusive memories. 
This is surprising since previous research indicated structural and functional abnormalities 
associated with PTSD that parallel brain regions associated with cognitive control, for 
example, hypoactivation of the lateral PFC or the ACC (e.g., Aupperle et al., 2012; Hayes, 
VanElzakker, & Shin, 2012; Kühn & Gallinat, 2013; Patel, Spreng, Shin, & Girard, 2012; 
Pitman et al., 2012). Moreover, studies investigating the treatment effect of repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation in PTSD patients demonstrated that neurostimulation of a 
brain region associated with cognitive control, the dlPFC, can influence re-experiencing 
(Boggio et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2004; Watts, Landon, Groft, & Young-Xu, 2012). Thus, 
using prospective analogue designs that manipulate activation levels in prefrontal brain 
regions via tDCS and that test effects on cognitive control, intrusive memories, and their 
interactions would be a novel approach and extend our knowledge on causal relations.  
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     Another approach to manipulate cognitive control is examining the effects of cognitive 
control trainings. There is converging evidence that training procedures can alter cognitive 
control and psychopathology across disorders (Koster, Hoorelbeke, Onraedt, Owens, & 
Derakshan, 2017; Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007, for overviews). However, research in the 
context of PTSD is limited. Only a few studies have tested whether cognitive control trainings 
influence posttraumatic stress symptoms in healthy (Bomyea & Amir, 2011; Callinan, 
Johnson, & Wells, 2015; Nassif & Wells, 2014) or clinical (Bomyea, Stein, & Lang, 2015) 
samples. The general principle of these trainings is that performing multiple sessions of a 
computerized cognitive control paradigm should modulate cognitive control functions. These 
modulated functions should then translate into improvements in the specific cognitive control 
paradigm, into transfer effects on other cognitive paradigms, and into reductions in 
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Typically, the effects of a cognitive control training are 
compared to a placebo training not focusing on cognitive control. Although all of the existing 
training studies reported beneficial effects on posttraumatic stress symptoms such as intrusive 
re-experiencing, they differ in training targets. Based on results from analogue studies, some 
researchers explored a training that focused on resistance to proactive interference. Bomyea 
and Amir (2011) reported improvements in working memory updating as well as in intrusive 
memories during a thought suppression task after one session of this training in healthy 
individuals. Moreover, Bomyea and colleagues (2015) demonstrated beneficial effects on 
working memory updating and intrusive re-experiencing after eight sessions of this training in 
women diagnosed with PTSD. In both studies the training was compared to a less-intensive 
control training. Other researchers examined Wells’s Attention Training, a cognitive 
paradigm that involves prefrontal activation and controlled selective attention despite 
automatic cognitions. Testing healthy individuals, Nassif and Wells (2014) and Callinan and 
colleagues (2015) reported significant effects of two sessions of this training (plus optional 
homework sessions) on intrusive memories in response to a recording of a distressing event, 
as compared to a placebo training consisting of a filler task. Although differing in training 
targets and assessments of intrusive memories, both approaches focused on training tasks that 
included neutral stimuli. In contrast, Schweizer and colleagues (2017) showed that performing 
twenty sessions of a working memory training with standardized trauma-related words and 
pictures of negatively valenced faces increased response inhibition and decreased 
posttraumatic stress symptoms in adolescents with PTSD. However, approaches with trauma-
related material do not inform about the role of more basic cognitive control functions. 
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     Taken together, both—tDCS and cognitive trainings—are important avenues for 
experimentally manipulating cognitive control and help to further shed light on causality in 
posttraumatic stress symptomatology. Thus, both approaches will be followed in the studies 
presented in this thesis. 
Rumination as an additional target of cognitive control manipulations  
     As mentioned above, intrusive memories include the short, involuntary, sensory reliving of 
the traumatic event itself. Equally aversive but phenomenologically and functionally distinct 
is rumination, defined as uncontrollable, repetitive, verbal thinking about the causes and 
consequences of the traumatic event for a longer period of time (Michael, Halligan, Clark, & 
Ehlers, 2007). Rumination typically appears in the form of “why” and “what if” questions, for 
example about how the event could have been prevented or whether something similar could 
happen again (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Thus, it also differs from intrusive memories in the type 
of cognition, as rumination does not include recollections but evaluative thoughts (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008). Importantly, rumination is not a key symptom of PTSD but a maladaptive 
cognitive processing style that maintains symptomatology. According to the cognitive model 
by Ehlers and Clark (2000), trauma survivors might ruminate to gain control over the 
perception of current threat and the experience of distressing symptoms and to escape 
intrusive memories by focusing on the traumatic event in a more abstract way. However, 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) assume that this is counterproductive as rumination might directly 
produce further posttraumatic stress symptoms by inducing negative affective states and 
providing internal cues for intrusive memories. Moreover, rumination might prevent change 
in posttraumatic stress symptomatology by further strengthening negative appraisals and by 
interfering with the completion of the fragmented trauma memory as it does not include 
recapitulating the details of what actually happened (Ehlers & Cark, 2000). Additionally, 
rumination has been identified as a core risk factor for depression (e.g., Spasojević & Alloy, 
2001). Therefore, it might also contribute to the development of comorbid depressive 
symptoms.  
     In general, there is accumulating evidence that rumination is cross-sectionally associated 
with PTSD (e.g., Ehring, Frank, & Ehlers, 2008; Michael et al., 2007; Razik, Ehring, & 
Emmelkamp, 2013) and represents a powerful predictor of posttraumatic stress symptoms 
such as intrusive re-experiencing in the aftermath of a traumatic event (e.g., Ehring & Ehlers, 
2014; Ehring et al., 2008; Michael et al., 2007; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; Wild et al., 
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2016). For example, in a recent meta-analysis, Szabo, Warnecke, Newton, and Valentine 
(2017) reported a moderate, positive relationship between rumination and posttraumatic stress 
symptoms in trauma-exposed individuals, with effects being strongest for intrusive re-
experiencing. Additionally, analogue research in healthy samples showed that experimentally 
manipulating rumination results in more intrusive memories (Ball & Brewin, 2012; Ehring, 
Fuchs, & Kläsener, 2009; Zetsche, Ehring, & Ehlers, 2009). However, given the significance 
of rumination as a maintaining factor for PTSD, the question is what drives trauma survivors 
to engage in rumination despite its negative effect? As mentioned above, Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) assumed rumination to be a consequence of problematic appraisals, in contrast to 
intrusive memories that mainly result from specific characteristics of the trauma memory. 
However, research from other clinical domains such as depression or emotion regulation also 
suggested that reduced cognitive control makes individuals more susceptible to ruminative 
thinking. Thus, cognitive control impairments might also causally influence rumination in 
trauma survivors and therefore further sustain persistent posttraumatic stress symptoms. 
     In recent years, different theories were proposed that link impaired cognitive control to 
rumination (e.g., Vălenaş & Szentágotai-Tătar, 2017, for an overview). For example, Linville 
(1996) suggested that deficient inhibition might increase the risk that thoughts become 
repetitive by failing to guard working memory against information or thoughts that are 
irrelevant to currently pursued goals. Moreover, reduced inhibition might make it more 
difficult to remove activated information that is no-longer relevant from working memory. 
Furthermore, according to the impaired disengagement hypothesis postulated by Koster, De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, and De Raedt (2011), rumination might be a normal phenomenon but 
becomes pathological if it persists over a longer period of time. Especially decreased 
cognitive control might hinder the disengagement of attention from cued negative or self-
referring thoughts and the inhibition of negative, goal-irrelevant information, thereby 
prolonging the processing of activated negative or self-referent material. Although referring to 
rumination in healthy or depressed individuals, these approaches can be transferred to 
rumination associated with PTSD. As described above, impaired cognitive control might 
make it more difficult for trauma survivors to ignore distracting trauma-related cues, to stay 
focused on activated goals, and to control contents of working memory, thereby facilitating 
persistent intrusive memories. In a similar way, deficient cognitive control might influence 
the control of stimuli that trigger rumination such as external stressors or negative affect. 
Additionally, cognitive control deficits might also be the reason why individuals get stuck in 
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recurrent ruminative thinking. Rumination does not consist of the short, sensory reliving of 
the trauma but is a type of thinking that persists over a longer period of time. In contrast to 
intrusive memories, reduced cognitive control might especially hinder individuals to stop 
ruminative thoughts once they have emerged by gaining control over contents of working 
memory, inhibiting trauma-related, self-referring thoughts, or shifting to alternative contents 
or evaluations. Thus, in terms of the unity/diversity framework, updating of working memory, 
inhibition, and shifting might be relevant for rumination. 
     Indeed, rumination has been empirically associated with impairments in cognitive control 
(e.g., Bernstein, Heeren, & McNally, 2017; De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; Pe et 
al., 2012; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013; Zetsche, D’Avanzato, & Joormann, 2012; Zetsche & 
Joormann, 2011). Three meta-analyses investigated the role of particular cognitive control 
functions. Yang, Cao, Shields, Teng, and Liu (2016) as well as Vălenaş and Szentágotai-Tătar 
(2017) reported significant relations between rumination and deficits in inhibition as well as 
shifting but no associations with working memory. Moreover, Zetsche, Bürkner, and Schulze 
(2018) demonstrated that individuals who frequently engage in rumination show particular 
deficits in removing no-longer relevant information from working memory. However, 
previous research did not focus on rumination in PTSD. Furthermore, causality must be 
clarified. According to the resource depletion account, ruminative thinking might also occupy 
cognitive resources, reduce capabilities for exerting cognitive control, and decrease 
performance in cognitive control tasks (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002). 
Hence, impaired cognitive control might also be a consequence but not a cause of frequent 
ruminative thinking. Fortunately, in contrast to cognitive research on posttraumatic stress 
symptoms, the examination of causal directions in the context of rumination has been 
extensively followed in recent years. For instance, tDCS was shown to influence ruminative 
thinking by targeting the dlPFC (De Raedt, Remue, Loeys, Hooley, & Baeken, 2017; 
Vanderhasselt, Brunoni, Loeys, Boggio, & De Raedt, 2013) and cognitive control trainings 
were proven to be effective for altering rumination (Koster et al., 2017; Mor & Daches, 2015, 
for overviews). Nevertheless, all of these results stem from healthy or depressed samples, not 
examining the causal link between rumination and cognitive control in the context of PTSD.  
     In conclusion, as rumination is a maintaining factor for posttraumatic stress symptoms and 
has been linked to impaired cognitive control, exploring whether modulating cognitive control 
does also affect posttraumatic rumination would clearly extend etiological models of PTSD. 
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Thus, although the main focus on this thesis is to further examine causal associations between 
impaired cognitive control and intrusive re-experiencing as a key symptom of PTSD, 
additional measures of rumination will be integrated in some of the studies presented in this 
thesis.  
Aim of the present thesis 
     The major goal of this thesis is to investigate the causal association between impairments 
in cognitive control and posttraumatic stress symptoms. In particular, this thesis addresses the 
questions whether a modulation of cognitive control influences intrusive re-experiencing and 
whether poor cognitive control precedes symptom development. Additionally, this thesis also 
focuses on the role of cognitive control for rumination, an important maintaining factor of 
PTSD symptomatology. Three studies are presented; two analogue studies with healthy sam-
ples exploring the effects of tDCS and one clinical study with a PTSD sample exploring the 
effects of a cognitive control training.  
     Study I and study II combine the trauma film paradigm with the tDCS approach. Both 
studies aim to manipulate a brain region that is related to cognitive control and to assess its 
effects on cognitive control as well as the development of intrusive memories after a trauma 
film. Furthermore, study I also measures post-film rumination. In both studies, the left dlPFC 
is chosen as the target brain region given its significance for cognitive control and its 
susceptibility to neuromodulation. A between-group design is used to compare the effects of 
anodal and cathodal tDCS with a sham stimulation group. Additionally, correlations between 
pre-stressor cognitive control and post-stressor intrusive memories or rumination are 
explored. The major difference between both studies is the theoretical framework to define 
cognitive control. Study I follows the unity/diversity framework and, based on recent 
analogue research, focuses on resistance to proactive interference as a specific cognitive 
control function. This study investigates whether tDCS on the left dlPFC influences resistance 
to proactive interference and film-related intrusive memories or rumination in a sample of 118 
women. Moreover, this study aims to replicate the well-established correlations between 
resistance to proactive interference and intrusive memories or rumination. In contrast, study II 
follows the DMC framework and focuses on proactive and reactive control as cognitive 
control functions. More specifically, effects of tDCS over the left dlPFC on proactive control 
and film-related intrusive memories as well as associations between both are examined in 121 
men and women. These studies extend earlier research by exploring relations between 
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activation in the left dlPFC, two different conceptualizations of cognitive control, and 
intrusive memories/rumination in healthy individuals. The idea of combining tDCS with the 
trauma film paradigm is novel and has not been studied before. Furthermore, to date no study 
has tested the DMC framework in the context of intrusive memories.  
     Study III follows the training approach and examines whether a cognitive control training 
including neutral material influences intrusive re-experiencing, rumination, and comorbid 
depressive symptoms in 33 PTSD patients. In this double-blind, randomized, controlled pilot 
study patients are assigned to either a 2-week cognitive control training designed by Siegle 
and colleagues (2007) or a placebo training and tested at baseline, post training, and a 1-
month follow-up. The training consists of Wells’s Attention Training and the adaptive Paced 
Auditory Serial Addition Task, tasks that already demonstrated to influence cognitive control, 
intrusive memories, and rumination in healthy and depressed individuals. Study III is the first 
investigation that transfers the established training by Siegle and colleagues (2007) to a PTSD 
sample. Despite answering the question whether modulating cognitive control affects 
posttraumatic intrusive re-experiencing and rumination, this study also aims to explore the 
suitability of the training as a short and easy-to-administer cognitive intervention in patients 
waiting for psychological treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Study I 
 
 
Does Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Affect Post-stressor 
Intrusive Memories and Rumination? An Experimental Analogue Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in  
Cognitive Therapy and Research. 
 
Voss, M., Ehring, T., & Wolkenstein, L. (2019). Does Transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation Affect Post-stressor Intrusive Memories and Rumination? An Experimental 
Analogue Study. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 43(3), 535-549. 
 
The final authenticated version is available online at www.springerlink.com  with 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-018-9976-8. 
Study I: TDCS effects on Intrusive Memories and Rumination 
34 
Abstract 
Deficits in cognitive control have been linked to intrusive memories after traumatic life 
events as well as rumination. However, causal relations are still unclear. Causality can be 
investigated by directly influencing a brain region associated with cognitive control via 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). In this study, we investigated the effects of 
tDCS over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) on one aspect of cognitive 
control—resistance to proactive interference (PI)—as well as on intrusive memories and 
rumination. Using a between-subject design, we expected active tDCS to affect intrusive 
memories and rumination by influencing resistance to PI. N = 118 healthy individuals 
completed the modified California Verbal Learning Test twice, once without stimulation 
and once during 20-minutes tDCS (anodal, cathodal, or sham). Following tDCS, 
participants watched a trauma film; afterwards, intrusive memories and rumination were 
assessed. TDCS neither affected resistance to PI nor film-related intrusive memories or 
rumination. Furthermore, individuals with low resistance to PI did not experience more 
intrusive memories or rumination. These results question the role of the left dlPFC as well 
as the well-established link between resistance to PI and intrusive memories. Future 
studies are needed to replicate these findings and to address possible methodological 
shortcomings of this study.  
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Introduction 
     Natural disasters, armed conflicts, accidents, or interpersonal violence: Many 
individuals experience a life-threatening event at least once in their life. However, only a 
minority develops persistent symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including 
trauma-related intrusive memories and rumination (Kilpatrick et al., 2013). Intrusive 
memories are unwanted recurring memories of the traumatic event that often take the form 
of sensory fragments of the experience (APA, 2013). In contrast, rumination is a 
maladaptive processing style that is experienced as uncontrollable repetitive verbal 
thinking about the trauma, its causes, and consequences (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehring et 
al., 2008). Both phenomena include difficulties in controlling unwanted memories and/or 
thoughts that grab an individual’s attention and affect current behavior. There is growing 
evidence that these difficulties are linked to individual differences in cognitive control as a 
basic cognitive mechanism (Aupperle et al., 2012; Joormann, Yoon, & Siemer, 2010; 
Polak et al., 2012; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). 
     Cognitive control comprises meta-level functions that are associated with working 
memory and keep thoughts or actions focused on goals despite goal-irrelevant 
interferences (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Since traumatic representations in long-term 
memory are easily activated by internal or external cues, cognitive control is needed to 
prevent them from intruding into consciousness and from interfering with goal-directed 
behavior (Wessel et al., 2008). Thus, individuals with limited cognitive control might be 
unable to ignore those cues and therefore experience persistent intrusive memories. 
Furthermore, persistent rumination might be maintained by a limited capacity to update 
cued negative representations in working memory and to inhibit currently irrelevant 
information (e.g., Brinker, Campisi, Gibbs, & Izzard, 2013; De Lissnyder et al., 2012; 
Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; Zetsche et al., 2012). Indeed, associations of intrusive 
memories and rumination with deficits in cognitive control have been empirically 
demonstrated across clinical and healthy samples (e.g., Beckwé, Deroost, Koster, De 
Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2014; Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005; Joormann 
& Gotlib, 2008; Klein & Boals, 2001; Polak et al., 2012). However, causality remains 
unclear: pre-trauma deficits in cognitive control might be a risk factor for intrusive 
memories and rumination, but intrusive memories and rumination might also induce stress 
levels that in turn reduce performance in cognitive control tasks.  
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     Establishing causality in the context of post-trauma symptomatology is difficult. It 
requires the manipulation of relevant processes either pre- or shortly post-trauma, a 
procedure that posits serious practical and ethical challenges. Therefore, the trauma film 
paradigm if often used as a laboratory analogue, whereby healthy individuals are 
confronted with a film depicting traumatic situations. In doing so, stressor-related 
intrusive memories and rumination can be assessed, and their modulation by experimental 
manipulations of key processes can be tested (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Earlier studies 
have used the trauma film paradigm to investigate the relationship between cognitive 
control and the development of intrusive memories (e.g., Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et 
al., 2008). These studies have focused on resistance to proactive interference (PI), a 
specific aspect of cognitive control that describes the inhibition of information that is no-
longer relevant in working memory (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). For example, Verwoerd 
and colleagues (2011) showed that a poor ability to resist PI, as measured by a modified 
California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT), is linked to more intrusive memories one week 
after watching a trauma film in a healthy sample. Thus, first evidence suggests that low 
ability to overcome PI might be a vulnerability factor for intrusive memories after a 
stressful event. Nevertheless, due to the design of previous studies, it cannot be ruled out 
that both, PI and intrusive memories, are affected by a third variable and thus do not 
causally influence each other. 
     Therefore, the present study aimed at modulating activation in a brain region that is 
associated with cognitive control and, in particular, resistance to PI to investigate causal 
effects on intrusive memories and rumination. A well-established method to induce such a 
modulation is transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). This safe, non-invasive, and 
effective method manipulates cortical excitability in a specific brain area by hyper- or 
depolarization of resting membrane potentials (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Priori, 2003; 
Wassermann & Grafman, 2005). Whereas cathodal stimulation decreases cortical 
excitability, anodal stimulation increases cortical excitability. When applied for several 
minutes, these tDCS-induced changes persist for at least one hour (Nitsche et al., 2008). 
We proposed the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) to be a promising target brain 
area for such a modulation, for a number of reasons. 
     Firstly, cognitive control in general but also interference resolution in particular are 
linked to frontal cortices, with the dlPFC being an important component of this network 
(e.g., Blasi et al., 2006; Bunge, Ochsner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001; Curtis & 
D’Esposito, 2003; Dulas & Duarte, 2016; Nee et al., 2007; Postle, Berger, Goldstein, 
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Curtis & D’Esposito, 2001; Postle, Brush, & Nick, 2004; Wolf, Walter, & Vasic, 2010). 
For example, Wolf and colleagues (2010) used a PI task with varying contextual demands 
and investigated corresponding activity in different brain regions. They proposed that 
increased cognitive control exerted by the left dlPFC is relevant for decreasing 
susceptibility to PI. Secondly, the dlPFC has been associated with controlling unwanted 
memories and thoughts as well as with symptoms of PTSD (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; 
Arnsten, Raskind, Taylor, & Connor, 2015; Clark et al., 2003). For instance, in a 
suppressing versus recalling task of memory contents, healthy individuals showed greatest 
dlPFC activation when intrusive memories needed to be controlled and individuals with 
negative coupling between dlPFC and hippocampus during early suppression attempts 
experienced fewer intrusive memories later on (Benoit, Hulbert, Huddleston, & Anderson, 
2014). Thirdly, beneficial effects of anodal tDCS and detrimental effects of cathodal tDCS 
over the left dlPFC on cognitive control have been documented in previous research 
(Andrews et al., 2011; Fregni et al., 2005; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013; Wolkenstein et 
al., 2014; Zaehle, Sandmann, Thorne, Jancke, & Herrmann, 2011). Moreover, it has been 
shown that the effect of anodal tDCS over the left dlPFC on state rumination, as measured 
several minutes after stimulation termination, is mediated by an enhancement of cognitive 
control in healthy individuals (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). In sum, in the current study we 
focus on the left dlPFC as there is consistent evidence that it plays a major role in 
cognitive control, including resistance to PI. However, it should of course be noted that 
resistance to PI and the control of intrusive memories and rumination can be expected to 
be supported by a complex inhibitory network, involving different brain regions that might 
also be promising targets for tDCS in future research (e.g., Anderson, Bunce, & Barbas, 
2015; Badre & Wagner, 2005; Blasi et al., 2006; Caplan, McIntosh, & De Rosa, 2007; 
D'Esposito, Postle, Jonides, & Smith, 1999; Feredoes, Tononi, & Postle, 2006; Johnson, 
Saykin, Flashman, McAllister, & Sparling, 2001; Kühn, Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, & 
Gallinat, 2012; Nee, Jonides, & Berman, 2007). 
     Overall, the major goal of this randomized, sham-controlled, double-blind analogue 
study was to identify causal relations between cognitive control and intrusive 
memories/rumination in a healthy sample. To achieve this goal, we manipulated the 
activity of the left dlPFC via anodal and cathodal tDCS and explored the impact of this 
manipulation on resistance to PI as an indicator of cognitive control. We hypothesized 
cathodal tDCS to decrease and anodal tDCS to increase resistance to PI, compared to 
sham stimulation (H1). Furthermore, we examined offline effects of tDCS on intrusive 
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memories and rumination after a trauma film to further clarify the role of pre-stressor 
differences in cognitive control for re-experiencing. As mentioned above, tDCS effects 
last for at least one hour (e.g., Nitsche et al., 2008) and offline designs have been used 
successfully in former studies (e.g., Dedoncker, Brunoni, Baeken, & Vanderhasselt, 
2016a; Hill, Fitzgerald, & Hoy, 2016; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; Wolkenstein et al., 
2014). We predicted cathodal tDCS to increase and anodal tDCS to decrease intrusive 
memories (H2) and rumination (H3) after a trauma film, compared to sham stimulation. 
Finally, we assumed that higher resistance to PI is associated with less intrusive memories 
(H4) and less rumination (H5) after the trauma film.  
Methods 
Design, randomization, and blinding 
     This randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled analogue study followed a between-
subject design with the between-factor stimulation condition (anodal vs. cathodal vs. 
sham). For resistance to PI, time point was an additional within-subject factor (pre vs. post 
tDCS). Allocation to stimulation condition was randomized via automated randomization 
software (randomizer.org). For blinding, all participants were informed that they would be 
randomly assigned to one of three stimulation conditions. These conditions would include 
20 minutes of stimulation but vary in electrode placement and stimulation intensity. The 
application of predefined codes to start the stimulator further allowed for a computerized 
double-blind assignment to the sham or verum condition.  
Sample 
     N = 120 healthy women between 18 and 40 years were recruited via advertisements at 
LMU Munich. Two participants were excluded due to violations to the study protocol. The 
final sample consisted of 118 women with a mean age of 23.32 (SD = 4.46). Exclusion 
criteria were diseases of the central nervous system; cardiovascular, respiratory and 
neuroendocrine diseases; seizures; first-degree relatives suffering from epilepsy; a history 
of traumatic brain injury; metallic particles around the head; a cardiac and cerebral 
pacemaker, cochlea implants and hearing aid devices; strong allergic reactions to sensing 
electrodes; current pregnancy; left-handedness as assessed by a version of the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971); psychotropic medication; a substance use 
disorder with less than 2 years of abstinence; a history of psychiatric disorders as assessed 
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by the M.I.N.I. International Neuropsychiatric Interview for DSM-IV (Ackenheil, Stotz-
Ingenlath, Dietz-Bauer, & Vossen, 1999) and the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; 
Krüger-Gottschalk et al., 2017); and a history of psychological treatment. Inclusion 
criteria were an educational qualification of university entrance diploma or higher and 
sufficient knowledge of the German language. We solely included females to preclude 
effects of gender. The administered stressful film fragment depicted the rape of a woman 
and thus might be differently processed by male compared to female participants. All 
participants signed informed consent and were reimbursed with 30 Euros or course credit. 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee and was conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.  
TDCS 
     A direct current of 1 mA was delivered via a battery-driven stimulator (NeuroConn 
GmbH, Ilmenau, Germany) and a pair of 0.9 % NaCL-soaked sponge electrodes (35cm2 
surface). One electrode was placed on the scalp over F3 according to the international 10-
20 system of electrode placement. The reference electrode was placed on the right deltoid 
muscle. The current was applied for 20 minutes plus a 5 second fade-in and fade-out 
phase. The sham stimulation also lasted 20 minutes with the current being applied only for 
the first 30 seconds and then ramped down. Thus, a temporary tingling experience 
comparable to that induced by verum stimulation was elicited. Active tDCS was only 
applied during the assessment of resistance to PI and not during the film or the assessment 
of intrusive memories and rumination.  
Stressful film fragment 
     Participants watched a 14-minutes fragment from "Irréversible" by Gaspar Noé 
depicting an extreme sexual and physical abuse of a woman. This fragment has been 
frequently used in trauma film research (Arnaudova & Hagenaars, 2017, for an overview). 
All participants were explicitly informed in the study advertisement and in the informed 
consent that they would be exposed to a film with violent content. The film was presented 
on an 18-inch screen in a darkened room.  
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Outcome measures  
     Resistance to PI. We used a modified version of the CVLT (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & 
Ober, 1987) as used by Verwoerd and colleagues (2011) to assess resistance to PI. This 
task was applied with identical parameters on both time points. The test contained two 
word lists. List 1 consisted of ten names of vegetables, ten names of animals and ten 
names of flowers. List 2 consisted of ten new names of vegetables, ten new names of ani-
mals and ten names of musical instruments. Hence, the two lists shared the categories 
vegetables and animals. Both lists were matched on word frequency. The order of the two 
lists was counterbalanced between participants. First, participants were presented the 
words of List 1 in a randomized order on the computer screen for 1000 ms each, with a 
1000 ms inter-stimulus interval. They were instructed to learn the words to the best of 
their ability. This phase was followed by a 4 minute free-recall phase in which participants 
had to speak out loud all words they could remember. The examiner documented the re-
sponses. Second, learning and free recall of List 1 were repeated, with participants being 
instructed to learn and recall more words than during the first trial. Third, participants 
again completed the procedure of the first trial but with List 2. Following Verwoerd and 
colleagues (2011), we computed a PI index as a measure of resistance to PI. We multiplied 
the total number of words recalled on Trial 1 with the total number of shared category 
words that were recalled on Trials 1 and 2. Next we divided this outcome by the total 
number of words recalled on Trials 1 and 2 and finally subtracted the number of shared 
words recalled from List 2 (PI = ((total recall Trial 1 × (recall shared words Trial 1 + Trial 
2))/ (total recall Trial 1 + total recall Trial 2)) - recall shared words List 2). Higher values 
on this index indicate poorer resistance to PI. 
     Post-film intrusive memories. We assessed the occurrence of intrusive memories after 
the film by a 6-item questionnaire based on Weidmann and Papsdorf (2010). The ques-
tionnaire began with a short definition of intrusive memories. Subsequently, participants 
were asked to indicate how often they had experienced intrusive memories during the rest-
ing period. They also indicated the percentage of time (from 0 to 100) they had experi-
enced intrusive memories and the predominant quality of them (“thought”, “image”, 
“short film scene”, “feeling”, “sound”, “something else”, “I do not know”, “I did not have 
intrusive memories”). Additionally, level of distress caused by the intrusive memories, 
level of vividness of the intrusive memories and level of control were rated on a 6-point 
Likert-scale (1 = “not at all” to 6 = “very”). 
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     Post-film rumination. Rumination after the film was assessed by a modified version 
of the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011). Six items from 
the original version of the PTQ were excluded because they referred to thoughts unlikely 
to occur after watching films. The remaining nine items captured the core characteristics 
of rumination (repetitiveness, intrusiveness, difficulties to disengage), were adapted for 
measuring film-related rumination (e.g., "I could not stop thinking about the film")1 and 
rated on a 5-point scale (1 = “never” to 5 = “almost always”). Internal consistency of the 
questionnaire was excellent (Cronbach's α = .946). 
Control measures  
     Trait rumination. The habitual use of rumination was measured by the German ver-
sion of the 10-item Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ-10D; Huffziger & Kühner, 
2012). Participants indicated their thoughts and actions in response to sad or depressed 
feelings (e.g., "I think ‘Why do I always react this way?’ “) on a 4-point scale, ranging 
from 1 = “almost never” to 4 = “almost always”.  
     Trait film-related intrusive memories and rumination. The trait tendency to experi-
ence intrusive memories and rumination in response to stressful films was measured by 
modified versions of the questionnaires for post-film intrusive memories and post-film 
rumination. This time the participants had to rate their typical responses to films that trig-
ger negative emotions in general. For the frequency of intrusive memories, answers were 
given on a 5-point scale (1 = “never” to 5 = “always”). 
     Neuropsychological control measures. We assessed visual-motor conceptual screen-
ing and cognitive flexibility by use of the Trail Making Test (TMT A/B; Reitan, 1992) and 
short-term and working memory capacity by use of a digit span test forward and backward 
(a version similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; Petermann, 2012). These 
measures were only used to rule out group differences in cognitive functioning prior to 
tDCS. They were not used as covariates.  
     Mood and arousal. To assess possible effects of tDCS and the film scene on partici-
pants’ mood and arousal, we administered two Self-Assessment-Manikins (SAM; Bradley 
& Lang, 1994) at several time points (see procedure). In the SAMs, participants had to 
indicate how they felt (1 = “very negative” to 9 = “very positive”) and how aroused they 
were (1 = “very calm” to 9 = “very high arousal”).  
                                                 
1 All items used in this study can be obtained upon request. 
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     Film-related emotion regulation. To check whether groups differed in their emotional 
processing and responding to the film, we assessed participants’ spontaneous use of reap-
praisal and suppression to regulate emotions during film presentation and resting period. 
Specifically, reappraisal and suppression during the presentation of stressful stimuli have 
been found to influence emotional distress and posttraumatic symptoms afterwards (e.g., 
Cavanagh, Fitzgerald, & Urry, 2014; Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009). For 
reappraisal, we used four adapted and slightly rephrased items (e.g., “I changed my 
thoughts about the film in a way that made me experience less negative emotions”) from 
Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, and Gross (2010) as well as from the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). For suppression, we used four 
adapted items (e.g., “Whenever possible, I avoided realizing my feelings”) from the Hei-
delberg Form for Emotion Regulation Strategies (HFERST; Izadpanah, Barnow, Neubau-
er, & Holl, 2017). Participants rated the extent to which the statements applied to them in 
the period during and after film presentation on a 5-point scale (1 = “does not apply” to 5 
= “does apply”).  
     Film exposure and distress. Participants estimated the amount of time they had 
looked away from the screen during the film on a 5-point scale (1 = “never” to 5 = “almost 
always”). For measuring subjective distress during the film, participants also indicated 
their mood (1= “very negative” to 9 = “very positive”) and arousal (1 = “very calm” to 9 = 
“very high arousal”) during film presentation retrospectively on two SAMs. To assess how 
attentively participants had followed the film, they completed 22 self-generated single 
choice, multiple choice and open-ended questions about the film (e.g., "What was the 
color of the victim’s handbag?"). We calculated a sum score for correct answers. 
Moreover, we assessed whether participants had seen the film before and whether they 
watched similar films frequently.  
Procedure 
     Each participant performed two sessions at the lab with an average inter-session-
interval of 7.22 days (SD = 0.85). First, sociodemographic and health data were assessed 
and M.I.N.I. and PCL-5 were administered to check exclusion criteria. Furthermore, par-
ticipants completed TMT A/B and digit span test, a baseline measurement of the modified 
CVLT via E-prime, and a set of questionnaires (EHI, RSQ-10D, trait film-related intrusive 
memories/rumination) via Unipark (EFS Survey, Questback GmbH). At session 2, partici-
Study I: TDCS effects on Intrusive Memories and Rumination 
43 
pants were screened for changes in exclusion criteria and tDCS was applied for 20 
minutes. The modified CVLT started 5 minutes after the onset of stimulation to reach 
maximum effects and took 15 minutes. After that, the room was darkened and the experi-
menter left the room while the participants watched the film scene. After the film scene, 
participants were asked to lean back for a moment and do nothing until the experiment 
would continue after 10 minutes. Thus, there were no environmental demands that could 
trigger intrusive memories or rumination (see also Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). Finally, 
participants completed questionnaires for post-film intrusive memories, post-film rumina-
tion, emotion regulation and film exposure and distress via Unipark (EFS Survey, Quest-
back GmbH). SAMs were administered at baseline, after 5 minutes of tDCS and after rest-
ing period. Heart rate and respiration rate were recorded via a respiration belt and three 
electrodes on the upper body and additional emotional measures were assessed during 
session 2. However, the obtained data was not subject to this paper. 
Data analyses  
     Data were analyzed by use of SPSS® Version 24.0. First, we examined whether tDCS 
groups significantly differed in any of the baseline control measures assessed on t1 to 
check comparability of groups. Furthermore, we examined group differences for control 
variables assessed after film presentation, i.e. film-related emotion regulation, film-elicited 
distress, time looked away and film-related attentiveness. All analyses were performed by 
use of Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) and Kruskal–Wallis tests. Additionally, changes 
in SAM mood and arousal ratings over the course of the experiment were analyzed by use 
of two separate mixed ANOVAs with the between-subject factor stimulation condition 
(sham vs. anodal vs. cathodal) and the within-subject factor time point (baseline vs. after 
tDCS start vs. after resting period). For main analyses, a mixed ANOVA with the be-
tween-subject factor stimulation condition (sham vs. anodal vs. cathodal) and the within-
subject factor time point (session 1 vs. session 2) was performed on the index of resistance 
to PI (H1). Effects of tDCS on intrusive memories (H2) and rumination (H3) were ana-
lyzed by use of a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with the number of post-
film intrusive memories, the percent of time they have been experienced and post-film 
rumination as dependent variables. For all subjects who reported intrusive memories, an 
exploratory MANOVA was conducted to investigate effects of tDCS on level of distress, 
vividness and control. Next, correlational analyses were performed to test associations 
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between resistance to PI and the intrusive memories measures (H4) as well as rumination 
(H5). Lastly, in exploratory post-hoc analyses, we examined whether resistance to PI, ru-
mination and number of intrusive memories significantly correlated with any of the con-
trol measures and we analyzed the result patterns for CVLT performance in shared and 
non-shared trials by use of mixed ANOVAs. Moreover, we calculated Bayes Factors to 
quantitate the relative strength of evidence for our main findings. For all correlation anal-
yses, the p-values were Bonferroni-Holm-corrected and Greenhouse-Geisser corrected 
tests are reported when the assumption of sphericity was violated in mixed ANOVAs.  
     We determined sample size by use of G*power (version 3.1, University of Duesseldorf, 
Germany), assuming a statistical power of .80 and an alpha level of .05. For resistance to 
PI, we calculated a total sample of 42 participants for the interaction between tDCS condi-
tion and time point (f = 0.25). For the global effect of tDCS on number of post-film intru-
sive memories, the percent of time they have been experienced and post-film rumination, 
we calculated a total sample of 114 participants (f2(V) = 0.0625). Lastly, for correlational 
analyses, a total sample of 84 (r = 0.3) participants was determined. 
Results 
     The data reported in this study is openly accessible in the associated OSF repository 
(https://osf.io/bcq6y/). 
Descriptive statistics and group differences in control measures 
     Descriptive statistics and group comparisons for control variables are presented in 
Table 1.1. 6.8 % of participants already knew the film fragment and 32.2 % of participants 
reported having watched similar films before. The amount of time participants had looked 
away during film presentation was low. Regarding film-related distress, participants 
reported to have experienced negative mood and to have felt aroused during film 
presentation. The stimulation groups did not differ in any of the control measures except 
for their arousal during film presentation, H(2) = 6.88, p < .05, with a mean rank of 55.92 
for the sham group, 70.47 for the anodal group and 51.71 for the cathodal group. 
However, we also compared valence and arousal ratings over time (baseline vs. after tDCS 
start vs. after resting period). For valence there was a significant main effect of time, 
F(1.88, 216.26) = 227.67, p < .001, η2 = .66, with mood worsening from baseline (M = 
6.84, SD = 1.25) to tDCS start (M = 6.14, SD = 1.60) and from tDCS start to resting period 
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(M = 3.67, SD = 1.62). For arousal there was also a significant main effect of time, F(1.75, 
200.99) = 107.24, p < .001, η2 = .48, with all participants feeling less aroused from 
baseline (M = 3.78, SD = 1.98) to tDCS start (M = 3.11, SD = 1.87) and more aroused 
from tDCS start to resting period (M = 5.97, SD = 1.84). However, there was neither a 
main effect of group nor a group x time interaction (all ps > .10).  
Resistance to PI 
     Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are presented in Table 1.2. In contrast 
to H1, the tDCS conditions did not differentially affect resistance to PI as indicated by a 
non-significant time x group interaction, F(2, 115) = 0.41, p = .66, η2 = .01. Unexpectedly, 
all individuals showed more PI at t2 (M = 2.74, SD = 2.65) compared to t1 (M = 0.05, SD 
= 2.58), F(1, 115) = 94.92, p < .001, η2 = .45.  
Post-film intrusive memories and post-film rumination  
     Overall, 22.9 % of participants reported intrusive memories during resting period in 
form of thoughts, 12.7 % in form of images, 30.5 % in form of a short film scene, 8.5 % in 
form of feelings and 1.7 % in form of sounds. 19.5 % of participants did not experience 
any intrusive memories. 1.7 % experienced a mix of different modalities and the remain-
ing 2.5 % included one participant who did not specify the modality of the intrusive mem-
ories, one participant who indicated “some kind of paranoia” and one participant who re-
flected about the quality of the movie. Removing these individuals from analyses did not 
change the main results. We applied square-root transformations for both intrusive memo-
ries measures to improve normality of the data distribution and reduce the impact of one 
extreme value. Using Pillai’s trace, the three tDCS groups neither differed in post-film 
rumination nor in the two intrusive memories measures, V = 0.02, F(6, 228) = 0.45, p = 
.84, η2 = .01. These results are in contrast to H2 and H3. Exploratory analyses of effects of 
tDCS on intrusion-related level of distress, level of vividness and level of control for those 
individuals who had experienced intrusive memories did also not reveal significant group 
differences, all ps > .10. 
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Table 1.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Group Differences of the Control Variables  
Notes. TMT = Trail Making Test, IM = Intrusive Memories, SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin; Analyses for 
Distress, Control and Vividness of Intrusive Memories were performed only for individuals who reported to 
experience Intrusive Memories at least seldom (sham n = 30, anodal n = 29, cathodal n = 28); Anodal n = 39 
for Film-Related Attentiveness. 
ns = nonsignificant. 
  
 
 
 
  Min - Max 
 Sham 
 (n = 40) 
 
 M (SD) 
 Anodal 
 (n = 40) 
 
 M (SD) 
 Cathodal 
 (n = 38) 
 
 M (SD) 
 
p 
      
Age 18.00 - 40.00 22.58 (4.50) 24.30 (5.13) 23.08 (3.51) ns 
Inter-session Interval   6.00 - 10.00   7.10 (0.90)   7.40 (0.93)   7.16 (0.68) ns 
TMT-A t1 10.50 - 50.00 26.73 (9.54) 22.81 (6.31) 23.31 (7.60) ns 
TMT-B t1 21.70 - 120.00 54.04 (19.00) 49.45 (15.63) 52.78 (15.17) ns 
Digit Span forward t1   5.00 - 12.00   9.00 (1.93)   9.53 (1.28)   9.11 (1.45) ns 
Digit Span backward t1   4.00 - 12.00   7.85 (2.07)   7.83 (2.18)   7.87 (2.11) ns 
Trait Rumination t1 10.00 - 33.00 19.95 (4.55) 20.25 (4.60) 21.47 (5.10) ns 
Trait Film-Related Rumination t1   9.00 - 36.00 16.70 (5.44) 17.10 (6.08) 17.92 (5.95) ns 
Trait Film-Related IM t1   1.00 - 5.00   1.95 (0.71)   2.05 (0.90)   2.21 (1.02) ns 
Trait Distress of IM t1   1.00 - 5.00   2.03 (0.85)   2.24 (1.00)   2.50 (1.07) ns 
Trait Vividness of IM t1   1.00 - 6.00   2.67 (1.06)   2.59 (1.05)   2.82 (1.31) ns 
Trait Control of IM t1   1.00 - 6.00   4.60 (1.35)   4.14 (1.27)   3.93 (1.61) ns 
Film-Related Suppression t2   4.00 - 20.00   9.75 (3.83) 10.35 (3.82)   9.87 (3.74) ns 
Film-Related Reappraisal t2   4.00 - 20.00 11.58 (3.86) 11.50 (4.62) 11.00 (4.10) ns 
Time looked away t2   1.00 - 5.00   1.48 (0.88)   1.68 (0.86)   1.74 (0.98) ns 
SAM Valence during Film t2   1.00 - 5.00   2.05 (0.88)   2.03 (1.07)   2.29 (1.25) ns 
SAM Arousal during Film t2   1.00 - 9.00   7.03 (1.48)   7.60 (1.39)   6.66 (1.92) .03 
Film-Related Attentiveness t2   9.00 - 20.00 13.58 (2.71) 14.69 (2.82) 13.53 (2.77) 
 
ns 
Study I: TDCS effects on Intrusive Memories and Rumination 
47 
Table 1.2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
 
Notes. CVLT = California Verbal Learning Test, PI = Proactive Interference, IM = Intrusive Memories; Anal-
yses for Distress, Control and Vividness of Intrusive Memories were performed only for individuals who report-
ed at least one Intrusive Memory (sham n = 34, anodal n = 31, cathodal n = 29). 
 
Link between resistance to PI, post-film intrusive memories, and post-film  
rumination 
     Since tDCS did not differentially affect resistance to PI on t2, post-film rumination or in-
trusive memories, we explored links between these variables across stimulation groups. Cor-
relations are depicted in Table 1.3. The more individuals had ruminated during the resting 
period, the more intrusive memories they had experienced. Furthermore, the more intrusive 
memories occurred, the more distressing, uncontrollable and vivid they were rated. Surpris-
ingly, there were no significant positive correlations between experience of PI on t2 and num-
ber of intrusive memories (H4) or rumination (H5). Since there was a significant change in 
resistance to PI from t1 to t2, we also calculated correlation coefficients between resistance to 
PI on t1, rumination and intrusive memories to assess possible associations before any manip-
ulation. However, these correlation patterns were generally in line with the ones found for 
resistance to PI on t2 (see Table 1.3) except that a negative correlation between the experience 
of PI and vividness of post-film intrusive memories still reached significance after Bonferro-
ni-Holm correction. 
  
 
 
 
 Min - Max 
 Sham 
 (n = 40) 
 
 M (SD) 
 Anodal 
 (n = 40) 
 
 M (SD) 
 Cathodal 
 (n = 38) 
 
 M (SD) 
     
CVLT PI t1 -7.53 - 7.36  -0.18 (2.53)  -0.09 (2.56)   0.45 (2.69) 
CVLT PI t2 -2.59 - 8.90   2.86 (2.41)   2.42 (2.73)   2.97 (2.83) 
Post-Film Rumination  9.00 - 45.00 25.05 (8.84) 25.88 (8.94) 23.26 (9.67) 
Post-Film Number of IM  0.00 - 20.00   4.78 (5.75)   3.93 (3.93)   3.45 (3.17) 
Post-Film % of time IM  0.00 - 100.00 31.35 (26.12) 32.33 (30.05) 27.45 (27.60) 
Post-Film Distress of IM  1.00 - 6.00   3.15 (1.33)   3.77 (1.28)   3.38 (1.35) 
Post-Film Control of IM  1.00 - 6.00   4.06 (1.39)   3.29 (1.58)   3.66 (1.57) 
Post-Film Vividness of IM  1.00 - 6.00   3.12 (1.41)   3.81 (1.28)   3.45 (1.24) 
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Post-hoc analyses 
     Exploratory correlation analyses. Recent research reported that decrements in cognitive 
performance in the face of stress are relevant for psychopathology (e.g., Quinn & Joorman, 
2015). Thus, we exploratory analyzed associations between change in PI, as calculated by 
subtracting PI on t2 from PI on t1, and intrusive memories and rumination. However, these 
analyses did not show substantial correlations, all ps > .10. Additionally, we explored correla-
tions between PI on t2, rumination, number of intrusive memories and control measures. After 
Bonferroni-Holm correction, post-film rumination was still significantly correlated with trait 
film-related rumination, r = .47, p < .001, mood during the film, r = -.54, p < .001, and arous-
al during the film, r = .49, p < .001. Similarly, post-film intrusive memories showed signifi-
cant correlations with a trait tendency for film-related intrusive memories, r = .33, p < .05, 
mood during the film, r = -.35, p < .01, and arousal during the film, r = .38, p < .01.2 
     Evaluation of the modified CVLT. Previous research also administering the CVLT re-
ported a between-lists performance decrease for shared trials and a between-lists performance 
increase for non-shared trials (Verwoerd et al., 2011). For the CVLT on t1, there was no be-
tween-lists performance decrease for shared trials (M = 10.09, SD = 2.71 for List 1; M = 
10.09, SD = 2.69 for List 2), F(1, 115) = 0.00, p = .98, η2 = .00, but a significant increase in 
recall performance for non-shared trials from List 1 (M = 5.05, SD = 1.63) to List 2 (M = 
5.79, SD = 1.60), F(1, 115) = 18.78, p < .001, η2 = .14. In contrast, for the CVLT on t2, all 
individuals showed a decreased recall performance for shared trials on List 2 (M = 10.72, SD 
= 3.18) compared to List 1 (M = 13.42, SD = 3.07), F(1, 115) = 108.76, p < .001, η2 = .49. 
However, increase in recall performance for non-shared items on List 2 (M = 6.72, SD = 1.72) 
compared to List 1 (M = 6.61, SD = 1.65) did not reach significance, F(1, 115) = 0.43, p = 
.51, η2 = .00. The three tDCS groups did not significantly differ in these results, all ps > .10.  
Bayesian analyses 
     To quantitate the relative strength of evidence for the non-significant findings, Bayesian 
hypothesis testing was additionally performed. A Bayes factor (BF01) is a statistical index that 
quantifies how well a hypothesis predicts observed data over an alternative hypothesis 
                                                 
2 Control variables that showed significant correlations with dependent variables were insert-
ed as covariates in the main analyses. However, they did not significantly change the main 
findings. 
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(Dienes, 2014). We calculated BF01 using JASP statistical software version 0.9.0.1 for our 
main hypotheses (JASP Team, 2018). Whereas a BF01 < 1 implies that a result is more likely 
to occur under an alternative hypothesis (H1) than under a null hypothesis (H0), a BF01 > 1 
indicates that a result is more likely to occur under a H0 than under a H1 (Wagenmakers, Wet-
zels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011). For the first hypothesis, we expected a significant 
tDCS x time interaction on PI. A Bayesian mixed ANOVA was performed with default prior 
scales. The results showed a BF01 of 8.387, with the interaction model (assuming the main 
effects of tDCS and time and their interaction) as the H1 versus the main-effect model (assum-
ing the main effects only) as the H0. Thus, there was substantial evidence in favor of the H0 
(Wagenmakers et al., 2011), indicating no interaction between tDCS condition and time. For 
testing the second and third hypotheses on the effects of tDCS on post-film intrusive memo-
ries and post-film rumination, we ran three separate Bayesian ANOVAs with the number of 
post-film intrusive memories, the percent of time they have been experienced (both measures 
square-root transformed), and post-film rumination as dependent variables. The H1 stated that 
the three tDCS groups differed in these variables whereas the H0 stated no group differences. 
We found a BF01 of 8.551 for the number of intrusive memories, a result indicating that the 
observed data is 8.551 times more likely to occur under the H0 than under the H1 and thus 
providing substantial evidence for no effect of tDCS condition (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, there was BF01 = 9.730 for percent of time of intrusive memories and BF01 = 
6.321 for post-film rumination. These analyses also provided substantial evidence in favor of 
the H0 (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). Lastly, we calculated Bayesian Pearson correlations for 
the associations between PI and both post-film intrusive memories measures as well as post-
film rumination. In line with our hypotheses, we tested whether the data were more likely to 
occur under the H0 (no association between PI and intrusive memories or rumination) or under 
the H1 (a positive association between PI and intrusive memories or rumination). Results are 
depicted in Table 1.4. Similar to previous analyses, sample correlations were weak and nega-
tive. Bayesian analyses implied strong evidence in favor of the H0, indicating no positive as-
sociations between PI and intrusive memories or rumination (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). 
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Table 1.4 
Bayesian Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
      
  CVLT PI t2 Post-Film  
Rumination 
Post-Film Num-
ber of IM  
Post-Film % of 
time IM  
      
CVLT PI t1 r 
BF0+ 
.35 
0.003 
-.21 
27.84 
-.12 
18.61 
-.17 
23.72 
CVLT PI t2 r 
BF0+ 
  - -.21 
28.47 
-.19 
26.20 
-.19 
25.63 
 
 
 
Notes. CVLT = California Verbal Learning Test, PI = Proactive Interference, IM = Intrusive Memories. For all 
tests, the H1 specifies that the correlation is positive.  
 
Discussion 
     The present study tested causal relations between cognitive control and intrusive memories 
as well as rumination in a healthy sample. A brain area associated with cognitive control, the 
left dlPFC, was stimulated via tDCS. We hypothesized cathodal tDCS to decrease and anodal 
tDCS to increase resistance to PI, an indicator of cognitive control, as well as cathodal tDCS 
to increase and anodal tDCS to decrease intrusive memories and rumination after a trauma 
film. We found neither an effect of tDCS on resistance to PI nor on intrusive memories or 
rumination. Furthermore, we expected individuals with higher resistance to PI to show less 
intrusive memories and less rumination after the trauma film. However, there was no signifi-
cant positive association between experience of PI in the CVLT and intrusive memories or 
rumination. In contrast, the trait tendency for film-related rumination and intrusive memories 
as well as valence and arousal during the film were linked to post-film intrusive memories 
and rumination. 
     The absence of a significant positive association between susceptibility to PI and intrusive 
memories is surprising as a link between these variables has been found in earlier research 
(Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2008). However, the present 
study slightly differed from previous research in the assessment of intrusive memories and 
resistance to PI. Whereas previous studies recorded the occurrence of post-film intrusive 
memories after a period of 24 hours (Wessel et al., 2008) or during a 1-week diary assessment 
(Verwoerd et al., 2011), we measured intrusive memories after a short post-film resting peri-
od. This procedure had been used before in studies testing the short-term tDCS effects on ru-
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mination (e.g., Vanderhasselt et al., 2013), and therefore seemed appropriate to be used in our 
study, too. Interestingly, participants in the current study reported an even greater number of 
intrusive memories in this short period compared to the one-week assessment by Verwoerd 
and colleagues (2011). Thus, the film fragment we used appears to be suitable for inducing 
intrusive memories. Furthermore, to enhance comparability, we administered the modified 
CVLT also used by Verwoerd and colleagues (2011) for measuring resistance to PI. Using 
this modified version also carried the advantage of a high number of items, which was ex-
pected to be useful to preclude ceiling effects in a healthy sample. However, all participants 
showed a performance decrease in the modified CVLT from session 1 to session 2, although 
positive practice effects on the regular CVLT have been reported (Duff, Westervelt, McCaf-
frey, & Haase, 2001; Woods, Delis, Scott, Kramer, & Holdnack, 2006). It cannot be ruled out 
that this decrease was caused by somewhat higher stress levels in session 2, which may have 
been triggered by the tDCS electrode placement, reduced motivation by participants, or in-
creased task difficulty caused by word interferences from session 1. Furthermore, in contrast 
to Verwoerd and colleagues (2011), there was no significant between-lists performance de-
crease for shared trials on session 1 and no between-lists performance increase for non-shared 
trials on session 2 in the present study. These changes were to be expected and—according to 
Verwoerd and colleagues (2011)—would have underlined the sensitivity of the modified 
CVLT for interference effects. It should be noted that we examined an exclusively female 
sample and Verwoerd and colleagues (2011) reported interference effects to be stronger for 
men compared to women. Nevertheless, the modified CVLT has only rarely been used in ear-
lier research and information regarding convergence with other established measures or on 
sensitivity to tDCS are largely lacking. Our results indicate that the modified CVLT index 
should be used with caution in future research. Apart from restrictions of the modified CVLT, 
in a recent study by Swick, Cayton, Ashley, and Turken (2017), the ability to overcome PI (as 
assessed by a probes working memory task with non-affective verbal and visual stimuli) was 
also unrelated to the severity of re-experiencing symptoms in combat veterans diagnosed with 
PTSD. Therefore, our results support recent research that questions the link between re-
sistance to PI and intrusive memories in general.  
     Concerning rumination, previous research posited that deficits in resolving interference 
from no-longer relevant information in working memory are related to recurring ruminative 
thoughts (De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Pe et al., 2012; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; Zetsche et al., 
2012; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). However, most of these studies applied interference tasks 
with affective stimuli or focused on naturally occurring rumination. In contrast, we examined 
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the link between resistance to PI and experimentally induced rumination by use of non-
affective stimuli. Thus, persistent rumination might be exclusively linked to deficits in con-
trolling no-longer relevant emotional information. Interestingly, a recent meta-analysis by 
Zetsche and colleagues (2018) analyzed a large body of published and unpublished research 
on the link between cognitive control and self-reported trait repetitive negative thinking. Re-
sults from this meta-analysis also showed that ruminators do rather experience specific defi-
cits in removing no-longer relevant information from working memory than general deficits 
in cognitive control, although effects were small in magnitude after controlling for depressive 
symptoms. Importantly, stimulus valence was not a significant moderator of this association. 
Nevertheless, the authors pointed out that, due to task heterogeneity, analyses only contrasted 
emotionally neutral versus emotionally mixed stimuli and thus did not differ between positive 
and negative affective material. Future research should further clarify whether deficits in re-
solving PI is selectively linked to negative information as well as investigate the role of vary-
ing induction and assessment methods of rumination. 
     Furthermore, we did not find the expected tDCS effect on resistance to PI. As already 
mentioned in the introduction, the ability to resist PI is supported by a complex network in-
cluding various brain areas (e.g., Blasi et al., 2006; D’Esposito et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 
2001). We focused on the left dlPFC as one part of this network as neuromodulation of this 
region has been associated with cognitive control shifts in former studies (Andrews et al., 
2011; Fregni et al., 2005; Frings, Brinkmann, Friehs, & van Lipzig, 2018; Wolkenstein & 
Plewnia, 2013; Zaehle et al., 2011). However, these studies used different tasks to assess cog-
nitive control. Thus, it is possible that there are other brain areas supporting the requirements 
of the modified CVLT more than the left dlPFC; these brain areas may then be more suitable 
stimulation sites when aiming to modify the resistance to PI. Therefore, we encourage future 
studies to further clarify causal relations by stimulating different brain areas or by using vary-
ing assessment methods of cognitive control. We recommend the use of tasks other than the 
modified CVLT due to the constraints mentioned above. In particular, tasks that rely on reac-
tion times instead of accuracy rates might be more adequate, given that a recent meta-analysis 
reported that, at least for healthy individuals, effects of tDCS over the dlPFC on cognitive 
control become manifest predominantly in altered reaction times (Dedoncker et al., 2016a). 
     Despite the non-significant results concerning resistance to PI, general deficits in cognitive 
control have been empirically linked to intrusive memories and rumination in different sam-
ples (Aupperle et al., 2012; Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005; Klein & Boals, 
2001; Polak et al., 2012; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) and tDCS over the left dlPFC has been 
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reported to influence cognitive control processes (e.g., Andrews et al., 2011; Fregni et al., 
2005; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013). Moreover, the activation of the left dlPFC has not only 
been associated with cognitive control but also with intrusive memories and rumination (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit et al., 2014; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). Therefore, even with 
no tDCS effect on resistance to PI and no significant correlation between resistance to PI and 
intrusive memories or rumination, we would have expected tDCS-induced changes in intru-
sive memories and rumination following stimulation of the dlPFC. However, similar to re-
sistance to PI, the control of unwanted memories and thoughts relies on a complex network, 
also including other brain structures such as the right dlPFC or the anterior cingulate cortex 
(Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson et al., 2015; Kühn et al., 2012; Mandell, Siegle, Shutt, 
Feldmiller, & Thase, 2014). At least for rumination, two studies that combined working 
memory training with bilateral or left stimulation of the dlPFC also found no effects of tDCS 
on rumination (De Putter, Vanderhasselt, Baeken, De Raedt, & Koster, 2015; Vanderhasselt 
et al., 2015). Compared with the present study, both studies relied on smaller sample sizes, 
used different stimulation parameters, or focused on naturally occurring rumination. Never-
theless, since our results also indicate no effects of tDCS over the left dlPFC on the occur-
rence of unwanted thoughts, it might be worthwhile to examine other brain areas in future 
research. Furthermore, we found that individuals with a trait tendency for post-film rumina-
tion and intrusive memories experienced more rumination and intrusive memories after film 
presentation. Therefore, future research could benefit from selecting participants based on 
these trait tendencies to strengthen the effects of neuromodulation. This assumption is also 
supported by a recent study indicating that base-level performance in cognitive control mod-
erates tDCS effects—that is, participants whose cognitive control is impaired the most, profit 
the most from anodal tDCS (Wolkenstein et al., in prep.).  
     In general, there is an ongoing debate about the effectiveness of neuromodulation. This 
study fits into this debate and some general limitations regarding tDCS should be considered. 
First, the stimulation period of 20 minutes only comprised the CVLT administration and not 
the trauma film. Nitsche and colleagues (2008) claimed even shorter periods to produce stable 
effects that last for at least one hour. However, the stability of effects varies as a function of 
stimulation period, current intensity, and target brain area (Nitsche et al., 2008). Thus, it can-
not be ruled out that the manipulation of the dlPFC rapidly declined after tDCS. Second, we 
used an extracephalic position of the reference electrode to avoid effects on other brain areas. 
Although this procedure has been successfully administered in other studies (e.g., Wolken-
stein & Plewnia, 2013), it may reduce stimulation intensity (Moliadze, Antal, & Paulus, 
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2010). Third, we had a young, highly-educated, healthy sample. Previous research has pointed 
towards possible ceiling effects for anodal tDCS in healthy samples (e.g., Furuya, Klaus, 
Nitsche, Paulus, & Altenmüller, 2014). Although we used a modified CVLT with 30 instead 
of 12 words per list to prevent those effects, we cannot rule them out. Furthermore, even 
though there are experimental studies reporting significant deteriorating effects of cathodal 
tDCS on cognitive control (e.g., Wolkenstein et al., 2014), a recent meta-analysis found no 
reliable effects of cathodal tDCS of the dlPFC on cognitive functioning in within-subject 
studies (Dedoncker, Brunoni, Baeken, & Vanderhasselt, 2016b). This result questions the 
suitability of cathodal tDCS over the dlPFC to inhibit cognitive control. Interestingly, Nier-
atschker, Kiefer, Giel, Krüger, and Plewnia (2015) showed that effects of cathodal tDCS can 
be moderated by specific genetic factors, suggesting that future studies in the area of neuro-
modulation should also consider genetic variability to reduce inconsistencies of results. Last-
ly, it should be noted that working mechanisms of tDCS are divisive. In a recent study exam-
ining the effects of direct transcranial electric stimulation on brain activity, Vöröslakos and 
colleagues (2018) showed that electric stimulation does influence brain networks in healthy 
subjects as long as induced electric fields are sufficiently strong (> 1 mV/mm at least). Ac-
cording to the authors, results from human cadaver brains suggest that scalp-applied current 
intensity is attenuated by skin, soft tissue, or skull thickness. Thus, scalp-applied currents of 
4-6 mA or higher are needed to achieve a high voltage gradient. However, due to safety rea-
sons, conventional stimulation protocols do not recommend currents larger than 2 mA. Our 
stimulation protocol was in line with this convention. However, tDCS-associated changes in 
cognitive control by use of 1 mA have been reported (e.g., Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013; 
Wolkenstein et al., 2014). Nevertheless, future studies should further investigate how to max-
imize direct effects on brain activity by use of alternative stimulation protocols (e.g., Chhatbar 
et al., 2017) or new stimulation methods (e.g., Vöröslakos et al., 2018). Furthermore, we had 
to keep the post-stimulation period as short as possible in this study. Therefore, we did not 
include a second cognitive control task to test whether cortical excitability had been achieved. 
Future investigation should also include additional cognitive measures to verify manipulation. 
Apart from these restrictions concerning tDCS, we measured the occurrence of intrusive 
memories retrospectively, a procedure that notoriously includes the risk of cognitive biases. 
The ability to remember and report the amount of film-related intrusive memories might be 
related to individual differences in cognitive functioning, e.g., short-term and working 
memory capacity. Compared to previous investigations that covered much longer assessment 
intervals, our measurement directly followed a relatively short resting period. Nevertheless, 
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an alternative assessment method could be instructing individuals to directly indicate an intru-
sive memory once it occurred. However, addressing the assessment of intrusive memories 
prior to resting period might focus participant’s attention on film-related thoughts and there-
fore trigger rumination or further intrusive memories, an effect that would reduce validity of 
the assessment. Furthermore, as already noted in previous research using diary assessments 
for intrusive memories (e.g., Wessel et al., 2008), monitoring contents of working memory 
and maintaining a task goal (i.e., tapping intrusive memories) is also a core characteristic of 
cognitive control and in turn subject to individual differences in cognitive functioning.  
     Despite these limitations, this study contributed to the challenging task of establishing cau-
sality in post-trauma symptomatology. Even though the hypotheses were not confirmed, the 
results extend existing research. To investigate causal relations, an indicator of cognitive con-
trol as well as a corresponding brain area had to be determined that are both associated with 
intrusive memories/rumination and susceptible to tDCS. Based on existing findings, we chose 
resistance to PI as measured by the modified CVLT as well as the left dlPFC. However, we 
found no associations with intrusive memories or rumination as expected and no effects of 
tDCS. At the same time, our results highlight the potential role of boundary conditions that 
should be further differentiated in future research, e.g., administering cognitive control tasks 
that include reaction times, using affective stimuli, or focusing on other brain areas for neu-
romodulation. Furthermore, selecting participants based on trait-measures of cognitive control 
or rumination/intrusive memories could be an important step to enhance effects of neuromod-
ulation in the future. In sum, until now we are not able to conclude whether differences in 
cognitive control are a risk factor for the occurrence of intrusive memories or rumination. 
And clearly, more research is needed to consider chances and limits of tDCS in the domain of 
PTSD-related symptomatology. Nevertheless, the current study offers starting points for fu-
ture investigations to finally answer the question of what determines individual vulnerability 
for intrusive memories and rumination after life-threatening events. 
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Abstract 
Investigating impairments in cognitive control has become an important avenue for identifying 
risk factors for intrusive memories. The dual mechanisms framework has proposed that 
cognitive control operates by two distinct modes: a proactive mode that is characterized by 
active maintenance of goal-relevant information to bias behavior before conflicting events; and 
a reactive mode that is characterized by the retrieval of goal-relevant information only when 
interference occurs. However, whether deficits in these cognitive modes are causally related to 
intrusive memories is unclear. In the present study we examined the effects of transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), an area 
commonly associated with cognitive control, on proactive control and intrusive memories. 
Furthermore, correlations between proactive control and intrusive memories were explored. In a 
between-subject design, N = 121 healthy individuals performed the AX-Continuous 
Performance Task—an established measure of proactive control—during 20-minutes tDCS 
(anodal, cathodal, or sham), then watched a trauma film, and later reported intrusive memories 
after a 10-minutes filler task. There were no effects of tDCS on proactive control or on intrusive 
memories. Moreover, proactive control was not related to intrusive memories. Thus, the 
findings question the role of the left dlPFC for proactive control and intrusive memories. Future 
studies in this field should consider alternative brain areas and further evaluate the susceptibility 
of the dual mechanisms of control to neuromodulation as well as their association with intrusive 
memories. 
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Introduction 
     Human functioning relies on the direction of cognitive capacity towards a particular goal 
despite goal-irrelevant information, an ability that is known as cognitive control. In recent 
years, results from studies in clinical and analogue samples indicated that impaired cognitive 
control might be a risk factor for the occurrence of posttraumatic intrusive memories, defined 
as unwanted recurring sensory fragments of a traumatic event (e.g., Aupperle et al., 2012; 
Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005; Klein & Boals, 2001; Polak et al., 2012). It 
has been suggested that cognitive control works as a gatekeeper that helps individuals to stay 
focused on activated goals despite internal or external cues that are potentially able to activate 
intrusive memories (e.g., Wessel et al., 2008). However, a number of questions still remain 
unanswered. First, causality is unclear in most studies with clinical samples (for a review of 
longitudinal and cross-sectional results see Aupperle et al., 2012). Reduced cognitive control 
might be a risk factor for intrusive memories or a by-product of posttraumatic symptoms. In 
addition, results concerning the disrupted cognitive control functions are inconsistent and par-
tially lacking a clear conceptual framework. For example, some studies identified diminished 
inhibition, for example, reduced resistance to proactive interference, as a precursor to intru-
sive memories (e.g., Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2008) but more recent research 
failed to replicate these findings (e.g., Voss, Ehring, & Wolkenstein, 2019; Woud et al., 
2019). The present study aims to overcome these limitations by exploring the causal link be-
tween cognitive control and intrusive memories within a specific concept: The dual mecha-
nisms of control (DMC) framework. 
     The DMC framework conceptualizes cognitive control as operating by two distinct modes: 
proactive and reactive control. According to Braver (2012), proactive control is an “early se-
lection” mode that maintains goal-relevant information to bias thoughts and actions on inter-
nal or external goals prior to conflicting events. In contrast, reactive control is a “late correc-
tion” mode that retrieves goal-relevant information only when it is needed, for example, to 
deal with interference after the detection of conflicting events. Although proactive control is 
more effective in most situations, it depends on valid contextual cues and consumes limited 
cognitive resources as well as working memory capacity (Braver, 2012). Thus, efficient cog-
nitive control is dependent on both, proactive, goal-directed and reactive, stimuli-driven pro-
cessing.    
     There is inter-individual variability in the deployment of proactive and reactive control 
when performing highly demanding cognitive tasks. For instance, higher fluid intelligence 
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and higher working memory capacity have been linked to proactive control (Burgess & Brav-
er, 2010; Redick, 2014; Richmond, Redick, & Braver, 2015). Furthermore, Braver (2012) 
posited that rather than showing global deficits in cognitive control, clinical and developmen-
tal samples might differ in their utilization of proactive and reactive control. Indeed, impair-
ments in proactive control have been found in old adults and young children (e.g., 
Brahmbhatt, White, & Barch, 2010; Braver et al., 2001; Bugg, 2014; Lorsbach & Reimer, 
2010) as well as in individuals with schizophrenia, depressive mood, or anxiety (e.g., Barch et 
al., 2001; Edwards, Barch, & Braver, 2010; West, Choi, & Travers, 2010; Yang et al., 2018). 
Until now, little is known about the role of proactive and reactive control for the development 
and maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the occurrence of intrusive 
memories. However, based on the predictions of the DMC framework (see Braver, 2012), it 
can be assumed that deficits in proactive control might be related to difficulties in maintaining 
goal-relevant information and in adaptively considering context information. These difficul-
ties might impede the ability to ignore external or internal goal-irrelevant cues that activate 
traumatic representations, thereby facilitating the occurrence of intrusive memories that inter-
fere with goal-directed behavior. Hence, individuals at risk for intrusive memories might not 
show reduced cognitive control per se but rather subtle deficits in deploying proactive control, 
an assumption that has not been directly tested within the DMC framework, yet. Studies ex-
amining context processing and sustained goal activation in PTSD patients provide first hints 
that support this assumption. For example, van Rooij and colleagues (2014) reported that vet-
erans with PTSD show less proactive response inhibition, i.e., lower anticipated stopping that 
relies on contextual cues, than healthy individuals. Moreover, compared to healthy controls, 
individuals suffering from PTSD demonstrated deficits in sustained attention to task goals 
(Jenkins, Langlais, Delis, & Cohen, 2000; Vasterling et al., 2002). The main goal of the pre-
sent study is to build on these results and to explore the causal link between proactive control 
and intrusive memories in healthy individuals in light of the DMC framework.  
     Since examining causality in the context of traumatic intrusions underlies practical and 
ethical challenges, the trauma film paradigm has been established as a useful analogue in 
healthy samples. By confronting healthy individuals with stressful film scenes, it is possible 
to test and manipulate key processes that are involved in the development of intrusive memo-
ries (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). However, even with the trauma film paradigm it cannot be 
ruled out that the mechanisms of interest are affected by third variables, which causes difficul-
ties in investigating causality. Thus, we aimed to manipulate proactive control and intrusive 
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memories after a trauma film by modulating activation in a brain area that is associated with 
cognitive control via transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS).  
     TDCS is as a safe, non-invasive, and effective method for the modulation of brain activity. 
The technique involves the hyper- or depolarization of resting membrane potentials (Nitsche 
& Paulus, 2001; Priori, 2003; Wassermann & Grafman, 2005) through a weak current applied 
over a specific brain area for several minutes. Cathodal stimulation reduces cortical excitabil-
ity and anodal stimulation increases cortical excitability in the stimulated region for at least 
one hour (Nitsche et al., 2008). Since cognitive control is a function of the prefrontal cortex, 
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) has been identified as a promising area to in-
duce cognitive control shifts (e.g., Blasi et al., 2006; Bunge et al., 2001; Curtis & D’Esposito, 
2003; Dulas & Duarte, 2016; Nee et al., 2007; Postle et al., 2001; Postle et al., 2004; Wolf et 
al., 2010). Also within the DMC framework, proactive control was associated with sustained 
activation of the lateral PFC whereas reactive control was linked to a wider network involving 
transient activation of the lateral PFC but also the anterior cingulate cortex and the posterior 
cortical or medial temporal lobe areas (Braver, 2012). Moreover, a number of studies demon-
strated that the left dlPFC is associated with changes in the cognitive control mode (e.g., 
Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Lesh et al., 2013; Lopez-Garcia et al., 2016). For ex-
ample, Braver and colleagues (2009) reported that the left dlPFC shows enhanced sustained 
activity in older adults that have been trained in proactive control and a more transient activa-
tion in young adults that have been motivated for a reactive mode via monetary rewards. Fur-
thermore, the dlPFC was also associated with intrusive memories (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; 
Arnsten et al., 2015; Clark et al., 2003). For example, Benoit and colleagues (2014) found that 
healthy individuals showed highest dlPFC activation when controlling intrusive memories in 
a suppressing versus recalling task of memory contents. Taken together, based on conceptual 
considerations and empirical evidence, the left dlPFC appears to be a central component for 
the modulation of cognitive control in general, proactive control in particular, and intrusive 
memories. 
     Nevertheless, there is also evidence that contradicts the prominent role of the left dlPFC in 
proactive control. Within the DMC framework, Gómez-Ariza and colleagues (2017) exam-
ined whether tDCS over the left dlPFC changes control modes in healthy young adults. Simi-
lar to previous research, the authors utilized the well-validated AX-Continuous Performance 
Task (AX-CPT) to assess proactive and reactive control. In this modified version of the clas-
sic Continuous Performance Task, participants have to respond to an A (cue) followed by an 
X (probe) and not respond to all other letter combinations (AY, BX, BY). Importantly, be-
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cause of a higher proportion of AX-sequences, both letters are strongly associated. The acti-
vated control mode is expected to translate into different performance patterns. Proactive con-
trol should be associated with the maintenance of contextual information and therefore lead to 
high target expectancies when an A cue is detected. Thus, individuals who engage in proac-
tive control should show reduced error rates and faster reaction times in BX trials and in-
creased error rates and slower reaction times in AY trials. However, in contrast to the predic-
tions of the DMC, Gómez-Ariza and colleagues (2017) found no effect of tDCS over the left 
dlPFC on performance in AY or BX trials. Interestingly, offline cathodal tDCS over the right 
dlPFC, a region that had been included as a control side, led to a slight decrease in proactive 
control. Nevertheless, given that the involvement of the left dlPFC in proactive control has 
been theoretically and empirically well-proven, the researchers encouraged future studies to 
further evaluate the manipulation of AX-CPT performance via tDCS of the left dlPFC with 
alternative task and stimulation parameters. Thus, in the current study we also used the AX-
CPT but administered a version modified by Richmond and colleagues (2015) that included 
40 % AX trials, 10 % AY trials, 10 % BX trials and 40 % BY trials. This trial proportion was 
used in previous studies that induced proactive control shifts (e.g., Gonthier, Macnamara, 
Chow, Conway, & Braver, 2016) and rules out possible confounding first-order frequency 
effects. Moreover, we used a constant current of 1 mA and a stimulation protocol that was 
successfully applied to manipulate cognitive control before (Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013; 
Wolkenstein et al., 2014). 
     In sum, the aim of this randomized, sham-controlled, double-blind analogue study was to 
investigate causal links between the activation of the left dlPFC (as manipulated by tDCS), 
cognitive control, in particular proactive control as defined within the DMC framework, and 
intrusive memories. We applied anodal, cathodal, and sham tDCS to the left dlPFC of healthy 
individuals to examine effects on proactive control as well as on the occurrence of intrusive 
memories after a trauma film. Thereby, we tested the following hypotheses: First, we predict-
ed cathodal tDCS to decrease and anodal tDCS to increase proactive control, compared to 
sham stimulation (H1). Second, we predicted cathodal tDCS to lead to more intrusive memo-
ries and anodal tDCS to lead to less intrusive memories after a trauma film, compared to sham 
stimulation (H2). Third, we examined associations between proactive control and intrusive 
memories. We proposed higher proactive control to be associated with less intrusive memo-
ries after the trauma film (H3). 
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Method 
Design, randomization, and blinding 
     The study followed a between-subject design with three tDCS groups (anodal vs. cathodal 
vs. sham). Participants were randomized to a tDCS group by use of automated randomization 
software (randomizer.org). They were informed that they would be assigned to one of three 
tDCS conditions that differ in electrode placement and stimulation intensity but not in stimu-
lation length. Furthermore, the stimulator was started via predefined codes, a technique that 
allowed a double-blind assignment to the sham or verum stimulation.  
Sample 
     N = 123 healthy adults between 18 and 41 years were recruited via advertisements and a 
lab database at LMU Munich. After excluding two participants due to error rates above 45 % 
in the AX-CPT (Goméz-Ariza et al., 2017), the final sample comprised 121 participants (67.8 
% female) with a mean age of 24.46 (SD = 5.14). Participants were eligible if they had 
sufficient knowledge of the German language and an educational qualification of university 
entrance diploma or higher. None of the participants reported diseases of the central nervous 
system; cardiovascular, respiratory or neuroendocrine diseases; seizures; first-degree relatives 
suffering from epilepsy; a history of traumatic brain injury; metallic particles around the head; 
a cardiac and cerebral pacemaker, cochlea implants and hearing aid devices; strong allergic 
reactions to sensing electrodes; current pregnancy; left- or mixed handedness as indicated by 
a short version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Veale, 2014); psychotropic 
medication; a substance use disorder with less than 2 years of abstinence; a history of 
psychiatric disorders as assessed by the M.I.N.I. International Neuropsychiatric Interview for 
DSM-5 (Sheehan, 2016) and the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Krüger-Gottschalk et 
al., 2017); or a history of psychological treatment. All participants gave informed consent and 
received monetary compensation or course credit. The study protocol was in compliance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the local ethics committee. 
Stressful film fragment 
     Participants watched a 9-minutes film depicting scenes of injury and death on an 18-inch 
screen in a darkened room. The scenes were derived from Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, and 
Deeprose (2009) and contained self-injury, a traffic accident, the killing of a man by an ele-
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phant as well as two fragments from the movie “American History X” by Tony Kaye. All 
participants were informed about the exposition to violent content in the study advertisement 
and in the informed consent. 
TDCS 
     A direct current of 1 mA was delivered by a CE-certified stimulator (NeuroConn GmbH, 
Ilmenau, Germany). Using a pair of 0.9 % NaCL-soaked sponge electrodes (35cm2 surface), 
the anode/cathode was fixated on the scalp over F3 according to the international 10-20 sys-
tem of electrode placement. To avoid polarization of another brain area, the reference elec-
trode was placed on the right deltoid muscle. Verum stimulation was administered for 20 
minutes plus a 5-seconds fade-in and fade-out phase. Sham stimulation was ramped down 
after 30 seconds, thereby eliciting a slight tingling on the head but no effects in the brain.  
Cognitive control measure  
     AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT). We used a version of the AX-CPT based 
on Gonthier and colleagues (2016). The task was presented on an 18-inch screen via EPrime. 
In each trial, participants saw a cue (any letter except X, K, or Y) in the center of the screen 
for 1000ms. Following an unfilled inter-stimulus interval of 4000ms, a probe (any letter ex-
cept A, K, or Y) appeared on the same position for 500ms. After the probe, a 1000ms inter-
trial interval followed in which a row of asterisks was presented. Participants had to respond 
as quickly as possible after they observed the second letter, i.e. the probe. They were instruct-
ed to press the target button with the middle finger of their right hand when they saw an A 
followed by an X, and to press the non-target button with the index finger of the right hand 
when they saw any other pair. Responses were recorded during the 500ms probe presentation 
and the 1000ms inter-trial interval. Participants completed 200 trials presented in four blocks. 
As reported in Gonthier and colleagues (2016) and Richmond and colleagues (2015), 40 % of 
the trials in each block contained an A followed by an X (AX trials), 10 % of the trials in each 
block contained an A followed by a letter other than X (AY trials), 10 % of the trials in each 
block contained a letter other than A followed by an X (BX trials), and 40 % of the trials in 
each block contained a letter other than A followed by a letter other than X (BY trials). Trials 
within each block were randomized. For each of these four trials, error rates and average re-
sponse times (RTs) for correct responses were computed. Higher proactive control is indicat-
ed by reduced error rates and faster reaction times in BX trials and increased error rates and 
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slower reaction times in AY trials. Similar to Gonthier and colleagues (2016), we additionally 
calculated the Proactive Behavioral Index (PBI), an index for the ratio of interference in AY 
and BX trials. A positive PBI reflects more interference on AY trials, indicating more proac-
tive control. It was calculated separately for error rates and RTs with (AY - BX)/(AY + BX). 
Importantly, prior to calculating the PBI, all error data was corrected for trials where error 
rates were equal to zero via (number of errors + 0.5)/(number of trials + 1) (Gonthier et al., 
2016).  
Post-film intrusive memories 
     Intrusive memories. Having watched the film, participants read a neutral filler text with 
technical information about a German airport (the Cologne Bonn airport) for 10 minutes. The 
aim of this filler text was to avoid that participants deliberately think about the film during an 
unguarded resting period and to measure the occurrence of intrusive memories during a situa-
tion that resembles everyday life. After this period, intrusive memories were assessed by a 6-
item questionnaire adapted from Weidmann and Papsdorf (2010). First, participants were 
provided a short definition of intrusive memories and indicated how often they had experi-
enced intrusive memories of the film during text reading, the time taken up by experiencing 
intrusive memories of the film while reading (from 0 to 100 % of the time) and—in case they 
had reported at least one intrusive memory—the predominant quality (“thought”, “image”, 
“short film scene”, “feeling”, “sound”, “something else”, “I do not know”). Furthermore, lev-
el of distress caused by the intrusive memories, level of vividness, and level of control were 
each measured on a 10-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 10 = “very”). 
     Impact of movie scale (IMS). In accordance with previous studies (e.g., Verwoerd et al., 
2011), a film-adapted version of the Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 
1979) was additionally used. The IMS contained six items relating to intrusive memories dur-
ing the 10-minutes reading period (e.g., “Images of the film came up spontaneously”) that 
were rated on a 4-point scale (1 = “not at all”, 4 = “often”) with item weights of 0, 1, 3, 5 (cf. 
Horowitz et al., 1979). Internal consistency of the scale was high (Cronbach's α = .91). 
 
Control measures 
     Trait film-related intrusive memories. The trait tendency for intrusive memories after 
stressful films was measured by modified versions of the questionnaires for post-film intru-
sive memories. Participants indicated their habitual responses to films that trigger negative 
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emotions in general. For the frequency of intrusive memories, answers were now given on a 
5-point scale (1 = “never” to 5 = “always”). 
     Trait response to intrusive memories. We applied a modified version of the 19-item Re-
sponse to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ; e.g., Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehring et al., 2008) 
to capture how participants habitually respond to intrusive memories of stressful events. The 
RIQ consists of five subscales measuring suppression (6 items), rumination (8 items), dissoci-
ation (3 items), the consumption of alcohol or drugs (1 item) and the distraction with music or 
TV (1 item). The latter two subscales were not of interest for this study. Answers were given 
on a 4-point scale (1 = “never”, 4 = “always”). Reliability and predictive validity were ac-
ceptable to good in previous research (e.g., Ehring et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2002).  
     Neuropsychological measures. The Trail Making Test (TMT A/B; Reitan, 1992) and a 
digit span test forward/backward (a version similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; 
Petermann, 2012) were administered to control for individual differences in visual-motor con-
ceptual screening, cognitive flexibility as well as short-term and working memory capacity.  
     Mood and arousal. We assessed whether tDCS and the film scene affected participants’ 
mood and arousal by two Self-Assessment-Manikins (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). Partici-
pants had to indicate how they felt (1 = “very negative” to 9 = “very positive”) and how 
aroused they were (1 = “very calm” to 9 = “very high arousal”) on a scale that included five 
non-verbal pictorial stimuli. 
     Film control measures. To assess how attentively participants had followed the film, par-
ticipants completed six self-generated multiple choice questions about the fragment from 
American History X (e.g., “What was the name of the perpetrator?”). A sum score for correct 
answers was calculated. Furthermore, we asked whether participants had seen the film scenes 
before, whether they watched similar films frequently, and how often they had looked away 
during the film on a 5-point scale (1 = “never”, 5 = “always”). Subjective distress during the 
film was measured by two additional SAMs for mood (1= “very negative” to 9 = “very posi-
tive”) and arousal (1 = “very calm” to 9 = “very high arousal”). 
     Motivation. Participants were asked to indicate their motivation to complete the study, to 
perform the AX-CPT, and to fill out the questionnaires on three visual analogue scales (0 = 
“not at all”, 10 = “very”). 
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Procedure 
     Participants were tested at the outpatient center of LMU Munich in a 2-2.5 hours session. 
First, sociodemographic and health questionnaires, the EHI short form and the M.I.N.I. and 
PCL-5 were administered to check eligibility. Next, participants completed TMT A/B and 
digit span test. After a 10-minutes break, tDCS was applied for 20 minutes. The computerized 
AX-CPT started 5 minutes after the onset of stimulation and took 25 minutes. Afterwards, the 
experimenter darkened the room and left the lab while the film was presented. SAMs were 
completed at baseline, after 5 minutes of tDCS before the start of the AX-CPT and after film 
presentation. Having watched the film, participants read the filler text for 10 minutes and then 
completed the measures of intrusive memories as well as the remaining questionnaires via 
Unipark (EFS Survey, Questback GmbH).  
Data analyses 
     Data were analyzed by use of SPSS® Version 24.0. To check comparability of stimulation 
groups, we examined group differences in any of the baseline or post-film control measures 
via Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) and Kruskal–Wallis-Tests. Furthermore, we analyzed 
mood and arousal ratings by use of two mixed ANOVAs with the between-subject factor 
tDCS group (sham vs. anodal vs. cathodal) and the within-subject factor time point (baseline 
vs. pre AX-CPT vs. post film). To test the effects of tDCS on proactive control in the AX-
CPT (H1), we performed mixed Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) with the between-subject 
factor tDCS group (sham vs. anodal vs. cathodal) and the within-subject factor trial type (AY 
vs. BX) and with error rates or RTs (for correct responses), respectively, as dependent varia-
bles. In addition, we performed a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with the 
between-subject factor tDCS group and the PBIs as dependent variables. Participants in the 
anodal condition were expected to show greater proactive control, as indicated by worse AY 
performance, better BX performance, and higher PBI values whereas participants in the ca-
thodal condition were expected to demonstrate lower proactive control as indicated by better 
AY performance, worse BX performance, and lower PBI values. To test effects of tDCS on 
intrusive memories (H2), we used a MANOVA with the number of post-film intrusive memo-
ries, the percent of time they had been experienced and the IMS score as dependent variables. 
An exploratory MANOVA was performed for all individuals reporting intrusive memories 
with level of distress, vividness and control of intrusive memories as dependent variables. 
Finally, Bonferroni-Holm--corrected Spearman-Rho-correlation coefficients were calculated 
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to test associations between the AX-CPT indices and the intrusive memories measures (H3). 
If not otherwise stated, all effects were tested at the .05 α-level (two-tailed) and Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected tests were used when the sphericity assumption was violated in mixed 
ANOVAs. Moreover, we computed Bayes Factors for each hypothesis to quantify the relative 
strength of evidence for our main findings. In addition to the main analyses, we calculated 
split-half reliabilities of the AX-CPT by creating two data sets (even, odd trials) and correlat-
ing mean RTs for correct responses and error rates for each trial type between the two data 
sets using Spearman-Brown correction. Reliability coefficients can be found in Table A.1 in 
the supplementary material. Sample size was determined via G*power (version 3.1, Universi-
ty of Duesseldorf, Germany), assuming a statistical power of .80 and an alpha level of .05. 
Results showed that in order to examine the effect of tDCS on cognitive control a total sample 
of 42 participants was required to test the interaction between tDCS condition and trial type (f 
= 0.25). For the global effect of tDCS on the three characteristics of intrusive memories post-
film (number of memories, percent of time experiencing intrusions, IMS score), the power 
analysis suggested that a sample of 114 participants (f2(V) = 0.0625) was needed. For the cor-
relational analyses, a total sample of 84 (r = 0.3) participants was required, according to the 
power analysis. 
Results 
     The data of this study is openly accessible in the associated OSF repository 
(https://osf.io/vak9y/). 
Descriptive statistics and group differences in control measures 
     In general, 30.6 % of participants were familiar with at least one of the film scenes and 
26.4 % of participants reported watching films with violent content regularly. There was a 
significant main effect of time on mood, F(1.28, 150.62) = 305.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, with 
mood decreasing from baseline (M = 7.09, SD = 1.27) to pre AX-CPT (M = 6.75, SD = 1.46) 
to post film (M = 3.73, SD = 1.62). Similarly, a significant main effect of time on arousal 
emerged, F(1.40, 165.34) = 217.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .65, with arousal increasing from baseline 
(M = 3.16, SD = 1.89) and tDCS start (M = 3.03, SD = 1.74) to post film period (M = 6.06, SD 
= 1.80). There was no main effect of group and no group x time interaction, neither for mood 
nor for arousal (all Fs ≤ 1.04, all ps ≥ .369). Descriptive statistics and group comparisons for 
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all other control measures are depicted in Table 2.1. The tDCS groups did not differ in any of 
these measures. 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Group Comparisons of Control Measures 
 
Notes. TMT = Trail Making Test, IM = Intrusive Memories, IMS = Impact of Movie Scale, RIQ = Response to 
Intrusions Questionnaire, SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin, AX-CPT= AX-Continuous Performance Task; 
Analyses for Distress, Control and Vividness of Intrusive Memories were performed only for individuals who 
reported to experience Intrusive Memories at least seldom. 
ns = nonsignificant; two-tailed. 
 
Cognitive control  
     Descriptive statistics for mean RTs and error rates (not transformed) for all trial types as 
well as the proactive control indices are presented in Table 2.2. For analyses, mean RTs and 
error rates were square-root transformed to reduce the impact of extreme values. The analyses 
  
 
 
 
  Min - Max 
 Sham 
 (n = 41) 
 
 M (SD) 
 Anodal 
 (n = 38) 
 
 M (SD) 
 Cathodal 
 (n = 42) 
 
 M (SD) 
 
p 
      
Age 18.00 - 41.00 24.49 (5.48) 25.37 (5.17) 23.62 (4.73) ns 
TMT-A  11.00 - 60.00 21.78 (6.42) 20.76 (7.61) 22.50 (7.61) ns 
TMT-B  24.00 - 167.00 51.51 (24.21) 44.53 (12.87) 52.60 (21.25) ns 
Digit Span forward    4.00 - 12.00   8.63 (1.83)   8.89 (1.71)   9.02 (1.68) ns 
Digit Span backward    3.00 - 12.00   7.37 (1.64)   7.55 (2.10)   7.76 (1.94) ns 
Trait Film-Related IM    1.00 - 5.00   2.39 (0.77)   2.32 (0.74)   2.50 (0.86) ns 
Trait Distress of IM    1.00 - 9.00   4.03 (1.60)   4.47 (1.99)   4.27 (1.61) ns 
Trait Vividness of IM    1.00 - 10.00   5.50 (2.29)   5.53 (2.33)   5.05 (1.68) ns 
Trait Control of IM    1.00 - 10.00   6.28 (2.43)   6.88 (2.21)   6.62 (1.69) ns 
Trait IMS   0.00 - 24.00   6.54 (5.18)   5.63 (4.91)   6.64 (4.81) ns 
RIQ Suppression   6.00 - 24.00 15.95 (3.67) 14.89 (3.45) 15.10 (3.34) ns 
RIQ Rumination   8.00 - 27.00 15.44 (4.76) 13.89 (4.01) 15.31 (4.05) ns 
RIQ Dissociation   3.00 - 10.00   4.73 (1.70)   4.71 (1.65)   4.86 (1.65) ns 
Time Looked away    1.00 - 4.00   1.88 (0.93)   1.79 (0.91)   1.95 (0.96) ns 
SAM Valence during Film    1.00 - 8.00   2.78 (1.46)   2.87 (1.26)   3.36 (1.43) ns 
SAM Arousal during Film    2.00 - 9.00   6.59 (1.86)   6.95 (1.72)   6.24 (1.71) ns 
Film-Related Attentiveness    1.00 - 6.00   4.15 (1.37)   4.42 (0.98)   4.31 (1.30) ns 
Motivation Start of study   3.00 - 10.00   8.83 (1.32)   8.55 (1.83)   8.60 (1.35) ns 
Motivation AX-CPT   2.00 - 10.00   7.12 (2.35)   7.29 (2.35)   6.67 (2.31) ns 
Motivation Questionnaire   1.00 - 10.00   8.49 (2.06)   9.13 (1.26)   8.93 (1.02) 
 
ns 
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of error rates (AY and BX) revealed a significant effect of trial type, with all participants 
making less errors in BX (M = 0.06, SD = 0.08) than in AY (M = 0.18, SD = 0.12) trials, F(1, 
118) = 141.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. The same pattern of results was found for RTs, participants 
responded faster in BX (M = 440.05, SD = 136.49) than in AY (M = 567.71, SD = 103.93) 
trials, F(1, 118) = 383.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .77. However, contrary to H1, none of the interac-
tion effects reached significance, all Fs ≤ 0.36, all ps ≥ .698. Additionally, there were no 
group differences for the PBIs, V = 0.009, F(4, 236) = 0.28, p = .891, ηp2 = .005 (Pillai’s 
trace). 
Post-film intrusive memories  
     Descriptive statistics of the intrusive memories measures are shown in Table 2.3. In gen-
eral, 24.8 % of participants reported no intrusive memories at all. In contrast, 14.9 % of par-
ticipants experienced intrusive memories as thoughts, 13.2 % as images, 34.7 % as a short 
film scene, 8.3 % as feelings, and 1.7 % as sounds. 2.5 % of participants did not specify the 
quality of the intrusive memory. For analyses, the dependent measures were square-root trans-
formed to reduce the impact of extreme values. In contrast to H2, the tDCS groups did not 
differ in the three intrusive memories measures, V = 0.03, F(6, 234) = 0.62, p = .711, ηp2 = .02 
(Pillai’s trace). Furthermore, there were no effects of tDCS on level of distress, level of vivid-
ness, or level of control of intrusive memories for those individuals who had experienced in-
trusive memories, V = 0.04, F(6, 174) = 0.63, p = .707, ηp2 = .021 (Pillai’s trace). 
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Link between cognitive control and post-film intrusive memories  
     Given that there were no group differences for proactive control or intrusive memories, we 
examined correlations across tDCS groups. Correlations between performance in AY and BX 
trials as well as indices of proactive control and intrusive memories are depicted in Table 2.4. 
The intrusive memories measures were highly inter-correlated but there were no significant 
correlations between intrusive memories and proactive control. When repeating these analyses 
only in the sham subgroup to exclude any effect of stimulation, the results did not change. 
Bayesian analyses 
     We quantitated the relative strength of evidence for the non-significant findings by use of 
Bayesian hypothesis testing. A Bayes factor (BF01) quantifies how well a hypothesis predicts 
observed data over an alternative hypothesis (Dienes, 2014). We computed BF01 using JASP 
statistical software version 0.11.1.0 for our main hypotheses (JASP Team, 2019). A BF01 < 1 
implies that a result is more likely to occur under an alternative hypothesis (H1) than under a 
null hypothesis (H0). In contrast, a BF01 > 1 indicates that a result is more likely to occur under 
a H0 than under a H1 (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). For the first hypothesis, we expected a 
significant tDCS x trial type interaction for error rates and RTs for correct responses as 
dependent variables (both measures square-root transformed). Thus, a Bayesian mixed 
ANOVA was performed with default prior scales. Testing the interaction model (assuming 
the main effects of tDCS and time and their interaction) as the H1 versus the main-effect 
model (assuming the main effects only) as the H0, the results showed a BF01 of 9.606 for error 
rates and a BF01 of 14.585 for RTs. Thus, we found substantial to strong evidence in favor of 
the H0 (Wagenmakers et al., 2011), indicating no interactions. Furthermore, we computed two 
separate ANOVAs with default prior scales with the PBIs as dependent variables to examine 
significant effects of tDCS group, with the H0 stating no differences between the three tDCS 
groups and the H1 stating group differences. Bayes factors for PBI on error rates (BF01 = 
10.205) and PBI on reaction times (BF01 = 11.272) suggested strong evidence in favor of the 
H0 (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). For the second hypothesis, we expected a significant effect of 
tDCS group on intrusive memories measures. Hence, we ran three separate Bayesian 
ANOVAs with default prior scales with the number of post-film intrusive memories, the 
percent of time they had been experienced and the IMS score (all measures square-root 
transformed) as dependent variables. The H0 stated no differences between the three tDCS 
groups in these variables whereas the H1 stated group differences. Results showed a BF01 of 
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7.334 for number of post-film intrusive memories, a BF01 of 8.375 for percent of time they 
had been experienced, and a BF01 of 3.695 for the IMS scores, implying substantial evidence 
for no effect of tDCS condition (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). For the third hypothesis, 
Bayesian Pearson correlations were calculated to analyze associations between the AX-CPT 
indices and the intrusive memories measures. The H0 stated no significant correlations. 
Results are summarized in Table 2.5. Bayesian analyses indicated no associations between 
AX-CPT indices and intrusive memories. 
 
75
 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
4 
 
Sp
ea
rm
an
-R
ho
-C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 fo
r t
he
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
        
 N
ot
es
. I
M
 =
 In
tru
si
ve
 M
em
or
ie
s, 
IM
S 
= 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f M
ov
ie
 S
ca
le
, R
Ts
 =
 R
ea
ct
io
n 
tim
es
 in
 m
s f
or
 tr
ia
ls
 w
ith
 c
or
re
ct
 re
sp
on
se
s, 
 
PB
I =
 P
ro
ac
tiv
e 
be
ha
vi
or
al
 sh
ift
 in
de
x.
  
**
* 
p 
< 
.0
01
; t
w
o-
ta
ile
d,
 B
on
fe
rr
on
i-H
ol
m
-c
or
re
ct
ed
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
 
3.
 
Er
ro
r 
R
at
e 
A
Y
 
Er
ro
r 
R
at
e 
B
X
 
R
Ts
 A
Y
 
R
Ts
 B
X
 
PB
I E
r-
ro
rs
 
PB
I R
Ts
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
 P
os
t-F
ilm
 n
um
be
r o
f I
M
  
 .8
7*
**
 
 .7
5*
**
 
-.0
1 
-.0
1 
 .0
0 
-.0
8 
  .
03
 
 .0
9 
2.
 P
os
t-F
ilm
 %
 o
f t
im
e 
IM
  
  -
 
 .7
2*
**
 
-.0
6 
-.0
6 
 .0
2 
-.0
3 
  .
03
 
 .0
2 
3.
 IM
S 
  
 - 
 .0
5 
 .0
9 
 .0
4 
-.0
4 
 -.
03
 
 .0
6 
 
 
 
Study II: TDCS Effects on Proactive Control and Intrusive Memories 
 
 
75 
 
 
76
 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
5 
Ba
ye
si
an
 P
ea
rs
on
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
A
Y
 
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
B
X
 
R
Ts
 A
Y
 
R
Ts
 B
X
 
PB
I E
rr
or
s 
PB
I R
Ts
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Po
st
-F
ilm
 n
um
be
r o
f I
M
 
r B
F 0
1 
.0
49
 
7.
65
7 
.0
03
 
8.
78
9 
.0
30
 
8.
34
7 
-.0
44
 
7.
83
6 
.0
34
 
8.
20
9 
.1
20
 
3.
78
6 
Po
st
-F
ilm
 %
 o
f t
im
e 
IM
 
r B
F 0
1 
-.0
36
 
8.
14
7 
-.0
80
 
6.
05
7 
.0
32
 
8.
28
2 
.0
02
 
8.
79
2 
.0
46
 
7.
76
8 
.0
53
 
7.
45
2 
IM
S 
r B
F 0
1 
.0
56
 
7.
33
3 
.0
89
 
5.
50
0 
.0
57
 
7.
26
8 
-.0
08
 
8.
76
0 
-.0
39
 
8.
02
9 
.0
75
 
6.
30
7 
 
 N
ot
es
. I
M
 =
 In
tru
si
ve
 M
em
or
ie
s, 
IM
S 
= 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f M
ov
ie
 S
ca
le
, R
Ts
 =
 R
ea
ct
io
n 
tim
es
 in
 m
s f
or
 tr
ia
ls
 w
ith
 c
or
re
ct
 re
sp
on
se
s, 
 
PB
I =
 P
ro
ac
tiv
e 
be
ha
vi
or
al
 sh
ift
 in
de
x.
 F
or
 a
ll 
te
st
s, 
th
e 
H
0 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 n
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 c
or
re
la
tio
ns
.
 
 
Study II: TDCS Effects on Proactive Control and Intrusive Memories 
 
 
76 
 
Study II: TDCS Effects on Proactive Control and Intrusive Memories 
  77 
Discussion 
     In this randomized, sham-controlled, double-blind analogue study we examined causal 
relations between the activation of the left dlPFC, cognitive control, and intrusive memories 
after a trauma film in healthy individuals. In particular, we applied anodal, cathodal, and sham 
tDCS to the left dlPFC, a brain region that is highly relevant for cognitive control mechanisms 
as well as intrusive memories. Importantly, we relied upon the DMC framework to define 
cognitive control and investigated tDCS effects on indices of proactive control as well as cor-
relations with intrusive memories. In contrast to our hypotheses, the results indicated no ef-
fects of tDCS over the left dlPFC on proactive control or intrusive memories after a trauma 
film. Moreover, the occurrence of intrusive memories was not related to proactive control.  
     Overall, individuals showed a positive PBI as well as slower reaction times and more er-
rors in AY trials, which points towards a proactive control mode in our sample. This finding 
is in line with previous research suggesting proactive control as a default mode in healthy 
young adults (e.g., Braver, 2012; Gómez-Ariza et al., 2017; Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 
2008). The predictions of the present study were that anodal tDCS over the left dlPFC in-
creases and cathodal tDCS decreases proactive control, as compared to sham stimulation. 
However, there was no difference in performance in the AX-CPT across the three stimulation 
groups. This result is unexpected as theoretical accounts stress the central role of the left 
dlPFC in the DMC framework (Braver, 2012), and as previous neuroimaging studies have 
demonstrated correlations between left dlPFC activation and performance in the AX-CPT 
(e.g., Braver et al., 2009; Lesh et al., 2013; Lopez-Garcia et al., 2016). Moreover, previous 
research emphasized the central role of the left dlPFC for the cognitive control network in 
general (e.g., Blasi et al., 2006; Bunge et al., 2001; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003) and for tasks 
that involve information maintenance in particular (e.g., Tremblay et al., 2014). However, our 
findings are not unprecedented. For example, Gómez-Ariza and colleagues (2017) also exam-
ined whether a manipulation of the left dlPFC via tDCS changes performance in the AX-CPT 
and found no stimulation effect. The present study confirms this finding by use of a larger 
sample size and altered task as well as stimulation parameters. Thus, our results further ques-
tion the lateralization of proactive control within the prefrontal cortex as well as its suscepti-
bility to tDCS. In general, cognitive control involves a complex neuronal network (e.g., Alva-
rez & Emory, 2006) and especially the DMC framework postulates time-dependent changes 
of activation patterns that have yet to be further empirically evaluated (Braver, 2012). More 
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attention should be paid to the role of the right dlPFC given that Gómez-Ariza and colleagues 
(2017) reported offline cathodal tDCS over the right dlPFC to decrease the PBI for error rates. 
This finding was surprising since previous conceptual and fMRI studies argued the right 
dlPFC to be less relevant for AX-CPT performance so that stimulation of this area was ex-
pected to be less effective (e.g., Braver et al., 2009). Thus, future stimulation studies must 
further clarify the lateralization of the dlPFC for the local and temporal dynamics of proactive 
control, preferably by combining neuromodulation with functional imaging.  
     Alternatively, the nonsignificant findings of the current study might also be a result of low 
sensitivity of the utilized proactive control task. We used the AX-CPT because it is a widely 
applied measure within the DMC framework, therefore enhancing comparability to previous 
research. In addition, it combines RTs and error rates, an important advantage given that a 
recent meta-analysis reported that for healthy individuals, effects of tDCS over the dlPFC on 
cognitive control are predominantly shown in altered RTs instead of error rates (Dedoncker et 
al., 2016a). However, reliability of the AX-CPT in healthy young adults has been subject to 
methodological discussion (Cooper, Gonthier, Barch, & Braver, 2017). As already mentioned, 
healthy young adults usually employ proactive control, leading to high performance in all 
trials except AY. Thus, as argued by Cooper and colleagues (2017), there might be ceiling 
effects that reduce discriminating power. This is especially relevant given that ceiling effects 
for anodal tDCS in healthy samples have also been discussed (e.g., Furuya et al., 2014). In-
deed, in our sample we also found low split-half reliabilities for the AY and BX trials for er-
ror rates (see Table A.1 in the supplementary material). Hence, although the AX-CPT is an 
established task, future neurostimulation studies might profit from using alternative tasks or 
including no-go trials in the AX-CPT to decrease the baseline utilization of proactive control 
as suggested by Gonthier and colleagues (2016). 
     In addition to the absent effects of tDCS over the left dlPFC on performance in the AX-
CPT as an indicator of proactive control, there was also no effect of tDCS on the occurrence 
of intrusive memories after the trauma film. These non-significant results underline a recent 
study by Voss and colleagues (2019) that also found no effects of 20 minutes tDCS over the 
left dlPFC on intrusive memories although activation of the left dlPFC has been frequently 
associated with intrusions (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Aupperle et al., 2012; Benoit et al., 
2014). In accordance with the involvement of other brain areas in proactive control as de-
scribed above, other brain areas have also been found to play a role in the regulation of un-
wanted images and thoughts (Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson et al., 2015; Kühn et al., 2012). 
Thus, future research should also focus on the modulation of intrusive memories via stimula-
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tion of these areas. Interestingly, in an fMRI study, Benoit and colleagues (2014) reported 
increased engagement of the dlPFC when unwanted memories had to be suppressed and indi-
viduals with negative coupling between dlPFC and hippocampus during early suppression 
reported fewer intrusive memories later on. At the behavioral level, intrusive memories were 
assessed by use of the think/no-think paradigm (Anderson & Green, 2001). In this paradigm, 
participants are instructed to either suppress or recall memories of previous learned pictures 
and have to report their success in doing so. Although our assessment of intrusive memories is 
common within the trauma film research, it was retrospective, based on self-report and with-
out any instruction to control intrusive memories. To avoid these limitations, future research 
might benefit from including the think/no think paradigm as reported by Benoit and col-
leagues (2014). This task might also be helpful to further explore the relationship between 
proactive control and intrusive memories. Given that there was no stimulation effect in the 
current study, we examined whether indices of proactive control prior to a stressful experi-
ence are linked to the development of post-stressor intrusive memories across stimulation 
groups. Surprisingly, there were no significant correlations. Future studies should further in-
vestigate the role of the dual mechanisms of control for posttraumatic symptomatology, espe-
cially in clinical samples. We proposed that a pre-stressor diminished proactive control would 
make it difficult to maintain current goals, use context information and ignore goal-irrelevant 
cues that activate stressful or traumatic representations, leading to higher levels of intrusive 
memories. However, it might also be that distressed individuals show reduced proactive con-
trol only after a traumatic event due to the constant preoccupation with other posttraumatic 
symptoms or possibly threatening stimuli. This preoccupation might lead to reduced cognitive 
resources for maintaining the cognitive more demanding proactive control mode. Thus, inves-
tigating causality within the DMC framework should further be focused in future research. In 
this context it should also be investigated whether an inflexible deployment of proactive and 
reactive control during different situational demands instead of per se diminished proactive 
control might be related to symptomatology. 
     Some methodological limitations of this study have to be addressed. First, effectivity of 
tDCS highly depends on stimulation period, current intensity, position of the reference elec-
trode and online versus offline stimulation. Moreover, although some experimental studies 
have shown significant declining effects of cathodal tDCS on cognitive control, a recent meta-
analysis questioned whether cathodal tDCS of the dlPFC has reliable effects on cognitive 
functioning (Dedoncker et al., 2016b). However, we used a stimulation protocol that demon-
strated stable effects on cognitive control parameters in previous investigations (e.g., Wolken-
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stein & Plewnia, 2013; Wolkenstein et al., 2014). Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the 
extracephalic position of the reference electrode or the low current intensity in this study led 
to reduced stimulation strength or a rapid decline of stimulation effects (e.g., Moliadze et al., 
2010; see also Voss et al., 2019). Furthermore, working mechanisms of tDCS are still contro-
versial. Vöröslakos and colleagues (2018) emphasized that scalp-applied current intensity is 
influenced by skin, soft tissue, or skull thickness and therefore currents of 4-6 mA or higher 
are needed to achieve a high voltage gradient. It has yet to be shown how effects on neuronal 
activity can be maximized by use of alternative stimulation protocols (e.g., Chhatbar et al., 
2017) or methods (e.g., Vöröslakos et al., 2018). Second, in this study, participants started to 
complete the AX-CPT 5 minutes after the onset of tDCS. Whereas tDCS lasted for additional 
15 minutes, completion of the AX-CPT took approximately 25 minutes. Thus, 10 minutes of 
the AX-CPT were completed offline without active stimulation. We chose this procedure be-
cause tDCS-induced changes in brain activity were reported to persist for at least one hour 
(Nitsche et al., 2008) and offline designs successfully induced cognitive control shifts in pre-
vious studies (e.g., Dedoncker et al., 2016a; Hill et al., 2016; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; 
Wolkenstein et al., 2014). However, in the study by Gómez-Ariza and colleagues (2017), 
tDCS effects on performance in the AX-CPT depended on target brain area and on online 
versus offline application. Thus, future tDCS studies that strive to achieve a better under-
standing of the temporal dynamics of the DMC have to take into account state-dependency 
and the differentiation between online and offline stimulation. Third, our participants were 
highly-educated healthy young adults who demonstrated low trait stress induced by intrusive 
memories. Future studies should also examine more heterogeneous samples to prevent floor 
effects for the occurrence of intrusive memories. In this context, it might also be worthwhile 
to preselect individuals based on criteria such as a disposition for intrusive memories or base-
level performance in cognitive control to strengthen tDCS effects.  
     In conclusion, by re-examining the susceptibility of proactive control to neuromodulation 
of the left dlPFC; by investigating the causal role of the left dlPFC for intrusive memories 
after a trauma film; and by exploring associations between proactive control and intrusive 
memories, this study extends existing research on the DMC framework and on risk factors for 
posttraumatic symptoms. We chose the left dlPFC as a target brain area for tDCS because of 
its well-established relation to proactive control and intrusive memories as well as its 
suitability for tDCS manipulation. However, taking the nonsignificant findings of previous 
research (Gómez-Ariza et al., 2017; Voss et al., 2019) into account, our results further 
highlight the importance to consider alternative brain areas and boundary conditions that 
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might increase effects of neurostimulation in the future. Furthermore, our study is one of the 
first that explored whether the DMC framework also applies to post-stressor intrusive 
symptomatology. Clearly, more research in this field is needed, most of all research that also 
includes clinical samples and real-life assessments. Thus, our results are only a starting point 
for future explorations of whether cognitive control—the central component of human 
cognitive functioning—does conceptually and causally influence why some individuals 
cannot get rid of unwanted, intruding memories. 
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Abstract 
Deficits in cognitive control are assumed to play an important role in the development and 
maintenance of intrusive re-experiencing in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). More-
over, deficient cognitive control has been linked to rumination, a maladaptive processing 
style that maintains symptomatology. There is an emerging field of neurobehavioral inter-
ventions targeting cognitive control impairments but empirical evidence in PTSD is still 
limited. In this pilot study, we tested whether a 6-session cognitive control training influ-
ences intrusive re-experiencing, rumination (repetitive negative thinking and brooding) as 
well as comorbid depressive symptoms in a sample of N = 33 PTSD patients. The pilot 
study followed a double-blind, randomized, controlled design with a cognitive control 
versus placebo training group and three measurement points (baseline, post, 1-month fol-
low-up). The cognitive control training consisted of Wells’s Attention Training and the 
adaptive Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task. Both groups showed a significant reduc-
tion in re-experiencing, repetitive negative thinking, and depressive symptoms after train-
ing. Surprisingly, only the placebo group reported a significant reduction in brooding. 
Cognitive transfer tasks indicated no effects on working memory updating or inhibition. 
The results are in contrast to previous studies testing components of the training in healthy 
individuals with intrusive memories as well as in depressive individuals. Recommenda-
tions for future studies include differentiating between trauma types, administering addi-
tional online training sessions, and increasing sample size. 
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Introduction 
     In recent years, cognitive processes have been discussed as risk factors for the devel-
opment and maintenance of psychopathology in general (e.g., Goschke, 2014) and Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in particular (Aupperle et al., 2012; Bomyea et al., 
2012). Whereas traditional cognitive models focus mainly on the content of trauma-related 
cognitions, recent approaches highlight the neuropsychological basis of these cognitions 
with the aim to expand etiological models and enhance therapy outcome (Bomyea et al., 
2015). In this context, cognitive control has been identified as a promising target for re-
search and intervention. 
     Cognitive control refers to higher-order executive processes that assign limited cogni-
tive capacity towards goal-relevant information. At the cognitive level, these processes 
include inhibiting distracting and goal-irrelevant stimuli, shifting between stimuli, or up-
dating representations in working memory. At the neuronal level, they are associated with 
activation in the prefrontal brain network, for example in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC; e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001; Robinson et al., 2014). Impairments in cognitive con-
trol have been discussed to be responsible for variability in the development of posttrau-
matic stress symptoms such as re-experiencing (e.g., Aupperle et al., 2012). Re-
experiencing can take the form of intrusive memories defined as vivid, unwanted, and 
recurring sensory fragments of the traumatic event (APA, 2013). It has been suggested 
that traumatized individuals with low cognitive control might exhibit difficulties in disen-
gaging attention from trauma-related stimuli and in controlling activated representations 
of the trauma in working memory (Aupperle et al., 2012; Wessel et al., 2008). These diffi-
culties are thought to result in a constant confrontation with internal or external trauma 
reminders and therefore facilitate persistent intrusive memories. Indeed, reduced cognitive 
control has been found in a wide range of PTSD patient groups (for overviews see Aup-
perle et al., 2012; Bomyea et al., 2012; Polak et al., 2012) and was associated with the 
development of intrusive memories in analogue samples (e.g., Verwoerd et al., 2011; 
Wessel et al., 2008). Moreover, disruptions in cognitive control are consistent with ob-
served frontal lobe abnormalities linked to PTSD key symptoms (Aupperle et al., 2012; 
Etkin & Wager, 2007; Kühn & Gallinat, 2013).  
     In addition to the link between impaired cognitive control and PTSD symptoms, cogni-
tive control might also influence maladaptive processing styles that maintain sympto-
matology, for example rumination. Similar to intrusive memories, rumination is a recur-
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ring, cognitive phenomenon. However, it does not involve the short sensory reliving of the 
event but refers to uncontrollable, repetitive thinking about the trauma, its causes, and its 
consequences for a longer period of time (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Moreover, rumination is 
not a key symptom of PTSD but has been identified as a maintaining factor that might 
provide internal cues for intrusive memories and inhibit the acceptance of the traumatic 
event (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehring et al., 2008; Elwood, Hahn, Olatunji, & Wil-
liams, 2009; Szabo et al., 2017). For instance, Wild and colleagues (2016) reported that 
rumination predicted posttraumatic stress symptoms in paramedics over a period of two 
years. Importantly, persistent rumination has also been associated with reduced cognitive 
control as reflected by deficits in updating, inhibiting, or shifting away from irrelevant 
negative representations in working memory (e.g., Brinker et al., 2013; Joormann et al., 
2010; Yang et al., 2016; Zetsche et al., 2018). Furthermore, the prefrontal cortex was also 
found to play an important role in ruminative thinking (e.g., De Raedt et al., 2017; 
Vanderhasselt et al., 2013).  
     Even though associations between reduced cognitive control and PTSD symptoms—
such as intrusive re-experiencing—or maintaining factors—such as rumination—are em-
pirically well-supported, the causal directions remain unclear. For example, low cognitive 
control might be a risk factor for the development of posttraumatic stress symptoms or 
merely a consequence of posttraumatic stress symptoms diminishing cognitive resources. 
One approach to clarify causality is to randomize PTSD patients to interventions that di-
rectly target cognitive control and examine the effects on symptomatology. Only few stud-
ies have followed this approach thus far. Schweizer and colleagues (2017), for example, 
tested whether a working memory training including trauma-related material affects cogni-
tive control and emotion regulation and reduces symptom severity in an adolescent sample 
of Iranian PTSD patients. When compared to a placebo training, participants in the cogni-
tive control group showed less error rates in a cognitive transfer task, less PTSD symp-
toms, and used more adaptive emotion regulation strategies after the training. However, 
the training did not influence maladaptive emotion regulation. Moreover, in a recent ran-
domized, controlled trial, women diagnosed with PTSD after a sexual trauma completed a 
high- versus low-intensive, neutral training of resistance to proactive interference, a com-
ponent of cognitive control that guides inhibition of no-longer relevant information in 
working memory (Bomyea et al., 2015). After the training, the high-intensive group 
showed higher working memory capacity and reduced intrusive re-experiencing as com-
pared to the low-intensive group. Besides these studies on clinical populations, data 
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gained from healthy samples have demonstrated that a low-dose cognitive control training 
reduces intrusive memories of a distressing event as compared to a control training (Calli-
nan et al., 2015; Nassif & Wells, 2014). Although these studies are highly informative, all 
of them were limited to only one specific trauma-type and none of them reported follow-
up data. Moreover, research also investigating the effects of a cognitive control training on 
rumination in the context of PTSD is missing.  
     Given the link between cognitive control and rumination and the important role of ru-
mination for maintaining PTSD, interventions that modulate cognitive control might also 
affect rumination and therefore influence symptomatology. Indeed, data from depressive 
samples show that practicing cognitive control alters rumination. For example, Siegle and 
colleagues (2007) designed a 2-week computerized training that aimed to increase pre-
frontal inhibitory control and thereby reduce symptom severity and rumination in unipolar 
depression. Specifically, the training included two well-established tasks: 1) Wells’s At-
tention Training that enhances prefrontal activation and controlled selective attention de-
spite automatic cognitions. This task has been administered in a number of studies focus-
ing on anxiety disorders and was also used in the above mentioned trainings for intrusive 
memories in healthy individuals (Callinan et al., 2015; Nassif & Wells, 2014). 2) The 
adaptive Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT), a task that increases activity in 
the prefrontal cortex and trains working memory in the face of frustration (e.g., Lazeron, 
Rombouts, de Sonneville, Barkhof, & Scheltens, 2003). Previous research indicated poor 
performance in the PASAT in traumatized individuals (e.g., Stein, Kennedy, & Twamley, 
2002) and PTSD patients (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2000). Siegle and colleagues (2007) com-
pared this training as an add-on to an outpatient day-treatment program with only the day-
treatment program in depressed individuals. They found more reduced rumination and 
depressive symptoms as well as altered brain functioning in the cognitive control group as 
compared to the day-treatment only group. In the following years, several studies used 
parts of this training to decrease rumination in healthy and clinical samples. For example, 
a training only including the adaptive PASAT decreased rumination in response to a natu-
ralistic stressor in a sample of high-ruminating healthy individuals (Hoorelbeke, Koster, 
Vanderhasselt, Callewaert, & Demeyer, 2015) as well as rumination, depressive symp-
toms, and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies in remitted depressed patients (Hoo-
relbeke & Koster, 2017), as compared to a placebo training. Yet, until now the effects of 
this cognitive control training on rumination have not been explored in PTSD patients. 
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     Taken together, examining the effects of a cognitive control training in PTSD will ex-
tend earlier research in numerous ways. First, it provides further insights into the causal 
relation between basic cognitive mechanisms and intrusive re-experiencing, thereby help-
ing to identify risk factors that contribute to the development of persistent PTSD symp-
toms. Second, although the importance of rumination for reinforcing PTSD symptoms is 
empirically well-supported, no study has explored whether modulating cognitive control 
in trauma patients also influences rumination. Thus, in this double-blind, randomized, con-
trolled pilot study we investigate the effects of the computerized cognitive control training 
introduced by Siegle and colleagues (2007) on intrusive re-experiencing in a sample of 
mixed-trauma PTSD patients. Moreover, we examine effects on posttraumatic rumination.  
We chose the training by Siegle and colleagues (2007) since components of this training 
have been shown to reduce intrusive memories in healthy individuals and rumination in 
healthy and depressed individuals as described above. Participants were randomized to 
either 6-session cognitive control training or placebo training and completed baseline, post 
and 1-month follow-up assessments of cognitive measures and symptomatology. We hy-
pothesized that the cognitive control training but not the placebo training would enhance 
cognitive control, reflected by training progress and performance increases in transfer 
tasks for working memory updating and inhibition. Furthermore, we expected the cogni-
tive control group to report reduced PTSD symptoms—in particular reduced intrusive re-
experiencing (primary outcome)—after training relative to the placebo group. Based on 
the evidences described above, we also hypothesized the cognitive control group to show 
reduced rumination operationalized as brooding and repetitive negative thinking after 
training as compared to the placebo group (secondary outcomes). Moreover, given the 
well-established effect of the training on depressive symptoms and the high comorbidity 
of depression and PTSD (Campbell et al., 2007), we expected the cognitive control train-
ing but not the placebo training to reduce comorbid depressive symptoms (secondary out-
come). Lastly, we exploratory examined changes in general PTSD symptoms as well as in 
regulation strategies for intrusive memories and investigated the tolerability of the train-
ing.  
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Method 
Design, randomization, and blinding 
     This randomized, double-blind pilot study followed a 2 x 3 design with the between-
factor training group (cognitive control vs. placebo training) and the within-factor meas-
urement point (baseline, post, 1-month follow-up). Allocation to training group was ran-
domized via automated randomization software (randomizer.org). The randomization plan 
was generated by the first author prior to the start of the study and was then kept by the 
last author who informed the staff conducting the trainings about group allocation. Partici-
pants were informed that they would be randomly assigned to one of two groups that vary 
in training intensity but were blind for the exact training condition. Interviewers for symp-
tom assessments were also blind for training condition and participants were instructed not 
to talk to the interviewer about the content of their training.3 
Sample  
     Participants between 22 and 66 years of age (M = 41.97, SD = 11.29) were recruited 
from the waitlist of the outpatient center at LMU Munich. Participant flow is depicted in 
Figure 3.1. Participants with both a single traumatic experience and with complex trau-
matic experiences were included. Further inclusion criteria were a) age of consent, b) suf-
ficient proficiency of the German language, and c) a diagnosis of PTSD as assessed by the 
German version of the Clinician-administered PTSD Scale for DSM-5 (CAPS; Müller-
Engelmann et al., 2018; Weathers et al., 2013).  Exclusion criteria were a) a primary diag-
nosis of major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder, a substance use disorder with less 
than 1 month of abstinence, a borderline personality disorder, or a history of psychosis, all 
assessed by the German version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID I 
and II; Wittchen, Zaudig, & Fydrich, 1997), b) current psychological treatment, and c) 
impaired and not-corrected hearing disability. All participants were tested at the outpatient 
center, signed informed consent and were paid 8 Euro per hour for baseline, post and fol-
low-up assessment. There was no reimbursement for training sessions. The study was ap-
                                                 
3 Please note that the blinding of the interviewers did not work for the first six participants. 
Here, interviews and trainings had to be conducted by the same person due to personnel 
changes in the research staff. 
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proved by the local ethics committee and conducted in accordance with the World Medi-
cal Association Declaration of Helsinki.  
Interventions 
     Both trainings consisted of two computerized tasks. All auditory stimuli were presented 
via headphones. Mood (angry, frustrated, stressed) was assessed before and after each 
training session on a 5-point scale (1 = “not at all”; 5 = “very”) via EPrime 2.0.  
     Cognitive control training. In line with Siegle and colleagues (2007), the cognitive 
control training aimed to activate the prefrontal cortex and increase control over contents 
of working memory. It contained German versions of Wells’s Attention Training and the 
adaptive PASAT. (1) Wells’s Attention Training was designed as part of the metacogni-
tive therapy (Wells, 2000) to increase selective attention, attention switching as well as 
divided attention and to exercise prefrontal control in the face of automatic cognitions. We 
used a version retrieved from www.metakognitivetherapie.de. Participants were briefly 
informed that the goal of this task is neither to suppress disturbing thoughts or feelings nor 
to get distracted from them but to learn how to control attention. They were presented nat-
uralistic sounds while looking on a fixation cross and instructed to focus on one sound at a 
time, switch between sounds, or count the number of sounds, despite co-occurring auto-
matic thoughts. The task ran via EPrime 2.0 for approximately 12 minutes. (2) The adap-
tive PASAT was designed to activate prefrontal control in the face of amygdala activity by 
exercising working memory during low level negative affect (Gronwall, 1977; Siegle et 
al., 2007). We used a version of the adaptive PASAT by Hoorelbeke, Koster, Demeyer, 
Loeys, and Vanderhasselt (2016). Participants were presented a series of auditory digits 
(1-9) and instructed to indicate the sum of the last two digits presented by clicking on the 
corresponding digit on the screen (1-18). Task difficulty, as defined by speed of number 
presentation, was continuously adapted based on participants’ performance. Each session 
began with an inter stimulus interval (ISI) of 3000 ms that speeded up or slowed down 
with 100 ms after four consecutive correct/incorrect responses. For each session, partici-
pants performed ten practice trials with individual feedback as well as 400 verum trials. 
To capture individual progress in task performance over time, we assessed Median ISI 
levels per session, with decreases indicating training progress. The task ran via INQUISIT 
4.0 Millisecond software for approximately 15 minutes.  
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Figure 3.1. Flow of Participants. 
Assessed for eligibility (n = 38) 
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Lost to follow-up (n = 3) 
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 n = 1 not cooperative 
 n = 1 cannot come to the lab, cannot be reached 
 
 
Completed Post-Assessment (n = 15) 
 
Allocated to Placebo training (n = 16) 
 Received complete training (n = 14) 
 Received only five trainings but continued study  
   (n = 1) 
 Drop-out (n = 1) 
- n = 1 could not be reached after 2nd training 
 
 
 
Completed Post-Assessment (n = 14) 
 
Allocated to Cognitive Control training (n = 17) 
 Received complete training (n = 13) 
 Received only four trainings but continued study 
   (n = 1) 
 Drop-out (n = 3) 
- n = 1 during 1st training because PASAT was too 
frustrating 
- n = 1 after 1st training due to symptom worsening 
- n = 1 after 4th training due to illness 
 
Lost to follow-up (n = 1) 
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Analyzed PP (n = 13) 
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      Placebo training. For a placebo version of Wells’s Attention Training, participants were 
also presented naturalistic sounds but only instructed to listen to them while looking on a fixa-
tion cross. Thus, no further instructions concerning attentional control were given. For the 
adaptive PASAT, we used a placebo version invented by Hoorelbeke and colleagues (2016). 
Instead of summing the digits, participants were instructed to immediately click on the last 
heard digit. All other task features were similar to the cognitive control training. Thus, alt-
hough low-level attention might have been exercised in both trainings, no effects on cognitive 
control were expected for the placebo training.  
Cognitive transfer tasks  
     To test transfer effects, we administered the Operation-span Task (O-span; Turner & 
Engle, 1989; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) and the Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935), 
taken from the Millisecond Test Library (https://www.millisecond.com/download/library/) 
and ran via INQUISIT 4.0 Millisecond software.  
     Operation-span. The O-span is a complex span task to measure updating of working 
memory. In each trial, participants were presented a math problem, e.g., (2*3) + 1 = ?, as well 
as a possible solution and had to indicate whether this solution was correct or incorrect as fast 
as possible. After each math problem, a letter appeared on the screen for 800 ms. Having 
completed a set of variably frequent math problems and letters, participants had to indicate 
the correct order of the afore presented letter sequence by choosing the letters from a 4x3 ma-
trix. The task consisted of a practice phase for letters (four trials), a practice phase for math 
problems (15 trials) and a practice phase in which both tasks were combined (three trials with 
two math problems and two letters). A time limit that restricted presentation for math prob-
lems in the final test phase was automatically calculated based on reaction times in the prac-
tice phase for math problems. In the final test phase, participants completed 15 trials contain-
ing three repetitions of five set sizes with three to seven letters. Furthermore, participants 
were instructed to answer at least 85 % of trials correctly and were informed about their cur-
rent accuracy rate. The total task took about 20 minutes. Outcome was the O-span score as 
calculated from the sum of the number of letters in correctly recalled sets. Higher scores indi-
cated better performance. 
     Stroop. The Stroop task assesses inhibitory control. Participants were shown a color word 
(“red”, “black”, “blue”, “green”) and asked to indicate the color in which the word was pre-
sented by pressing the corresponding response button as fast as possible. The tasks consisted 
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of congruent trials, in which color word and color were identical; incongruent trials, in which 
color word and color differed; and control trials, in which colored rectangles instead of words 
were presented. Participants had to complete a total of 84 trials presented in random order, 
with an inter-trial-interval of 200 ms and a 400 ms error feedback. A Stroop score was calcu-
lated as the difference between mean response times in incongruent and control trials, with 
higher scores indicating lower inhibitory control (Stroop, 1935). 
Self-report measures 
     Primary outcome measures. PTSD symptoms were assessed by the German PTSD 
checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5) and the CAPS. The PCL-5 (Krüger-Gottschalk et al., 2017) is a 
20-item scale that asks participants to rate distress caused by DSM-5 PTSD symptoms on a 5-
point scale (0 = “not at all” to 4 = “very strong”). This measure was adapted to assess symp-
toms during the last week instead of the last month. The CAPS (Müller-Engelmann et al., 
2018; Weathers et al., 2013) is a structured interview that assesses DSM-5 PTSD symptoms 
during the last month. Answers were rated on a 5-point scale (0 = “symptom is absent” to 4 = 
“extreme/incapacitating”). For both measures, a total score as well as scores for each symp-
tom cluster (re-experiencing; avoidance; altered mood or cognition; hyperarousal and reactivi-
ty) were calculated, with higher scores indicating higher severity. Given that our main hy-
pothesis is related to re-experiencing, the scores of these subscales were the primary outcomes 
and total scores as well as the other symptom scores were additional outcomes. Psychometric 
qualities of the PCL-5 and the CAPS have proven to be good (Krüger-Gottschalk et al., 2017; 
Müller-Engelmann et al., 2018).  
     Secondary outcome measures. Rumination in terms of brooding was measured by the 10-
item Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ-10D; German version by Huffziger & Kühner, 
2012). Participants rated habitual thoughts and actions in response to sad or depressed mood 
on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 = “almost never” to 4 = “almost always”. The questionnaire 
consists of the subscales brooding (moody pondering, e.g., “I think ‘Why do I have problems 
other people don’t have?’ ”) and reflection (resolution-oriented analysis, e.g., “I write down 
what I am thinking about and analyze it.“), with brooding representing a more maladaptive 
response style and therefore being in the focus of this study (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). Furthermore, we administered the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire 
(PTQ; German version by Ehring et al., 2011), a 15-item questionnaire that assesses rumina-
tion as repetitive thinking in response to negative experiences independent of content (e.g., "I 
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keep thinking about the same issue all the time"). Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = 
“never” to 5 = “almost always”). Internal consistencies of the RSQ-10D brooding subscale 
(Cronbach's α = .76-.93) and of the PTQ total score (Cronbach's α = .96-.97) were acceptable 
to excellent. Depressive symptoms were captured by the Inventory of Depressive Symptoms- 
self rating (IDS-SR; German version by Drieling, Schärer, & Langosch, 2007). The 30-item 
questionnaire asks participants to indicate how he or she felt during the past seven days on up 
to four possible responses that range in intensity (e.g., 0 = “I do not feel sad”; 3 = “I feel sad 
nearly all of the time.”). Internal consistency of the IDS-SR was good to excellent 
(Cronbach's α = .85-.91). For all measures, higher scores indicated more symptoms. 
     Additional measures. For exploratory analyses, we applied a modified version of the 19-
item Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ; e.g., Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehring et al., 
2008) to capture how participants deal with intrusive memories. The RIQ consists of five sub-
scales measuring suppression, rumination, dissociation, the consumption of alcohol or drugs 
(1 item), and the distraction with music or TV (1 item). For this study, only the first three sub-
scales were analyzed. Answers were given on a 4-point scale (0 = “never” to 3 = “always”). 
Higher scores indicated a more frequent use of the response style. Internal consistency of the 
subscales was acceptable to good except for dissociation (suppression: Cronbach's α = .72-
.80, rumination: Cronbach's α = .76-.85, dissociation: Cronbach's α = .52-.58). Participants’ 
evaluation of the training was assessed by a short questionnaire consisting of four visual ana-
logue scales. Participants rated the trainings’ difficulty, logic, and helpfulness for improving 
symptomatology as well as how competent they had felt in doing the training (0 = “not at all” 
to 100 = “very”). Furthermore, participants were asked to make a guess whether they were in 
the high or low intensive training condition. 
Control measures 
     Neuropsychological measures. To compare baseline neuropsychological characteristics 
between the two groups, we administered paper-pencil versions of the Trail Making Test 
(TMT A/B; Reitan, 1992) to measure visual-motor conceptual screening and cognitive flexi-
bility, the Digit Span Test forward and backward (a version similar to the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale; Petermann, 2012) to assess short-term and working memory capacity, and 
the vocabulary test (WST; Schmidt & Metzler, 1992) to estimate verbal intelligence.  
     Childhood maltreatment. The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire - Short Form (CTQ; 
German version by Wingenfeld et al., 2010) was used to check group differences in childhood 
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maltreatment. The CTQ is a 28-item self-report measure that retrospectively assesses emo-
tional abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional neglect, and physical neglect during 
childhood. Participants are asked to rate a number of statements (e.g., ‘When I was growing 
up I didn’t have enough to eat’) on a 5-point scale (1 = “never true” to 5 = “very often true”). 
An overall score was used, with higher score indicating a higher amount of abuse and neglect.  
Procedure 
     After a telephone screening for a first check of eligibility, potential participants were invit-
ed for the baseline assessment. Having signed written informed consent, sociodemographic 
data were assessed and PCL-5, CAPS, SCID I & II were administered. If no exclusion criteri-
on was met, participants completed the neuropsychological tasks as well as a baseline assess-
ment of the transfer tasks. Furthermore, participants were given the self-report measures 
(CTQ, RSQ-10D, PTQ, IDS-SR, RIQ) and instructed to complete them at home and bring 
them to the first training session. Next, participants were randomized to a training group, re-
ceived training instructions, and performed six training sessions within a period of approxi-
mately 14 days, with a maximum of one session per day. Having completed the training, par-
ticipants were invited for the post assessment in which they completed the CAPS, the PCL-5, 
the transfer tasks, the self-report measures (except CTQ) as well as the training evaluation. 
Participants returned to the lab approximately four weeks later for a follow-up assessment that 
followed the identical procedure (except training evaluation). Upon completion of the follow-
up, participants were debriefed and reimbursed. Please note that additional clinical question-
naires that were only relevant for the following psychological treatment in the outpatient cen-
ter were completed during the assessments. 
Data analyses 
     Data were analyzed using SPSS® Version 24.0. All effects were tested at the .05 α-level 
(two-tailed). Baseline group differences on demographic, clinical, and neuropsychological 
measures as well as drop-out rates for the training were examined using independent sample t 
tests or Mann-Whitney-U-tests for continuous measures and Fisher’s Exact tests for categori-
cal measures. Group differences in training evaluation were tested using a Multivariate Anal-
ysis of Variance (MANOVA) with perceived difficulty, logic, and helpfulness of the training 
as well as perceived individual competence as dependent variables. For all further analyses, 
linear mixed models (LMMs) were used. LMMs are an intention-to-treat (ITT) approach that 
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includes all available data and handles missing data under the missing at random assumption 
(Gueorguieva & Krystal, 2004). Thus, the ITT-sample comprised all randomized participants 
and missing data were not imputed. A compound symmetric covariance structure was speci-
fied for all models first. If these models failed to converge, an identical covariance structure 
was used. To test the effects of  training session on mood (angry, frustrated, stressed), differ-
ence scores (∆; post-training assessment minus baseline assessment) were computed for each 
session, with positive scores indicating an increase of anger, frustration, or stress. Group dif-
ferences, changes over time, and group x time interactions were analyzed. The basic model 
was a two-level (participants and measurement points) repeated-measures design with the 
difference scores as dependent variables and time effects varying across participants (random 
effects) and across training group (cross-level interaction). Group was dummy coded (0 = 
placebo training, 1 = cognitive control training). When analyzing training task progress, the 
basic model was a two-level (participants and measurement points) repeated-measures design 
with Median ISI of the training task as dependent variable. Time effects varied across partici-
pants (random effects). Importantly, in accordance with Hoorelbeke and colleagues (2016), 
separate analyses for each training group were conducted since outcome measures of the 
training tasks differed. Training progress was indicated by a decrease in Median ISI over 
time. For main analyses on cognitive transfer and clinical variables, the basic model was also 
a two-level (participants and measurement points) repeated-measures design. An outcome 
variable was predicted by dummy codes of time, group, and their interaction. The time dum-
mies reflected the differences between baseline and post-training (t1, coded as 0, 1, 0) and 
between baseline and follow-up (t2, coded as 0, 0, 1). The group dummies reflected the dif-
ferences between placebo (0) and cognitive control training (1). Time effects varied across the 
group (cross-level interaction) and participants (random effects). The O-span score and Stroop 
score were used as outcome variables when testing cognitive transfer effects. Primary clinical 
outcomes were PCL-5 and CAPS re-experiencing scores and secondary clinical outcomes 
were RSQ-10D brooding, PTQ, and IDS-SR scores. Additionally, we conducted exploratory 
analyzes for training effects on RIQ subscales, PCL-5 and CAPS total scores as well as other 
PCL-5 and CAPS symptom clusters. For the CAPS, only baseline to follow-up assessments 
were compared because the interview referred to a 4-week interval that did not adequately 
capture symptom changes after two weeks of training. In addition to ITT analyses, per-
protocol (PP) analyses were performed that only included participants who completed all as-
sessments and attended at least four training sessions. For the primary and secondary clinical 
outcomes, Cohen’s d was calculated from the observed means and standard deviations ac-
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cording to Carlson and Schmidt (1999; see also Morris, 2008). Differences within group were 
computed via dwithin = (Mi - Mpre)/SDpooled with SDpooled = [((ni - 1)SDi2 + (npre - 1)SDpre2)/(ni + 
npre - 2)]. Differences between within-group effects were computed via ∆d = ((MiCC - MpreCC) - 
(MiPl - MprePl))/SDpooled-pre with SDpooled-pre = [((nCC - 1)SDpreCC2 + (nPl - 1)SDprePl2)/(nCC + nPl - 
2)].  
Results 
Baseline group characteristics 
     Descriptive statistics for ITT and PP demographic, clinical, and neuropsychological con-
trol measures are presented in Table 3.1. The two groups did not differ in any of these 
measures. In general, baseline PTSD symptom severity as measured via CAPS can be consid-
ered as moderate in the present sample (ITT: M = 36.03, SD = 9.03; PP: M = 35.52, SD = 
9.28), ranging from 14 to 58. 78.80 % of the sample (ITT) reported comorbid DSM-IV disor-
ders as assessed by SCID I. Comorbid disorders included current or past mood disorders 
(45.45 %), anxiety disorders (21.82 %), substance use disorders (18.18 %), eating disorders 
(12.73 %), and somatoform disorders (1.82 %). Baseline IDS-SR scores indicated a severe 
level of depressive symptoms across all participants (ITT: M = 41.32, SD = 13.19; PP: M = 
38.18, SD = 11.66). 
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Training evaluation  
     The number of participants who started the training but did not complete all six sessions 
did not differ between the two groups (p = .656). Analyses of training evaluation were per-
formed on all individuals who completed the post assessment. Across groups, participants 
rated the training as moderately difficult (M = 49.70, SD = 24.90), moderately logical (M = 
59.87, SD = 29.05), and moderately helpful for improving symptomatology (M = 51.83, SD = 
29.69). Furthermore, they felt moderately competent in doing the training (M = 56.60, SD = 
24.56). There was a significant effect of training group on this evaluation, F(4, 24)  = 5.73, p 
= .002, Wilk's Λ = .511, ηp2 = .49. Separate ANOVAs were conducted for each dependent 
variable, with each ANOVA evaluated at an alpha level of .0125. A significant group differ-
ence emerged on difficulty of the training, F(1, 27) = 11.04, p = .003, ηp2 = .29, with partici-
pants in the cognitive control group perceiving the training as more difficult (M = 63.34, SD = 
16.31) than participants in the placebo group (M = 36.96, SD = 25.17). Group effects on all 
other dependent variables did not reach significance. At post assessment, participants’ esti-
mates whether they were in the high versus low intensity training condition were at about 
chance level, with 51.70 % of participants making a correct estimate. Descriptive statistics of 
changes in mood during training sessions are depicted in Table B.1 in the supplementary ma-
terial. Data indicates more frustration, stress, and anger in the cognitive control compared to 
the placebo group. ITT-analyses revealed significant effects of training group for frustration 
(B = 0.89, SE = 0.26, 95% CI [0.37, 1.41], p = .001), stress (B = 0.58, SE = 0.29, 95% CI 
[0.02, 1.15], p = .042), and anger (B = 0.77, SE = 0.25, 95% CI [0.27, 1.26], p = .002), with 
participants in the cognitive control group showing higher difference scores. No other effects 
reached significance. Results in the PP-sample confirmed these findings except that there was 
only a trend towards higher stress levels in the cognitive control group (B = 0.55, SE = 0.33, 
95% CI [-0.10, 1.19], p = .098). However, LMM analyses should be interpreted with caution 
since visual inspection of residual plots showed violations of the assumption of normality as 
well as extremely low variance in difference scores, with only a few individuals reporting 
mood changes at all.  
Training task progress  
     Training task progress for each group for the ITT- and the PP-sample is displayed in Fig-
ure 3.2. Importantly, as suggested by Hoorelbeke and colleagues (2016), separate analyses for 
each training group were performed since outcome measures of both training tasks were of a 
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different nature. Analyses indicated a trend towards a performance improvement of partici-
pants in the placebo group across sessions (ITT: B = -29.23, SE = 15.17, 95% CI [-59.90, 
1.45], p = .061; PP: B = -30.36, SE = 17.97, 95% CI [-66.76, 6.03], p = .099)4. However, there 
was a significant extreme value that could not be handled by data transformation. After re-
moving this participant from the analyses, the trend disappeared (ITT: B = -19.98, SE = 36.82, 
95% CI [-95.51, 55.55], p = .592; PP: B = -20.87, SE = 41.36, 95% CI [-107.15, 65.41], p = 
.619). For the cognitive control group, both ITT- and PP-analyses showed a trend towards a 
significant improvement across training sessions (ITT: B = -158.50, SE = 88.18, 95% CI [-
345.64, 28.63], p = .091; PP: B = -167.93, SE = 84.96, 95% CI [-350.75, 14.89], p = .069).  
Cognitive transfer outcomes 
     Mean scores for baseline, post, and follow-up assessments of cognitive transfer tasks are 
provided in Table 3.2. Table 3.3 depicts the results of the LMMs for the cognitive transfer 
outcomes in the ITT- and in the PP-sample. ITT-analyses indicated no significant effects on 
updating of working memory as measured with the O-span task or on inhibitory control as 
measured with the Stroop task. For the Stroop task, there was a significant extreme value at 
the baseline assessment for one participant in the ITT-sample. Excluding this participant did 
not change results. Analyses in the PP-sample confirmed the results for the O-span task. For 
the Stroop task, the main effect of group reached significance, indicating less inhibitory con-
trol in the cognitive control group.  
  
                                                 
4 For one participant, the PASAT score for the third training session was missing due to com-
puter malfunction. Thus, although the participant had received the training, this data point 
could not be included in the analyses. 
Study III: Cognitive Control Training in PTSD 
  101 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Means and Standard Deviations for Training Progress in the Intention-to-treat 
(ITT) and the Per-protocol (PP) Sample for (A) Placebo Group and (B) Cognitive Control 
Group. 
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Table 3.3  
Results of the Linear Mixed Models for Cognitive Transfer Variables in the Intention-to-treat  
(ITT) and in the Per-protocol (PP) Sample 
 Operation-span   Stroop   
Fixed parts B SE p  B SE p  
         
ITT (n = 33) 
Intercept 36.25 3.38 <.001 
  
371.77 98.68 
 
<.001  
Group  -6.19 4.71 .193  -40.90 137.49 .767  
Time (t1)  0.83 3.80 .828   21.92 118.75 .854  
Time (t2)  6.23 4.23 .146  -102.84 124.25 .411  
Group x t1  0.88 5.58 .875   44.43 167.62 .792  
Group x t2 -5.67 5.88 .338  -10.79 173.35 .951  
         
PP (n = 25)         
Intercept 36.08 3.74 <.001  256.31 77.75 .002  
Group -6.39 5.18 .222  236.92 107.82 .032  
Time (t1)  1.83 4.24 .668  115.45 102.13 .264  
Time (t2)  6.42 4.24 .139  -26.63 98.96 .789  
Group x t1 -0.06 5.88 .991  -164.46 139.54 .245  
Group x t2 -5.80 5.88 .331  -188.75 137.24 .176 
 
 
 
Notes. t1= dummy for baseline-post comparison; t2= dummy for baseline-follow-up comparison; ITT Operation-
span: baseline score for one participant is missing due to abort by participant; ITT & PP Stroop: post score for 
one participant is missing due to computer malfunction.  
 
 
Clinical outcomes 
     Primary outcomes. Mean scores for baseline, post, and follow-up assessment are depicted 
in Table 3.2. Table 3.4 shows the results of the LMMs. For PCL-5 re-experiencing and CAPS 
re-experiencing, all ITT-participants reported a significant symptom improvement from base-
line to follow-up (PCL-5: dwithinCC = -0.38, dwithinPl = -0.79; CAPS: dwithinCC = -0.37, dwithinPl = -
0.85) but there was no significant group x time interaction. Repeating the analyses in the PP-
sample did not change the significant main effect of time for the CAPS (dwithinCC = -0.34, 
dwithinPl = -0.65) but for the PCL-5 the main effect of time missed the significance level. 
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     Secondary outcomes. Mean scores for baseline, post, and follow-up assessments are also 
shown in Table 3.2. Looking at depression, there was a non-significant trend towards a reduc-
tion of depressive symptoms from baseline to follow-up in all ITT-participants but no differ-
ences between groups or group x time interactions. In the PP-sample, this reduction was sig-
nificant (dwithinCC = -0.41, dwithinPl = -0.52). Additionally, there was a significant group effect in 
the PP-sample, with participants in the cognitive control group reporting in general more de-
pressive symptoms. Regarding rumination, ITT-analyses showed that brooding scores signifi-
cantly declined in the short term (dwithinCC = -0.20, dwithinPl = -0.98) as well as in the long term 
(dwithinCC = -0.38, dwithinPl = -0.76) in all participants. However, there was a significant group x 
t1 interaction (∆d = 0.75). This interaction was broken down by conducting separate LMMs 
for the placebo and for the cognitive control group: The models specified were identical to the 
main models but excluded main effect and interaction term for the training conditions. In con-
trast to our hypothesis, these analyses showed a significant reduction of brooding from base-
line to post assessment only in the placebo group (B = -3.34, SE = 0.85, 95% CI [-5.18, -1.51], 
p = .002) but not in the cognitive control group (B = -0.79, SE = 0.83, 95% CI [-2.51, 0.94], p 
= .355). This result pattern was also found in the PP-sample. For repetitive negative thinking 
assessed by the PTQ, ITT-analyses indicated a significant reduction from baseline to follow-
up across training groups (dwithinCC = -0.14, dwithinPl = -0.46) but no significant interactions. In 
the PP-sample, a model with an identical covariance structure did not converge. Therefore, we 
repeated the analyses with a fixed slope for the t1 dummy variable. Now, the model con-
verged and confirmed the results of the ITT-sample. 
     Additional outcomes. Group characteristics for the additional outcome measures for each 
time point are summarized in Table B.2 in the supplementary material. Results of ITT-
analyses revealed that, compared to baseline, all participants showed significantly less sup-
pression of intrusive memories and less rumination in response to intrusive memories at post 
assessment (suppression: B = -1.62, SE = 0.79, 95% CI [-3.23, -0.02], p = .048; rumination: B 
= -2.89, SE = 1.04, 95% CI [-4.97, -0.80], p = .007) and at follow-up assessment (suppression: 
B = -2.20, SE = 0.86, 95% CI [-3.94, -0.47], p = .014; rumination: B = -3.10, SE = 1.16, 95% 
CI [-5.41, -0.78], p = .010). Unexpectedly, the group x time interaction reached significance 
for the suppression subscale, both for the post assessment (B = 2.36, SE = 1.13, 95% CI [0.06, 
4.66], p = .045) and the follow-up assessment (B = 3.24, SE = 1.20, 95% CI [0.81, 5.66], p = 
.010). These interactions were quantified by separate LMMs for the placebo and for the cog-
nitive control training group that excluded main effect and interaction term for the training 
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conditions. For the placebo group, analyses showed decreased suppression of intrusive memo-
ries in the short-term (B = -1.62, SE = 0.79, 95% CI [-3.24, 0.00], p = .050) and in the long-
term (B = -2.12, SE = 0.85, 95% CI [-3.85, -0.38], p = .019). This reduction was not found in 
the cognitive control training group (post: B = 0.76, SE = 0.78, 95% CI [-0.82, 2.35], p = .335; 
follow-up: B = 0.90, SE = 0.81, 95% CI [-0.73, 2.53], p = .271). Repeating the analyses in the 
PP-sample confirmed these findings. Total PCL-5 and CAPS scores decreased from baseline 
to follow-up across all ITT-participants (PCL-5: B = -8.46, SE = 3.98, 95% CI [-16.39, -0.53], 
p = .037; CAPS: B = -9.38, SE = 2.79, 95% CI [-15.00, -3.76], p = .002). In PP-participants, 
the symptom improvement from baseline to follow-up for PCL-5 total scores just missed the 
significance level (B = -7.67, SE = 3.93, 95% CI [-15.52, 0.18], p = .055) and the main effect 
of group reached significance (B = 10.22, SE = 4.92, 95% CI [0.41, 20.03], p=.041), with the 
cognitive control group showing more severe symptomatology. The PP-results for the CAPS 
total scores confirmed the ITT-analyses but a main effect of group was also additionally 
found (B = 7.41, SE = 3.43, 95% CI [0.52, 14.30], p = .036). Regarding symptom clusters, 
there was a significant reduction from baseline to follow-up in symptoms of avoidance across 
ITT-groups (PCL-5: B = -2.35, SE = 0.73, 95% CI [-3.80, -0.89], p = .002; CAPS: B = -1.51, 
SE = 0.49, 95% CI [-2.51, -0.52], p = .004). For the CAPS, we also found a significant reduc-
tion in hyperarousal and reactivity symptoms from baseline to follow-up in both ITT-groups 
(B = -2.72, SE = 0.76, 95% CI [-4.24, -1.19], p = .001) and a significant main effect of group 
indicating more hyperarousal and reactivity symptoms in the cognitive control as compared to 
the placebo group (B = 2.25, SE = 0.83, 95% CI [-0.58, 3.91], p = .009). PP-analyses were 
mostly in line with these results. However, for the PCL-5 hyperarousal and reactivity sub-
scale, a main effect of group also reached significance in the PP-sample (B = 4.15, SE = 1.47, 
95% CI [1.22, 7.07], p = .006), indicating that individuals in the cognitive control group 
showed more symptoms than individuals in the placebo group. 
Discussion 
     This pilot study evaluated the effects of a computerized 6-session cognitive control train-
ing in PTSD patients with different traumatic experiences. In particular, we tested whether a 
training developed by Siegle and colleagues (2007) modified intrusive re-experiencing as well 
as rumination and depression, as compared to a placebo training. Although performance pat-
terns in the cognitive control group indicated a non-significant improvement in the training 
task, we did not find significant transfer effects on other cognitive control measures. Moreo-
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ver, in contrast to our hypotheses, participants in the cognitive control and in the placebo 
group showed a reduction in intrusive re-experiencing, in rumination as defined by repetitive 
negative thinking, and in depressive symptoms over time. Surprisingly, a decline in rumina-
tive brooding did only reach significance in the placebo but not in the cognitive control group. 
Additional analyses demonstrated that all participants reported a decrease in PTSD avoidance 
and hyperarousal and reactivity symptoms and ruminated less in response to intrusive memo-
ries after the trainings. Unexpectedly, participants in the placebo but not in the cognitive con-
trol group also showed a decrease in suppressing intrusive memories.  
     Most symptom measures in this pilot study indicated that participants benefited from the 
trainings but no differential improvements occurred between the two training groups. A num-
ber of explanations may account for these absent differences. Firstly, both trainings might 
have influenced cognitive control. However, in the first part of the placebo training, partici-
pants only listened to different sounds without completing a cognitive task at all. The second 
part consisted of a placebo version of the adaptive PASAT, a task that had been implemented 
in studies that demonstrated differential effects on rumination and depressive symptoms be-
fore (Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Hoorelbeke & Koster, 2017). Hence, we would argue that the 
placebo training did not influence cognitive control although we cannot fully rule this out. 
     Secondly, the cognitive control training might not have influenced cognitive control at all. 
Our results indicate non-significant performance improvements in the cognitive control train-
ing task but these changes did not translate into generalized improvements in transfer tasks. 
We decided to use far transfer tasks to rule out that strategy training drives the effects as pos-
sible in near transfer tasks. In particular, we applied two well-established tasks of working 
memory updating and inhibition, components of cognitive control that had been associated 
with posttraumatic stress symptoms such as re-experiencing (for reviews see Aupperle et al., 
2012; Polak et al., 2012). However, choosing adequate far transfer tasks is challenging 
(Koster et al., 2017) and our results are in line with recent other studies that also reported no 
training effects on far transfer tasks (e.g., Fonzo et al., 2019). Nevertheless, Hoorelbeke and 
colleagues (2015) also administered the adaptive PASAT as a cognitive control intervention 
and compared it to a visual search control training. The researchers found an improvement in 
O-span task performance but no differential effects between the two groups emerged. In con-
trast to our study, they focused on healthy individuals with high rumination but not on a clini-
cal sample. Moreover, Siegle and colleagues (2007) used an identical training as we did in 
depressive individuals and reported that only the cognitive control group showed performance 
improvements in a near transfer task, the non-adaptive PASAT, as compared to a waitlist 
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group. Furthermore, participants displayed increases in dlPFC responses in a working 
memory digit-sorting task even though performance changes could not be interpreted due to 
ceiling effects. Hence, it has been demonstrated that the training used in this study is able to 
influence cognitive control. Future studies that focus on PTSD samples should additionally 
include neuroimaging and near transfer tasks such as the non-adaptive PASAT (Gronwall, 
1977) to verify effects on multiple dimensions.  
     Thirdly—assuming that the cognitive control training induced cognitive shifts that we 
were just not able to capture—the trained cognitive control functions might not be as relevant 
as expected in PTSD patients. There is strong empirical evidence for associations between 
cognitive control deficits and intrusive re-experiencing as reported in cross-sectional, longitu-
dinal, and experimental studies (Aupperle et al., 2012; Polak et al., 2012). Moreover, previous 
research demonstrated that components of our training have beneficial effects on intrusive 
memories. For example, testing healthy participants, Nassif and Wells (2014) and Callinan 
and colleagues (2015) reported that intrusive memories reduced while listening to a narrative 
of a stressful event only in a group that completed Wells’s Attention Training but not in a 
control group that completed a filler task. The filler task consisted of circling specific letters 
or digits in random matrices. Our pilot study shows that translating this experimental ap-
proach into a clinical PTSD sample with comorbid disorders and using a placebo training that 
is more similar to the original training does not replicate the findings. However, other studies 
also examined cognitive control trainings in PTSD. Bomyea and colleagues (2015) explored 
the effects of a cognitive control training that solely relied on the modification of resistance to 
proactive interference. Importantly, they focused on a homogeneous female sample with 
PTSD after sexual traumatization to maximize study power. The researchers reported a reduc-
tion of re-experiencing after a high-intensive training as compared to a low-intensive training 
but no differential improvements in anxiety, depression, or other PTSD symptom clusters. 
Most recently, Woud and colleagues (2019) also used this training in an analogue design and 
examined effects on intrusive memories in healthy participants after watching a trauma film. 
Similar to our results, they found no group differences in various assessments of intrusive 
memories (intrusion provocation task, intrusion diary, intrusion questionnaire) and in O-span 
score. Thus, also for a training that focuses on a specific cognitive control function, results are 
heterogeneous. In contrast, Fonzo and colleagues (2019) recently published a randomized 
controlled trial in trauma survivors with acute PTSD and with chronic PTSD. Their training 
focused on a number of cognitive control functions and was compared to a control condition 
of playing computer games. The researchers also reported no differential PTSD symptom im-
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provement for the acute PTSD sample, even though their training was comprehensive and 
used a relative unspecified control condition. Interestingly, Fonzo and colleagues (2019) 
demonstrated a more pronounced reduction of re-experiencing symptoms in the training 
group within the chronic PTSD sample. Hence, the nature of the traumatic event and symp-
tom chronicity should be taken into account in future research on cognitive control and PTSD. 
Furthermore, we used a training that included neutral stimuli, i.e. stimuli without trauma-
related affective valence. Given that traumatized individuals with low cognitive control 
should have difficulties in disengaging attention from trauma-related stimuli (Wessel et al., 
2008) and Schweizer and colleagues (2017) demonstrated that a working memory training 
including trauma-related material reduces PTSD symptom severity, addressing “hot” cogni-
tive control functions might be a more promising approach for future training studies.  
     In addition to PTSD symptoms, this study also investigated effects on rumination—a mal-
adaptive processing style that maintains symptomatology—and on depressive symptoms. Pre-
vious research clearly demonstrated that the cognitive control training used in this study dif-
ferentially improves rumination and depression when compared to treatment-as-usual (Siegle 
et al., 2007) or placebo interventions (Hoorelbeke & Koster, 2017; Hoorelbeke et al., 2015; 
Hoorelbeke et al., 2016). However, in our study no differential improvements emerged alt-
hough participants showed rather high levels of depression. Moreover, only participants in the 
placebo group reported a significant reduction in brooding and—although interaction effects 
did not reach significance—effect sizes on improvements in other clinical measures were 
larger in the placebo group as compared to the cognitive control group. These rather contra-
dictory findings are surprising. A major limitation that must be taken into account when inter-
preting the results are observed differences between groups despite randomization. Even 
though only significant in the PP-sample, data generally indicated that depressive and PTSD 
symptomatology was more severe in the cognitive control group as compared to the placebo 
group. This higher symptom severity might have made it more difficult for participants to 
profit from the cognitive more demanding cognitive control training, thereby limiting the po-
tential of the training to alter symptomatology and increasing the threshold for achieving 
training effects. Moreover, although we used a version of the PASAT that adapted task diffi-
culty to participants’ performances, the general aim of the PASAT is to activate prefrontal 
control despite low level negative affect. Therefore, it can be perceived as frustrating and 
stressful by anxious participants (Tombaugh, 2006). Indeed, PTSD patients felt more stressed, 
frustrated, and angry during the cognitive control training as compared to the placebo train-
ing. Experiencing these negative emotions might have triggered maladaptive processing styles 
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that interfered with symptom reduction. Lastly, we used a placebo version of Wells’s Atten-
tion Training in which participants were instructed to listen to different naturalistic sounds 
while looking at the computer screen. Completing this task over a period of two weeks with-
out any other task demands might have induced some states of mindfulness that affected 
brooding (e.g., Perestelo-Perez, Barraca, Peñate, Rivero-Santana, & Alvarez-Perez, 2017, for 
a meta-analysis on mindfulness and depressive brooding). This explanation would also be in 
line with the placebo group showing less suppression of intrusive memories after the training, 
as beneficial effects of mindfulness on intrusive memories have been reported (Follette, Palm, 
& Person, 2006). However, future studies should evaluate these assumptions.  
     We are aware that a number of limitations might have biased our results. First, we chose 
an active control group to examine the isolated effects of one mechanism modified. Neverthe-
less, due to the lack of a waitlist control group we cannot draw conclusions whether the symp-
tom changes would have also been observed with no intervention at all or rely on non-specific 
factors such as behavioral activation or placebo expectancies. Second, the study protocol in-
cluded only six training sessions in two weeks. Studies using the identical number reported 
significant training-induced improvements, at least in depressive symptomatology and rumi-
nation (e.g., Siegle et al., 2007). Nevertheless, other studies using components of our training 
and reporting significant effects on rumination instructed participants to perform at least ten 
training sessions over a period two weeks (Hoorelbeke et al., 2015; Hoorelbeke & Koster, 
2017). Thus, it should be examined whether more training sessions would also lead to more 
pronounced effects in PTSD patients, for example by including online trainings at minimal 
costs in future studies (Hoorelbeke & Koster, 2017). Third, this study was run as a pilot study 
with a small sample size. At the moment, power analyses for LMMs are not well-
implemented. Hence, we calculated power by use of a post-hoc power analysis for an ANO-
VA with a within-between interaction via G*power (version 3.1, University of Duesseldorf, 
Germany). Assuming an alpha level of .05, an effect size of 0.25, and inserting our PP-sample 
size of 25 participants, a power of .76 was estimated. Thus, it falls shortly below the recom-
mended threshold of .80. We recommend future studies to validate our findings by use of a 
larger sample size.  
     Taken together, although research on the cognitive underpinnings of PTSD symptoms is 
flourishing, there is a need for more studies on causal relations to expand etiological models 
and enhance interventions. The present pilot study contributed to this need and transferred an 
established cognitive control training to a clinical sample of PTSD patients by including a 
double-blind testing, an active control condition, and a follow-up assessment. Moreover, this 
Study III: Cognitive Control Training in PTSD 
  111 
study is the first one that examined effects of a cognitive control training on rumination in 
PTSD patients. However, the obtained results did not confirm distinct effects of the adminis-
tered cognitive control training on PTSD symptoms such as intrusive re-experiencing or 
maintaining factors such as rumination. Thus, we recommend future studies to differentiate 
between acute and chronic PTSD samples, administer a higher number of training sessions, 
and re-test our effects within a larger sample to further evaluate its potential for clinical re-
search and practice. 
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     The major goal of this thesis was to contribute to the understanding of impaired cognitive 
control as a causal risk factor for posttraumatic stress symptoms, in particular for intrusive re-
experiencing. Additionally, relations between poor cognitive control and rumination, a 
maladaptive processing style that is closely linked to intrusive re-experiencing and maintains 
symptomatology, were explored. Although a lot of cross-sectional and—to a lower extent—
longitudinal research exist that report associations between deficits in cognitive control and 
PTSD-related symptoms, research demonstrating that manipulating cognitive control alters 
symptomatology is lacking. However, this is a necessary condition for applying the term 
causal risk factor (Kraemer et al., 1997; Vogt et al., 2014). In this thesis, three studies with 
different methodological approaches were conducted to fill the existing gap. These studies 
examined whether poor cognitive control precedes symptom development (study I & II), but 
also aimed to experimentally manipulate cognitive control (study I-III). In this chapter, the 
main results will be summarized and interpreted in the context of earlier research, thereby 
discussing implications for future approaches. Additionally, general strengths and limitations 
will be outlined. 
Summary of findings 
     Study I aimed to test the effects of manipulated cognitive control on intrusive memories as 
well as rumination in a healthy sample using tDCS and the trauma film paradigm. A brain 
area that plays a major role in cognitive control—the left dlPFC—was stimulated via anodal, 
cathodal, or sham tDCS. Conceptually, this study relied on the unity/diversity framework and 
assessed changes in cognitive control via a modified version of the CVLT, a common 
measure of resistance to proactive interference. It was hypothesized that cathodal tDCS would 
diminish and anodal tDCS would enhance resistance to proactive interference as compared to 
sham stimulation. Furthermore, cathodal tDCS was expected to increase and anodal tDCS to 
decrease intrusive memories and rumination after a trauma film, compared to sham tDCS. 
However, stimulation did neither affect resistance to proactive interference nor intrusive 
memories or rumination. Moreover, based on previous analogue studies (Verwoerd et al., 
2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2008), it was expected that individuals with higher 
pre-stressor resistance to proactive interference would report less intrusive memories and less 
rumination after the trauma film. Surprisingly, there were no significant correlations in the 
expected direction. To address methodological shortcomings of study I, slight methodological 
changes were made in study II, for example in the trauma film and in the assessment of 
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intrusive memories. Most importantly, this study conceptually relied on the DMC framework 
and examined the relation between proactive control—assessed by the AX-CPT—and 
intrusive memories. Given the significance of the left dlPFC within the DMC framework, this 
region was again chosen as the stimulation target. Cathodal tDCS was predicted to diminish 
and anodal tDCS to enhance proactive control, compared to sham tDCS. Moreover, cathodal 
tDCS was hypothesized to increase and anodal tDCS to decrease intrusive memories after the 
trauma film, compared to sham tDCS. Again, these hypotheses were not supported by the 
data. There was no stimulation effect on proactive control or on intrusive memories. 
Moreover, study II explored whether low pre-stressor proactive control would be associated 
with more film-related intrusive memories but no significant correlations emerged.  
     Taken together, the results of study I and study II speak against causal associations 
between activation in a brain region associated with cognitive control, performance in 
cognitive control tasks, and intrusive memories or rumination; at least when cognitive control 
is conceptualized as resistance to proactive interference in terms of the unity/diversity 
framework or as a proactive control mode in terms of the DMC framework. However, the 
manipulation of cognitive control via tDCS is controversial and the conclusions that can be 
drawn from analogue samples are limited (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Hence, study III went 
beyond the analogue approach and explored whether a cognitive control training induces 
symptom changes in mixed-trauma PTSD patients. In this randomized, controlled, double-
blind pilot study it was hypothesized that patients who had completed six sessions of a 
cognitive control training designed by Siegle and colleagues (2007) would show increased 
cognitive control as compared to patients who had completed a placebo training. Moreover, it 
was predicted that only the cognitive control group would demonstrate reduced intrusive re-
experiencing, rumination, and depressive symptoms. However, although non-significant 
training progress occurred in the cognitive control group, there were no significant 
improvements in far transfer tasks measuring working memory updating and inhibition. Also 
in contrast to hypotheses, the cognitive control training did not outperform the placebo 
training in its effects on clinical outcomes. Both groups showed a decline in intrusive re-
experiencing, rumination defined as repetitive negative thinking, and depressive symptoms. 
Exploratory analyses indicated that both groups also demonstrated reduced avoidance 
symptoms, arousal and reactivity symptoms as well as rumination in response to intrusive 
memories after completing the training. Surprisingly, reductions in rumination defined as 
brooding and in suppression of intrusive memories were only found in the placebo group but 
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not in the cognitive control group. Thus, study III does not support the assumption that a 
cognitive control training shows better effects on symptomatology than a placebo 
intervention.  
Integration of results and implications for future research  
     The results question whether impaired cognitive control is indeed a causal risk factor for 
symptoms of PTSD—in particular intrusive re-experiencing—or maladaptive processing 
styles that maintain PTSD—in particular rumination. Thus, the current view on cognitive 
control in PTSD has to be re-evaluated by considering alternative models and methods. This 
is especially important in a research field that is mainly based on heterogeneous, cross-
sectional, empirical findings and notoriously lacks clear conceptual assumptions. In previous 
chapters, the results were already discussed within their theoretical context and with regard to 
methodological limitations. Hence, some general implications for future research will be 
presented in the following. 
The model: changing the perspective on cognitive control in PTSD 
     Using Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model (2000) and Brewin’s dual representation theory 
(Brewin, 2008; Brewin et al., 1996), possible pathways via which impaired cognitive control 
might influence PTSD symptom development were introduced in chapter one. However, the 
results presented in this thesis indicated no link between cognitive control and the 
development of intrusive memories in analogue samples; no effects of tDCS over the 
cognitive control brain network on intrusive memories in analogue samples; and no 
differential effects of a cognitive control training on intrusive re-experiencing in a clinical 
sample. Thus, the assumption that impaired cognitive control could be a causal risk factor for 
PTSD was not supported. However, this thesis examined a limited number of cognitive 
control functions. As a result, global interpretations should be made with caution. 
Furthermore, methodological shortcomings concerning the manipulation of cognitive control 
limit the generalizability of findings. Nevertheless, the obtained results are in line with latest 
research that also questions cognitive control deficits to be associated with, to precede, or to 
influence PTSD symptomatology. Most recently, results were published indicating that PTSD 
patients do not differ from healthy controls in cognitive control functions such as resistance to 
proactive interference (Swick et al., 2017), that resistance to proactive interference does not 
precede symptom development (Woud et al., 2019), and that cognitive control trainings do 
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not differently influence posttraumatic stress symptoms in analogue (Woud et al., 2019) or 
acute PTSD samples as compared to placebo interventions (Fonzo et al., 2019). However, as 
presented in chapter one, prospective and experimental research is still scarce and results are 
inconsistent. For example, the most recent findings by Woud and colleagues (2019) speak 
against previous analogue and training research also focusing on resistance to proactive 
interference (see chapter one). In contrast to prospective and experimental approaches, a large 
body of retrospective, cross-sectional research confirmed poor performance of PTSD patients 
in different cognitive control tasks (e.g., Aupperle et al., 2012; Polak et al., 2012) as well as 
reduced activation in the cognitive control brain network (Jacob, Dodge, & Vasterling, 2019, 
for a most recent review). These observed impairments might only be a consequence of 
extreme stress exposure during the traumatic event or of depleted cognitive resources due to 
distressing posttraumatic or comorbid symptoms. For instance, intense stress exposure might 
itself have a toxic effect on brain functioning, thereby leading to hypoactivation of prefrontal 
brain regions (e.g., Rasmusson & Shalev, 2014, for an overview) that morph into diminished 
cognitive control functions. Furthermore, deficits in working memory updating or inhibition 
in terms of the unity/diversity framework might be a result of intrusive re-experiencing or 
hyperarousal. These symptoms might exhaust cognitive resources and create distraction 
during cognitive control tasks. Additionally, deficits in proactive control in terms of the DMC 
framework might result from diminished resources to implement the more demanding 
proactive control mode. Alternatively, they might also be a consequence of absent reliable 
contextual cues from the environment due to the poorly contextualized trauma memory or of 
threat perception that induces a preference for reactive control. For example, Steudte-
Schmiedgen and colleagues (2014) reported that traumatized individuals show higher 
conflict-driven adjustments of cognitive control when dealing with interference as compared 
to healthy individuals. The researchers explained this result by traumatized individuals 
actively engaging in a reactive control mode to adapt to changes in the environment. 
However, some important restrictions of the theoretical assumptions presented in this thesis 
must be emphasized before drawing final conclusions. 
     First, this thesis focused on “cold” cognitive functions: the applied cognitive control tasks 
included neutral but not emotional or trauma-related stimuli. Aupperle and colleagues (2012) 
suggested that trauma exposure draws attention towards trauma-related stimuli in all 
individuals but that basic pre-traumatic cognitive control deficits should amplify their impact 
and lead to PTSD symptoms. Moreover, they assumed that brain regions supporting cognitive 
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control in neutral and affective situations should overlap. Furthermore, although the model 
suggestions in chapter one emphasized the control of specific threat-related/trauma-related 
stimuli, it was assumed that basic cognitive control functions and activation in prefrontal 
brain areas might underlie or even dictate these processes. However, these assumptions could 
be wrong and it might be important to take the content of the to-be-controlled information 
into account. Especially disturbances in exerting cognitive control over emotional material 
such as difficulties in updating trauma-related information in working memory or in inhibiting 
trauma-related stimuli might influence intrusive re-experiencing. For example, decreased 
performance of PTSD patients in tasks involving negative emotional material such as the 
emotional Stroop task has been reported (Bomyea, Johnson, & Lang, 2017; Cisler & Koster, 
2010, for overviews). Moreover, as already mentioned, Schweizer and colleagues (2017) 
demonstrated that adolescents with PTSD who completed a working memory training with 
trauma-related stimuli showed better performance in a cognitive transfer task and less PTSD 
symptoms than a placebo group. Additionally, even for rumination, a large body of research 
reported significant links between rumination and impaired cognitive control in tasks with 
emotional material (De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Pe et al., 2012; Zetsche et al., 2012; Zetsche & 
Joormann, 2011). Hence, we cannot rule out that impaired “hot” but not “cold” cognitive 
control functions are a causal risk factor for PTSD. Future research should examine whether 
diminished cognitive control over emotional material precedes or influences symptom 
development—for example, by testing the ability to inhibit highly-valued but irrelevant 
stimuli in a trauma film design (see also Aupperle et al., 2012). In this context, it will be 
essential to combine research on cognitive control with research on attention, interpretation, 
and memory biases. These biases might affect the processing of emotional material in PTSD 
(see also Bomyea et al., 2017) and should be clearly differentiated from “hot” cognitive 
control functions.  
     Second, impaired cognitive control might not be a causal risk factor but a proxy risk factor 
for PTSD, i.e. it is associated with another risk factor but does not directly affect the outcome 
(Kraemer et al., 1997). Pre-traumatic cognitive control deficits might operate by influencing 
other peri-traumatic or posttraumatic variables such as dissociation (Breh & Seidler, 2007; 
Özdemir, Özdemir, Boysan, & Yilmaz, 2015), visuospatial processing and integration of 
contextual information (Hayes et al., 2012; Holmes & Bourne, 2008, for summaries), 
emotion-regulation attempts and success (Bomyea & Lang, 2016; Hendricks & Buchanan, 
2016, for reviews), or effectiveness of extinction learning (Lommen, Engelhard, Sijbrandij, 
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van den Hout, & Hermans, 2013; Marin, Camprodon, Dougherty, & Milad, 2014, for 
reviews). For example, it has been assumed that immediately after a traumatic event, periods 
of not thinking about the trauma help processing of and adapting to the event (e.g., McNally, 
2003). In this context, Bomyea & Lang (2015) differentiated automatic thought regulation 
from deliberate thought suppression. Automatic thought regulation includes implicit processes 
that maintain activated goals and inhibit distracting stimuli. Thus, these processes might be 
similar to the cognitive control functions described in chapter one. In contrast, deliberate 
thought suppression is to actively avoid thinking about certain trauma-related targets. 
Ineffective thought suppression typically evokes rebound effects of the to-be-suppressed 
content and therefore increases unwanted thoughts and negative affect (Bomyea & Lang, 
2015; Hayes et al., 2012). Analogue research showed that better inhibitory control was 
correlated with more effective deliberate suppression of neutral thoughts (Brewin & Beaton, 
2002) and negative, personally relevant thoughts (Brewin & Smart, 2005) directly after stress 
exposure. Thus, even if impaired automatic thought regulation does not causally influence 
PTDS symptoms, traumatized individuals with poor cognitive control might more often fail in 
effective deliberate thought suppression. These assumptions could be tested by instructing 
participants to suppress upcoming intrusive memories in future analogue designs.  
     Third, Wessel and colleagues (2010) aimed to manipulate pre-stressor cognitive control in 
an analogue design via testing healthy “evening-type“ participants during a non-optimal or 
optimal time of the day. Although the manipulation did not affect cognitive control in terms 
of working memory updating and inhibition, the researchers found weak negative correlations 
between pre-stressor cognitive control and intrusive memories after a trauma film only in 
non-optimal but not in optimal environments. Thus, they suggested that pre-trauma deficits in 
cognitive control might become more relevant for PTSD when individuals need to 
compensate for non-optimal life conditions. In contrast, Thompson and Gottesman (2008) 
tested whether performance in a broad test of cognitive abilities before entering the military 
predicts later combat-related PTSD in war veterans. Interestingly, higher cognitive abilities 
reduced the risk for PTSD only in veterans with low-combat exposure but not with high-
combat exposure. The researchers interpreted these results in such a way that the detrimental 
effect of trauma exposure on cognitive functioning outperforms the protective effect of high 
cognitive abilities. Hence, boundary conditions of the environment might affect the way in 
which cognitive control vulnerabilities operate on PTSD symptom development and need to 
be further explored in the future.  
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     Last, the proposed models and the presented studies did not focus on the flexible 
adjustment of cognitive control functions in interaction with individual appraisals of 
situational demands. For the unity/diversity framework, it was assumed that impairments in 
inhibiting no-longer relevant information in working memory would predict intrusive 
memories since activated representations of traumatic experiences belong to the past and need 
to be controlled. However, it remains unclear whether this process requires an evaluation of 
information as being no-longer relevant in the particular situation. With regard to the 
assumptions of Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model and of the dual representation theory, this 
requirement should not always be met given the poor integration of the trauma memory into 
its context and the here-and-now quality of activated representations. Thus, whether inhibition 
of no-longer relevant information or other inhibitory functions are relevant for dealing with 
intrusive memories might depend on the here-and-now quality of the specific situation. Also 
regarding the DMC framework, it was assumed that low proactive control should be 
associated with PTSD symptom development. However, we do not know in which way 
individuals define the goal that needs to be maintained in a specific situation. When trauma 
victims are confronted with a specific situation that most likely triggers intrusive re-
experiencing, the maintained goal might be to avoid trauma cues. Thus, increased proactive 
control might support maintaining this goal and prevent inhibitory-learning in the long-term, 
therefore being a risk factor for symptom persistence. Therefore, future theoretical and 
methodological approaches should further specify the circumstances under which cognitive 
control might influence PTSD. 
The method: implications for analogue research using tDCS  
     In clinical psychology, psychiatry, and neurosciences, tDCS has received much attention 
as a promising method for manipulating brain activation related to cognitive control (Plewnia, 
Schroeder, & Wolkenstein, 2015). However, the confidence in this method is decreasing due 
to the high fragility and low specificity of tDCS effects as well as the diversity in stimulation 
protocols. TDCS effectivity can be influenced by current intensity, stimulation duration, 
sponge sizes, electrode positions, or state-dependency (Tremblay et al., 2014). For example, 
an extracephalic position of the reference electrode can have a decreasing effect (e.g., Plewnia 
et al., 2015; Wörsching et al., 2016), an increasing effect (Tremblay et al., 2014), or no effect 
at all (Dedoncker et al., 2016) on stimulation outcome. Such complexities challenge a system-
atic analysis of what works best to make the stimulation most effective and achieve the antic-
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ipated outcomes. Moreover, Bestman and colleagues (2015) stated that the enthusiasm in 
tDCS does not match the current understanding of its working mechanisms and its use has 
“outspaced the mechanistic rationales for its application” (p. 13). This statement is supported 
by recent research that questions whether tDCS over prefrontal regions has a reliable effect on 
cognitive control indices (e.g., Gordon et al., 2018; Vöröslakos et al., 2018); that highlight the 
uncertainty about dose-effect relationships (e.g., Hoy et al., 2013) and sham stimulation ef-
fects (Fonteneau et al., 2019); or that criticize the oversimplification of anodal/cathodal tDCS 
leading to excitatory/inhibitory effects (Bestman et al., 2015). For instance, Imburgio and Orr 
(2018) meta-analytically quantified the effects of single-session tDCS over the dlPFC on cog-
nitive control tasks defined by the unity/diversity framework. The researchers found signifi-
cant effects only on tasks measuring working memory updating but not on tasks measuring 
shifting or inhibition. Also in study I and study II, we did not find stimulation-induced chang-
es in indices of cognitive control. However, as presented in chapter one, a large body of re-
search exists that demonstrated significant effects of tDCS on cognitive control measures. 
Nevertheless, some general recommendations should guide future analogue tDCS research in 
the context of cognitive control and posttraumatic stress symptoms: 
     TDCS is a non-focal stimulation method that does not selectively affect a single brain re-
gion but leads to a widespread distribution of currents across brain areas and thereby might 
influence neuronal activity even in opposite directions. In this thesis, the left dlPFC was cho-
sen as the center of stimulation. However, several other candidate brain regions for targeting 
cognitive control exist (see chapter one). Even with an extracephalic reference electrode, we 
do not know whether tDCS over the left dlPFC has influenced other brain regions and if so, in 
which way, to what extent, and to which consequences. Equally, electrode placement over 
another candidate brain region—or at least over the right dlPFC—might increase stimulation 
effects on cognitive and behavioral measures (e.g., Gómez-Ariza et al., 2017; Hayes et al., 
2012; Tremblay et al., 2014). Thus, studies are needed that test alternative brain regions and 
combine our design with neurophysiological measures or neuroimaging to have additional 
indicators of changed brain activity (e.g., see Wörsching et al., 2016). These studies might 
also use stimulation methods with greater spatial precision such as transcranial magnetic 
stimulation or high definition tDCS (e.g., Dayan, Censor, Buch, Sandrini, & Cohen, 2013). 
Since tDCS over the dlPFC was also argued to act via neurotransmitter alterations by modify-
ing synaptic microenvironment (e.g., Brunoni et al., 2012), it would also be interesting to in-
tegrate measures of brain metabolites in the future. Importantly—considering the low statisti-
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cal power resulting from small sample sizes in most tDCS studies and the large number of 
degrees of freedom in stimulation protocols—future research would benefit from multi-
centered approaches. Moreover, having identified successful stimulation protocols, case series 
testing repeated tDCS in PTSD patients would further inform about causality in clinical 
symptomatology. However, it must be emphasized that there are still large gaps in our 
knowledge on tDCS working mechanisms. Thus, the presented suggestions for future tDCS 
research should not culminate in a neuro-reductionism, breaking down complex mental pro-
cesses into brain areas, neuronal processes, or transmitter systems without profound theoreti-
cal foundations. Rather, clinical psychology, psychiatry, and neurosciences should stimulate 
each other and lead to a more integrated perspective on clinical and neurobiological phenom-
ena associated with PTSD. 
     Additionally, the analogue studies presented in this thesis combined tDCS with the trauma 
film paradigm. The trauma film paradigm is a highly useful prospective method for examin-
ing exposure and reactions to a traumatic experience (James et al., 2016). More specifically, 
film-exposure has been shown to provoke responses that are similar to real-life posttraumatic 
stress symptoms, for example intrusive memories, but that typically decline within a few 
hours or days (Holmes & Bourne, 2008, for a review). Thus, the analogue trauma does not 
induce persistent distress but allows studying risk factors under laboratory conditions. For 
example, even though study I did not show that pre-stressor cognitive control predicted post-
stressor intrusive memories, we replicated earlier findings that more negative peri-traumatic 
emotional responses to the stressor increase the likelihood of intrusive re-experiencing (e.g., 
Clark & Mackay, 2015). Although the trauma film paradigm opens up multiple chances to 
investigate symptom development, its limitations should also be taken into account. First, the 
majority of tDCS studies reporting stimulation effects on cognitive control used within-
subject designs (e.g., Brunoni & Vanderhasselt, 2014). Within-subject designs take physio-
logically different stimulation effects between individuals into consideration, for example, 
due to differences in head anatomy (see also Tremblay et al., 2014). However, implementing 
a within-subject design in the trauma film approach is challenging as presenting a film frag-
ment twice might limit the occurrence of intrusive memories due to habituation, and present-
ing an alternative film fragment might affect comparability. Nevertheless, when examining 
thought suppression as described above, paradigms that integrate behavioral tasks with trauma 
film reminders, for example, the modified think/no-think paradigm (e.g., Anderson & Green, 
2001) might facilitate the implementation of within-subject designs in future analogue re-
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search. In addition, the trauma film paradigm has been repeatedly criticized for lacking eco-
logical validity since viewing a distressing film is passive and fails to mimic the complexity 
of real-life traumatization. Thus, some of the assumptions of the theoretical models described 
in chapter one—for example the need to deal with trauma reminders or the impact of threat 
perception on imbalance in control modes—might not be met when investigating intrusive 
memories in analogue trauma. As a result, the proposed pathways by which impaired cogni-
tive control influences posttraumatic stress symptoms might not be adequately reflected. To 
increase ecological validity, virtual reality has been proposed as a method that enhances the 
active involvement of the individual and the complexity of the experience (Dibbets & 
Schulte-Ostermann, 2015). However, due to ethical reasons, analogue trauma in non-clinical 
populations will never be as complex and as disturbing as real life traumatization. Hence, the 
implications for real-life experiences that can be drawn from analogue samples and the gener-
alizability of results will always be limited. 
The meaning: implications for clinical research and practice  
     Investigating the causal association between impaired cognitive control and PTSD 
symptom development cannot only extend etiological models but also prevention programs 
and interventions. Thus, the presented non-significant results also raise important questions 
for clinical research and practice:  
     1) Does cognitive control not play a role for the prevention of PTSD? Certainly, it is too 
early to draw final conclusions as more research examining cognitive control manipulations 
and temporal precedence is needed. As described above, alternative models and methods for 
exploring the link between impaired cognitive control and PTSD symptoms exist and have yet 
to be tested. Moreover, this thesis relied on analogue samples and patients who suffer from 
PTSD. Previous research approaches also suggested interesting pre-trauma paradigms to 
identify risk factors for PTSD in real-life settings, for example testing fire-fighters prior to 
their first exposure to real fire (Bryant & Guthrie, 2005). Although these approaches are 
challenging in terms of ethics and participants’ commitment, investigating—or even 
training—different cognitive control functions in high-risk populations such as emergency 
personnel would further inform about the role of cognitive control for symptom development 
under natural conditions.  
     2) Are cognitive control trainings ineffective in PTSD patients? Even though previous 
research reported that the cognitive control training by Siegle and colleagues (2007) has the 
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potential to reduce intrusive memories and rumination in healthy and depressed individuals, 
the training did not outperform a placebo intervention in PTSD patients as reported in study 
III. Surprisingly, effects sizes were even higher for the placebo intervention. Additionally, 
recent research on alternative cognitive control trainings also reported null-effects or no 
differential improvements on PTSD-related symptoms in clinical or analogue samples. These 
trainings either focused on a single cognitive control function such as resistance to proactive 
interference (Woud et al., 2019) or included a number of cognitive control tasks (Fonzo et al., 
2019). However, future training research might pay more attention to the interplay between 
cognitive control, trauma type, and temporal dynamics in symptom development. Study III 
was performed in a natural setting, including PTSD patients with single or repeated traumatic 
experiences during adulthood, single or repeated traumatic experiences during childhood, or 
even a mixture of all. Due to the small sample size, subgroup analyses were not feasible. 
However, the nature and time course of the traumatization as well as its occurrence during 
childhood, adolescence, or adulthood might influence the effects of cognitive control 
manipulations on PTSD. In contrast to individuals who have experienced traumatization 
during adulthood, individuals who were traumatized during critical periods of brain 
development—for instance as a result of childhood maltreatment or domestic violence—
might show diverse patterns of impaired cognitive and brain functions that are more difficult 
to influence. For example, childhood trauma has been associated with underdevelopment of 
the prefrontal cortex (e.g., De Bellis et al., 1999). This underdevelopment might further 
interact with other higher-order functions such as memory, emotion, or stress adaption 
(Brown, Becker-Weidman, & Saxe, 2014, for an overview), that in turn affect posttraumatic 
symptoms. Therefore, theoretical models are needed that focus on the particular role of 
cognitive control in individuals with childhood trauma and future clinical research should take 
this factor into account when aiming to manipulate symptomatology via cognitive control 
trainings.  
     3) Is it important to take individual differences in cognitive control into account in the 
psychological treatment of PTSD? Even if future studies further supported the null-findings 
presented in this thesis, cognitive deficits might be a barrier to effectiveness of established 
psychological treatments. In general, 20-50 % of PTSD patients do not profit from current 
PTSD treatments (Schottenbauer, Glass, Arnkoff, Tendick, & Gray, 2008). Most of these 
treatments consist of interventions that are cognitive demanding, for example cognitive 
restructuring or mental imagery, and therefore rely on cognitive control. Deficits—even if 
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emerging as a consequence of symptomatology—might make it more difficult for individuals 
to modify thoughts and actions during interventions and these difficulties might reduce 
treatment response. For example, previous research has shown that individuals with better 
performance in cognitive control tasks respond more favorable to cognitive-behavioral 
interventions (Falconer, Allen, Felmingham, Williams, & Bryant, 2013). In this context, 
future research could study whether adding an easy-to-administer cognitive control 
intervention to an established PTSD treatment augments treatment progress and outcome. For 
example, focusing on depression, Siegle and colleagues (2007) included the training 
described in this thesis as an add-on to an intensive outpatient day-treatment program. They 
reported more improvements in depressive symptoms in the training group as compared to a 
control group only receiving the day-treatment program. Thus, investigating whether 
cognitive control trainings interact with specific components of PTSD treatments and increase 
treatment response would further inform about working mechanisms and could improve the 
effectiveness of interventions. In addition, future research should examine whether providing 
cognitive control trainings to patients who are at risk for cognitive control impairments 
facilitates other interventions. Risk groups could be individuals with a history of alcohol or 
substance abuse—as chronic substance abuse is associated with decreased cognitive control 
(e.g., Bartzokis et al., 2002; Jovanovski, Erb, & Zakzanis, 2005; Rourke, 2009) and is highly 
prevalent in PTSD patients (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; Scherrer et 
al., 2008)—as well as individuals who suffer from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, a 
syndrome that is highly comorbid with PTSD (e.g., Adler, Kunz, Chua, Rotrosen, & Resnick, 
2004; Harrington et al., 2012). In sum, this thesis encourages future research to pay more 
attention to subgroups that might benefit from cognitive control interventions.  
General strengths and limitations 
     The studies reported in this thesis made a distinct contribution to the existing research on 
cognitive control in PTSD. At the conceptual level, they explored cognitive control within 
two different frameworks. Especially study II is one of the first investigations that examined 
intrusive re-experiencing in the context of the dual mechanisms of control and additionally 
evaluated the susceptibility of control modes to tDCS. At the methodological level, study I 
and study II introduced a novel analogue approach by combining the trauma film paradigm 
with neurostimulation. Study III implemented a famous cognitive control training by Siegle 
and colleagues (2007) in PTSD patients and also focused on posttraumatic rumination. 
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Although hypotheses have not been confirmed, all three studies expand our knowledge on the 
role of cognitive control for intrusive re-experiencing and posttraumatic rumination by 
questioning causal associations. Moreover, all three studies distinguish themselves through 
their high methodological quality. Study I and II feature a large number of participants, a 
sham-controlled design, and a double-blind testing procedure. Study III, although a pilot 
study, includes double-blind testing, a highly comparable active control condition, and 
provides follow-up data. Despite these strengths, it is plausible that a number of limitations 
might have biased the results. Some major ones that apply to all three studies will be 
summarized in the following.  
     In all three studies, the assessment of clinical measures was mainly based on retrospective 
self-report questionnaires. What people say about themselves is a valuable access to their 
subjective reality and clearly important to take into account. However, retrospective self-
report questionnaires lack validity. Memory biases, social desirability biases, introspective 
ability, intentional maximization/minimization of symptoms, item understanding, or affective 
states may influence the way individuals evaluate and report their experiences (Candel & 
Merckelbach, 2004; Stone et al., 2000). We applied a number of strategies to deal with this 
limitation. For example, in study I and study II we gave participants a clear definition of 
intrusive memories, assessed affective states throughout the study procedure, and used 
different methods to capture intrusive memories. Moreover, intrusive memories in both 
studies and rumination in study I had to be indicated after a short post-film period, a 
procedure that was used before (e.g., Vanderhasselt et al., 2013) and decreases the risk of 
memory biases. Furthermore, in study III we implemented different measures of rumination to 
capture different conceptualizations (repetitive negative thinking, brooding, rumination in 
response to intrusive memories). Additionally, PTSD symptoms were not only assessed via 
questionnaires but also via structured interviews conducted by a trained clinician, therefore 
providing a more objective evaluation of symptom severity. However, future research could 
improve validity in numerous ways. First, ecological validity can be enhanced by integrating 
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA; Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008), a 
measurement tool that prompts participants via smartphone signals throughout the day to 
answer symptom-related questions. Especially in clinical samples, this approach might 
provide a more comprehensive view into patients’ daily symptom fluctuations and also offer 
information on acute stressors that might influence daily experiences. For analogue research 
using tDCS, this method might be less suitable as stimulation effects fade away after 1-2 
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hours (e.g., Nitsche et al., 2008). Thus, only after-stimulation effects could be tapped. Second, 
in-lab symptom provocation could be applied at baseline and post-/follow-up assessments. 
During symptom provocation, individuals with PTSD are presented trauma reminders such as 
photographs, sounds, or imagery and are asked to report acute distress, intrusive re-
experiencing, or regulation strategies. Importantly, when following this approach in clinical 
samples, it might be necessary to prescreen patients on their typical response to trauma 
stimuli with intense dissociation due to ethical reasons. Third, self-report measures could be 
enriched by physiological indices such as heart rate variability, blood pressure, skin 
conductance, electromyography, or salivary cortisol as well as neuroimaging of relevant brain 
regions (see Lanius, Bluhm, Lanius, & Pain, 2006, for an overview). This is especially 
interesting as an interaction of intrusive re-experiencing, cognitive control, and physiology 
has been proposed (De Putter et al., 2015; Gillie, Vasey, & Thayer, 2014). Thus, evaluating 
symptom changes, for example after a cognitive control training, using this multimodal 
approach would provide a more comprehensive picture of individuals’ reaction to trauma 
reminders and increase the potential to capture manipulation effects.  
     Another limitation is the assessment of cognitive control. We did not replicate the well-
established correlation between pre-stressor cognitive control and post-stressor intrusive 
memories (study I & II) and we did not find effects of the cognitive control manipulations on 
performance in most cognitive control tasks. In this context, low reliability of cognitive 
control measures must be discussed. Low reliability affects effect sizes and therefore 
decreases statistical power (Nicewander & Price, 1983; Vasey, Dalgleish, & Silverman, 
2003). In our studies, the modified CVLT did not seem to be sensitive enough to interference 
effects and the AX-CPT showed low reliability for error rates in AY and BX trials. However, 
all tasks applied in this thesis are considered as standard measures of cognitive control and 
were chosen to increase comparability to previous investigations. Thus, low reliability is a 
common problem in cognitive control research and should be treated more critically in the 
future. Moreover, even if tasks are reliable, they might not be valid to capture the construct of 
interest (Vasey et al., 2003). In this context, the impurity problem of cognitive control tasks 
becomes relevant. It assumes that most cognitive control tasks are not a pure measure of a 
single construct but also include other cognitive processes, with the consequence that a large 
proportion of variance in the specific task might result from variation in other requirements of 
the task and not from variation in the construct of interest (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). This 
limitation biases the interpretation of low scores on a task as well as low or absent 
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correlations with other tasks or constructs (Miyake et al., 2000). For example, the Stroop task 
and the O-span task as applied in study III are two of the most famous cognitive control 
measures within the unity/diversity framework and were identified as measures of inhibition 
(Stroop) and updating of working memory (O-span) using latent-variable analysis (Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the Stroop task has also been 
conceptualized as a measure of selective attention, processing speed, or cognitive flexibility 
(Jensen & Rohwer, 1966; Lamers, Roelfos, & Rabeling-Keus, 2010) and the O-span task has 
also been related to shifting between different task demands (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, 
it might be important to integrate a number of tasks assessing the same construct of interest 
when investigating effects of cognitive manipulations to acknowledge the multifaceted nature 
of this construct in future research. Additionally, it should be mentioned that circadian 
rhythms were found to affect performance in cognitive control tasks (Hasher, Lustig, & 
Zacks, 2007, for an overview). We tried to avoid testing participants very early in the morning 
or very late in the evening to reduce effects of fatigue but we did not assess individuals’ 
optimal testing times. This is especially important given the influence of optimal testing 
environments on the link between cognitive control and intrusive memories as mentioned 
above (Wessel et al., 2010). 
     Lastly, it must be emphasized that study III was a pilot study consisting of a small sample 
and lacking a waitlist control group. Given the challenge of recruiting PTSD patients in a 
naturalistic, outpatient setting, we were only able to compare two groups to ensure a 
reasonable number of participants in each group. A highly competitive active control 
condition was chosen. In doing so, we could examine whether potential training effects were 
indeed a result of manipulating cognitive control and not driven by placebo expectancies. 
Thus, the active control condition is a strength of study III. However, with the significant 
improvements seen in both training groups we do not know whether symptom improvement 
would have also occurred with no training at all. Hence, future studies with larger samples 
would benefit from including a waitlist control group to facilitate the interpretation of 
findings.  
Conclusion 
     To conclude, the present thesis strived for the challenging task of examining causality in 
posttraumatic stress symptoms and therefore contributed to the limited knowledge on causal 
risk factors for PTSD. In particular, this thesis focused on impaired cognitive control, thereby 
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shifting attention from investigating cross-sectional links to exploring temporal precedence 
and cognitive manipulations in the context of posttraumatic intrusive re-experiencing. This 
thesis proposed theoretical models that combined established theories on cognitive control 
and PTSD for illustrating the possible pathways by which this risk factor might operate. In 
addition, this thesis also focused on the link between impaired cognitive control and 
rumination, an important maintaining factor of PTSD. In three empirical studies with 
analogue as well as clinical samples, novel methodological approaches to experimentally 
manipulate cognitive control were tested. In summary, the absent effects of tDCS over a brain 
region associated with cognitive control on post-stressor intrusive memories and rumination; 
the absent correlations between pre-stressor cognitive control and post-stressor intrusive 
memories and rumination; the absent differential symptom improvements in PTSD patients 
completing a cognitive control or a placebo training; all of these results speak against causal 
associations between impaired cognitive control and posttraumatic stress symptoms or 
processing styles. Nevertheless, final conclusions cannot be drawn since the body of research 
on causality is clearly too small and methodological shortcomings of the presented studies 
must be taken into account. A number of model modifications and methodological changes 
have been proposed. Future investigations are needed that build on the theoretical and 
methodological suggestions of this thesis and that unravel the complex brain-cognition-
emotion interactions in PTSD. This is of particular importance to further understand and to 
finally prevent the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive disturbances some individuals have to 
suffer from after experiencing a life-threatening event ever since the beginning of mankind. 
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     Verkehrsunfälle, gewalttätige Übergriffe oder der plötzliche Tod einer nahestehenden 
Person – in Deutschland wird ein Viertel aller Menschen mindestens einmal im Leben mit 
einem traumatischen Ereignis konfrontiert (Mearcker et al., 2008). Obwohl solch ein Ereignis 
meist mit einschneidenden Veränderungen einhergeht, erholt sich der Großteil der betroffenen 
Personen im Laufe der Zeit von der akuten Belastung und findet ins Leben zurück. Manche 
Personen leiden jedoch auch noch Monate oder Jahre nach dem Ereignis unter akuten, 
belastenden Symptomen, die die Lebensqualität erheblich einschränken: Alpträume, 
aufdrängende Erinnerungen, das Gefühl, wieder in die traumatische Situation zurückversetzt 
zu sein, hohe Anspannung und Wachsamkeit oder das Vermeiden von Situationen oder Orten, 
die mit dem Trauma in Verbindung stehen. All diese Symptome können Ausdruck einer 
Posttraumatischen Belastungsstörung (PTBS) sein (APA, 2013). Trotz der hohen Prävalenz 
traumatischer Ereignisse ist die Lebenszeitprävalenz einer PTBS mit 2 % in Deutschland 
vergleichsweise gering (Mearcker et al., 2008). Aus diesem Grund muss es bestimmte 
Faktoren geben, die das Risiko beeinflussen, eine PTBS zu entwickeln. Die Identifikation 
dieser Faktoren ist nicht nur entscheidend für die Entwicklung ätiologischer Modelle, sondern 
auch für die Konzipierung individueller Präventionsmaßnahmen sowie effektiver 
Therapiemethoden. Ein möglicher prä-traumatischer Risikofaktor, der in den vergangenen 
Jahren immer mehr Aufmerksamkeit erhalten hat, ist reduzierte kognitive Kontrolle.  
      Kognitive Kontrolle bezeichnet die Fähigkeit, zielgerichtetes Verhalten zu initiieren, 
aufrechtzuerhalten und zu regulieren, vor allem im Angesicht sich stetig verändernder 
Anforderungen durch die Umwelt (Cohen, 2017, für einen Überblick). Auf neuronaler Ebene 
wird kognitive Kontrolle mit Strukturen des Frontalhirns, insbesondere mit Aktivität im 
anterioren cingulären Cortex und im dorsolateralen präfrontalen Cortex (dlPFC), assoziiert 
(z.B. Mansouri et al., 2009; Niendam et al., 2012). Auf konzeptueller Ebene besteht jedoch 
Uneinigkeit darüber, wie sich kognitive Kontrolle am besten operationalisieren lässt. Zwei der 
populärsten Modelle sind dabei der Unity/Diversity Ansatz nach Miyake und Kolleg*innen 
(2000) und der Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) Ansatz nach Braver (2012). Gemäß dem 
Unity/Diversity Ansatz (Miyake et al., 2000) besteht kognitive Kontrolle aus drei getrennten 
Funktionen, die hoch miteinander korrelieren: Aktualisierung und Überwachung von Inhalten 
des Arbeitsgedächtnisses, Inhibition von automatischen Reaktionstendenzen und Wechsel 
zwischen verschiedenen Zielen, Aufgaben oder Handlungen. Friedman und Miyake (2004) 
ergänzten das Modell zudem um die Inhibition von zielirrelevanten, ablenkenden 
Informationen sowie die Inhibition von Informationen, die nicht länger relevant sind, auch 
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bekannt als proaktive Interferenzkontrolle. Demgegenüber besteht kognitive Kontrolle gemäß 
dem DMC Ansatz (Braver, 2012) aus zwei qualitativ unterschiedlichen Kontrollmodi, die 
flexibel angewandt werden: Proaktive Kontrolle stellt einen frühen Selektionsprozess dar, bei 
dem zielrelevante Informationen aktiv im Arbeitsgedächtnis aufrechterhalten werden, um das 
Verhalten darauf auszurichten und Interferenzen früh zu inhibieren. Reaktive Kontrolle stellt 
einen späten Korrekturprozess für Zielkonflikte dar. Zielrelevante Informationen werden erst 
aktiviert, wenn Interferenzen von zielirrelevanten Informationen bereits aufgetreten sind und 
diese unterdrückt werden müssen. 
     In Hinblick auf PTBS gehen verschiedene Modelle davon aus, dass eine reduzierte 
kognitive Kontrolle vor allem mit intrusivem Wiedererleben, einem Kernsymptom der PTBS, 
zusammenhängen könnte. Intrusives Wiedererleben äußert sich insbesondere in intrusiven 
Erinnerungen, d.h. kurzes, unkontrollierbar wiederkehrendes Wiedererinnern des 
traumatischen Ereignisses in Form von lebhaften Sinneseindrücken (Marks et al., 2018). 
Beispielsweise postulieren Aupperle und Kolleg*innen (2012), dass fast alle Menschen direkt 
nach einem Trauma besonders aufmerksam für traumabezogene Reize seien, aber nur 
Personen mit verminderter kognitiver Kontrolle Schwierigkeiten darin hätten, Reaktionen auf 
diese Reize zu regulieren. Dies könne intrusives Wiedererleben begünstigen. In der 
Dissertation wurden diese Prozesse noch detaillierter am Beispiel zweier bekannter Modelle 
für PTBS, dem Kognitiven Modell nach Ehlers und Clark (2000) und der Dual 
Representation Theory nach Brewin (2008) dargestellt. Dabei wurde vor allem davon 
ausgegangen, dass reduzierte Inhibition und reduzierte Aktualisierung von 
Arbeitsgedächtnisinhalten gemäß dem Unity/Diversity Ansatz und reduzierte proaktive 
Kontrolle gemäß dem DMC Ansatz die zentralen kognitiven Kontrollfunktionen sind, die 
intrusives Wiedererleben beeinflussen.  
     Wenn eine reduzierte kognitive Kontrolle tatsächlich einen kausalen Risikofaktor für 
Symptome der PTBS, insbesondere für intrusives Wiedererleben, darstellen soll, müssen 
gemäß Vogt und Kolleg*innen (2014) die folgenden Voraussetzungen erfüllt sein: Defizite in 
der kognitiven Kontrolle müssen (a) mit PTBS-Symptomen assoziiert sein, (b) PTBS-
Symptomen zeitlich vorausgehen und (c) manipulierbar sein und diese Manipulation muss zu 
Veränderungen in der PTBS-Symptomatik führen. In der Tat liefern zahlreiche 
querschnittliche Studien mit klinischen Stichproben Hinweise darauf, dass eine niedrige 
kognitive Kontrolle mit PTBS-Symptomatik, insbesondere intrusivem Wiedererleben, 
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zusammenhängt (u.a. Aupperle et al., 2012; Polak et al., 2012). Hier ist jedoch unklar, ob 
Unterschiede in der kognitiven Kontrolle bereits vor dem Trauma vorhanden waren oder 
durch die PTBS-Symptomatik selbst bedingt sind. Bei der Untersuchung von zeitlichen 
Zusammenhängen steht die Traumaforschung vor erheblichen ethischen und methodischen 
Herausforderungen. Aus diesem Grund haben sich in den vergangenen Jahren insbesondere 
Analogstudien etabliert, die gesunde Personen mit Hilfe des Traumafilm-Paradigmas 
untersuchen (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Dabei wird den Versuchsteilnehmer*innen ein 
Filmausschnitt gezeigt, der sehr belastende oder traumatische Inhalte darstellt, und 
anschließend werden filmbezogene, intrusive Erinnerungen gemessen. In Bezug auf kognitive 
Kontrolle haben verschiedene Studien beschrieben, dass insbesondere Defizite in proaktiver 
Interferenzkontrolle im Sinne des Unity/Diversity Ansatzes eine erhöhte Anzahl intrusiver 
Erinnerungen vorhersagen (u.a. Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2008). Die Studienlage 
ist jedoch insgesamt eingeschränkt und Befunde zum DMC Ansatz fehlen ganz. Zudem 
mangelt es erheblich an Studien, die untersuchen, inwiefern eine Manipulation von kognitiver 
Kontrolle intrusives Wiedererleben beeinflussen kann. Erste vielversprechende Hinweise 
liefern diesbezüglich Ansätze, bei denen kognitive Kontrolle mit Hilfe kognitiver Trainings 
gezielt verändert und dadurch intrusives Wiedererleben verringert wurde (z.B. Bomyea & 
Amir, 2011; Bomyea et al., 2015).  
     Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es, einen Beitrag zur Aufklärung kausaler 
Zusammenhänge zu leisten und aufbauend auf den bisherigen Ergebnissen zu untersuchen, 
inwiefern eine reduzierte kognitive Kontrolle der Entwicklung intrusivem Wiedererlebens 
vorausgeht und inwiefern eine gezielte Manipulation kognitiver Kontrolle die Symptome 
beeinflussen kann. Neben kausalen Zusammenhängen zwischen kognitiver Kontrolle und 
intrusivem Wiedererleben sollte in dieser Arbeit zudem die kausale Beziehung zwischen 
reduzierter kognitiver Kontrolle und Rumination im Fokus stehen. Rumination ist definiert als 
repetitives, unkontrollierbares, verbales Denken bzw. Grübeln über die Ursachen und 
Konsequenzen der traumatischen Erfahrung (Michael et al., 2007). Zahlreiche quer- und 
längsschnittliche Untersuchungen ergaben, dass Rumination mit PTBS Symptomen assoziiert 
ist und diese aufrechterhalten kann (u.a. Ehring & Ehlers, 2014; Michael et al., 2007; Murray 
et al., 2002; Szabo et al., 2017; Wild et al., 2016). Besonders Studien mit gesunden und 
depressiven Proband*innen haben zudem gezeigt, dass Rumination ebenfalls mit reduzierter 
kognitiver Kontrolle zusammenhängt (u.a. Vălenaş & Szentágotai-Tătar, 2017; Yang et al., 
2016) und durch kognitive Trainings gezielt beeinflusst werden kann (u.a. Koster et al., 
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2017). Im Kontext von PTBS wurde dies bislang jedoch nicht untersucht. Insofern war ein 
zweites Ziel dieser Arbeit, kausale Zusammenhänge zwischen defizitärer kognitiver Kontrolle 
und posttraumatischer Rumination zu erforschen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, wurden drei 
empirische Studien durchgeführt, die sich unterschiedlicher Ansätze bedienten, um kognitive 
Kontrolle zu modulieren und Zusammenhänge mit intrusivem Wiedererleben sowie 
Rumination zu erfassen: Zwei Analogstudien mit gesunden Stichproben, die die Effekte von 
transkranieller Gleichstromstimulation (tDCS) untersuchten und eine Pilotstudie mit einer 
PTBS Stichprobe, die die Effekte eines kognitiven Kontrolltrainings erforschte. 
    Studie I und Studie II kombinierten das Traumafilm-Paradigma mit tDCS, einem gut 
etablierten, verträglichen Verfahren zur Manipulation kortikaler Aktivität und damit 
verbundenen kognitiven Kontrollfunktionen. Bei tDCS wird für einen kurzen, begrenzten 
Zeitraum Gleichstrom mittels Schwammelektroden über einer zuvor definierten Hirnregion 
appliziert. Als grundlegender Wirkmechanismus wird dabei eine durch den Gleichstrom 
bedingte Verschiebung des neuronalen Ruhemembranpotentials angenommen. Dadurch 
kommt es zu einer kortikalen Erregbarkeitssteigerung bei anodaler und zu einer 
Erregbarkeitsverminderung bei kathodaler Stimulation, die bis zu eine Stunde anhalten kann 
(Nitsche et al., 2008). Da der linke dlPFC ein wesentlicher Bestandteil des der kognitiven 
Kontrolle zugrunde liegenden Netzwerkes ist (u.a. Fassbender et al., 2004) und in bisherigen 
Studien bereits gezeigt wurde, dass eine anodale tDCS des dlPFC kognitive Kontrollprozesse 
erhöhen und eine kathodale tDCS des dlPFC kognitive Kontrollprozesse reduzieren kann 
(Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013; Wolkenstein et al., 2014), wurde der linke dlPFC in beiden 
Studien als Zielstruktur gewählt. Beide Studien zielten darauf ab, kognitive Kontrolle mittels 
tDCS über dem linken dlPFC zu manipulieren und Effekte dieser Manipulation auf intrusive 
Erinnerungen (Studie I & II) sowie Rumination (Studie I) in Reaktion auf einen Traumafilm 
zu erforschen. Zudem untersuchten beide Studien, ob eine gering ausgeprägte kognitive 
Kontrolle vor dem Traumafilm spätere filmbezogene intrusive Erinnerungen oder Rumination 
vorhersagt. Konzeptuell orientierte sich Studie I am Unity/Diversity Ansatz und fokussierte 
auf proaktive Interferenzkontrolle als relevanten kognitiven Kontrollprozess. N = 118 gesunde 
Frauen absolvierten den modifizierten California Verbal Learning Test zur Erfassung von 
proaktiver Interferenzkontrolle zweimal – einmal vor und einmal während 20-minütiger 
Stimulation des linken dlPFC. Dabei wurden sie randomisiert einer von drei 
Stimulationsgruppen zugeordnet: anodaler, kathodaler oder Scheinstimulation. Anschließend 
wurde den Teilnehmerinnen eine traumatische Filmszene gezeigt und nach einer 
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zehnminütigen Ruhephase intrusive Erinnerungen und Rumination erfasst. In dieser Studie 
zeigten sich weder Effekte von tDCS über dem linken dlPFC auf proaktive 
Interferenzkontrolle und filmbezogene intrusive Erinnerungen oder Rumination noch 
signifikante Zusammenhänge zwischen diesen Maßen. Studie II folgte einem ähnlichen 
Design wie Studie I, definierte kognitive Kontrolle aber im Rahmen des DMC Ansatzes und 
richtete den Fokus auf reduzierte proaktive Kontrolle. N = 121 gesunde Männer und Frauen 
absolvierten die AX-Continuous Performance Task – ein etabliertes Maß für proaktive 
Kontrolle – während 20-minütiger Stimulation. Anschließend sahen sie eine traumatische 
Filmszene, lasen für zehn Minuten einen neutralen Text und gaben im Anschluss intrusive 
Erinnerungen während des Textlesens an. Auch in dieser Studie gab es weder einen tDCS 
Effekt auf das Maß für kognitive Kontrolle noch auf filmbezogene intrusive Erinnerungen. 
Zudem zeigte sich kein signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen proaktiver Kontrolle vor dem 
Film und filmbezogenen intrusiven Erinnerungen. Insgesamt sprechen die Ergebnisse der 
beiden Studien also gegen kausale Zusammenhänge zwischen reduzierter kognitiver 
Kontrolle und intrusiven Erinnerungen oder Rumination, zumindest wenn kognitive Kontrolle 
als proaktive Interferenzkontrolle im Rahmen des Unity/Diversity Ansatzes oder als 
proaktiver Kontrollmodus im Rahmen des DMC Ansatzes erfasst wird. 
     Im Gegensatz zu den Analogdesigns der ersten beiden Studien fokussierte Studie III auf 
eine klinische Stichprobe von N = 33 PTBS Patient*innen sowie auf die Effekte eines 
kognitiven Kontrolltrainings. Im Speziellen untersuchte diese doppelblinde, randomisierte, 
kontrollierte Pilotstudie, ob sechs Sitzungen eines kognitiven Kontrolltrainings intrusives 
Wiedererleben, Rumination sowie komorbide depressive Symptome signifikant positiv 
beeinflussen können. Die Teilnehmer*innen wurden randomisiert entweder dem kognitiven 
Kontrolltraining oder einem Placebotraining zugeordnet und an drei Messzeitpunkten (prä 
Training, post Training, 1 Monat Follow-up) untersucht. Das kognitive Kontrolltraining 
orientierte sich an Siegle und Kolleg*innen (2007) und bestand aus der adaptiven Paced 
Auditory Serial Addition Task sowie aus Wells’s Attention Training. Obwohl sich die 
Proband*innen deskriptiv in den Aufgaben des kognitiven Kontrolltrainings verbesserten, 
zeigten sich keine Transfereffekte auf kognitive Kontrollaufgaben die Arbeitsgedächtnis oder 
Inhibition erfasst haben. Entgegen der Erwartungen gab es in dieser Studie außerdem eine 
signifikante Abnahme in intrusivem Wiedererleben, Rumination (operationalisiert als 
repetitives negatives Denken) und Depression bei allen Versuchspersonen nach dem Training, 
unabhängig von der Trainingsgruppe. Zudem fand sich in der Placebogruppe, aber nicht der 
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kognitiven Kontrollgruppe, eine signifikante Reduktion in Rumination, wenn diese als 
Grübeln in Reaktion auf negative Emotionen operationalisiert wurde. Insofern stellen die 
Ergebnisse die Relevanz kognitiver Kontrollprozesse infrage. 
     Zusammenfassend war es das Ziel dieser Dissertation, kausale Zusammenhänge zwischen 
verringerter kognitiver Kontrolle und Symptomen der PTBS, wie intrusives Wiedererleben, 
sowie aufrechterhaltenden Faktoren, wie Rumination, näher zu beleuchten. Damit sollte das 
Wissen über Risikofaktoren für die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung der PTBS erweitert 
und somit aktuelle ätiologische Modelle sowie Präventions- und Interventionsansätze ergänzt 
werden. Im Allgemeinen unterstützen die Ergebnisse der dargestellten Studien nicht die 
Annahme, dass reduzierte kognitive Kontrolle einen kausalen Risikofaktor für intrusives 
Wiedererleben oder Rumination darstellt. Vielmehr warfen sie die Frage auf, ob 
Einschränkungen der kognitiven Kontrolle in PTBS Patient*innen, welche bisher in 
zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen berichtet wurden (u.a., Aupperle et al., 2012, für eine 
Übersicht), eher eine Folge der Traumatisierung oder der posttraumatischen Symptomatik 
darstellen könnten. Bevor jedoch endgültige Schlüsse gezogen werden, müssen Limitationen 
der durchgeführten Studien, insbesondere in Hinblick auf die Manipulation von kognitiver 
Kontrolle, in Betracht gezogen werden. Aus diesem Grund wurde in der Arbeit die 
methodische Herangehensweise der Studien kritisch hinterfragt und es wurden mögliche 
Einschränkungen bei der Interpretation der Ergebnisse diskutiert. Dabei wurde vor allem auf 
das Potenzial aber auch die Herausforderungen von Analogdesigns mit 
Gleichstromstimulation eingegangen. Außerdem wurden Implikationen für theoretische 
Modelle sowie zukünftige analoge und klinische Forschung abgeleitet. Insgesamt ist die 
vorliegende Dissertation eine der wenigen Arbeiten, die sich mit kausalen Zusammenhängen 
im Kontext posttraumatischer Symptomatik beschäftigt hat und bereichert damit den aktuellen 
Forschungsstand zu Risikofaktoren für die Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung. 
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Table A.1 
Split-half reliability (Spearman-Brown coefficients) of the AX-CPT trials 
Notes. RTs = Reaction times in ms based on trials with correct responses. 
  
 
 
 
 Trial type 
 Sham 
 (n = 41) 
 
r 
 Anodal 
 (n = 38) 
 
 r 
 Cathodal 
 (n = 42) 
 
 r 
Overall 
(n = 121) 
 
r 
      
Error rates  AX .902 .720 .796 .826 
  AY .386 .639 .608 .543 
  BX .711 .568 .529 .633 
  BY .947 .886 .898 .918 
RTs  AX .990 .982 .946 .979 
  AY .952 .874 .899 .912 
  BX .942 .909 .942 .925 
  BY .988 .976 .980 .982 
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